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The danger in supplanting the real measure of safety (i.e., crash frequency and severity) 
by surrogates arises when the link between the two is conjectural, when the link remains 
unproven for long, and when the use of unproven surrogates becomes so habitual that the 
need to eventually speak in terms of crashes is forgotten. 
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 Transportation safety is a highly contentious issue in the design of cities and 
communities. While urban designers, architects and planners often encourage the use of 
aesthetic streetscape treatments to enhance the livability of urban streets, conventional 
transportation safety practice regards features such as street trees as fixed-object hazards, 
and strongly discourages their use. This dissertation examines the subject of urban 
roadside safety to better understand the safety impacts of livable streetscape treatments. It 
finds that there is little empirical evidence to support the assertion that livable streetscape 
treatments have a negative impact on a roadway’s safety performance, and substantial 
evidence indicating that they will actually enhance safety. Instead, the more substantive 
barrier to their use is a design philosophy that discounts the important relationship 
between driver behavior and safety performance. This dissertation traces the origin and 
evolution of this philosophy, and proposes an alternative approach, termed “positive 
design,” that better accounts for the existing empirical evidence on urban road safety, as 
well the dynamic relationships between road design, driver behavior and crash 









Streets and their sidewalks, the main public places of a city, are its most vital organs. 
Think of a city and what comes to mind? Its streets. If a city’s streets look interesting, the 
city looks interesting; if they look dull, the city looks dull. 
- J. Jacobs, 1962, p. 37 
 
Urban areas present unique challenges to the roadway designer. Urban and 
regional stakeholders demand a transportation network that allows them to accomplish 
their travel objectives with a minimum amount of travel delay, and to have these travel 
demands met in a safe and reliable way. Correspondingly, the design and implementation 
of “safe and efficient” roadways has become a central organizing concept for many 
transportation agencies. 
While safety and efficiency are important to the successful performance of urban 
roadways, many transportation professionals and urban stakeholders have become 
increasingly aware that the economic and developmental vitality of urban areas requires 
that transportation networks do more than just expedite traffic. Beyond simply acting as 
thoroughfares for motorists, urban streets often double as public recreational spaces for 




socialize, and generally engage in the diverse array of social and recreational activities 
that, for many, are what makes urban living enjoyable (see Figure 1-1). In short: 
“streets are what constitute the outside for many urbanites; places to be when they are not 
indoors… Sociability is a large part of why cities exist and streets are a major if not the 
only public place for that sociability to develop.” (A. Jacobs, 1993, p. 4) 
 
 
Figure 1-1: The Social and Recreational Character of Urban Streets 
 
In urban areas, streets comprise between 25% and 35% of all developed land, 
making public rights-of-way the largest single land use (A. Jacobs, 1993). As such, 
streets play an important, if not the primary, role in shaping the quality and character of 
urban living. While much of contemporary planning and engineering practice is oriented 




recreational amenity should not be discounted. As William Whyte discovered as part of 
his Street Life Project:  
It is often assumed that children play in the street because they lack playground 
space. But many children play in the streets because they like to. One of the best 
play areas we came across was a block on 101st street in East Harlem… The street 
itself was the play area. Adjoining stoops and fire escapes provided prime 
viewing across the street and were highly functional for mothers and older people. 
There were other factors too, and had we been more prescient, we could have 
saved ourselves a lot of time spent later looking at plazas (1980, p. 248).   
 
Beyond these quality-of-life benefits, streets that are designed to support and 
sustain pedestrian activity have been increasingly linked to a host of highly-desirable 
social outcomes, including economic growth (Florida, 2002), improvements in air quality 
(Frank, Stone and Bachman, 2000) and increased physical fitness and health (Frank, 
Engelke and Schmid, 2003), to name only a few. For these reasons, as well as a host of 
others, many groups and individuals encourage the design of “livable” streets, or streets 
that seek to better integrate the broader needs of pedestrians and urban residents into a 
roadway’s design. 
There has been a great deal of work describing the characteristics of livable 
streets (see esp. Duany, Plater-Zyberk and Speck, 2000; Ewing, 1996; J. Jacobs, 1961; 




minimum, seek to enhance the pedestrian character of the street by both increasing its 
aesthetic appeal, as well as minimizing the negative impacts of automobile use on 
pedestrians. Of particular importance is the design of the roadside, which is the area 
between the vehicle travelway and edge of the right-of-way. In urban areas, the roadside 
is the location for most of the activities that characterize urban living, and often include 
sidewalks, benches, street cafes and indeed, most non-motorized activity. 
Correspondingly, livability advocates encourage the placement of street trees, 
landscaping, aesthetic street lights and other roadside features along the edge of the 
vehicle travelway to both increase a street’s aesthetic appeal, as well as to physically 
buffer pedestrians from potentially hazardous oncoming traffic (see Figure 1-2).  
 
 





Considering Traffic Safety 
While most would agree that the inclusion of trees and other streetscape features 
enhances the aesthetic quality of a roadway, there is substantive disagreement about their 
safety effects. From the perspective of traffic safety, the trees, bollards, street lights and 
other roadside features depicted in the figure above are fixed-object hazards that can 
transform a minor navigational error on the part of a driver into a hazardous, and 
potentially fatal, fixed-object crash. When one considers the aggregate statistics on run-
off-roadway crashes, there is indeed cause for concern. In 2002 alone, there were over 
12,000 fatal crashes involving fixed objects, accounting for more than 30% of the total 
fatal crashes for that year (Data Source: Fatal Analysis Reporting System [FARS]).   
Because of concerns about the potential hazard of a run-off-roadway event, 
conventional transportation design practice encourages the design of “forgiving” 
roadsides, or roadsides that will allow a vehicle to leave the travelway without 
encountering a fixed object. Typically, this is achieved by providing a “clear runout 
zone” adjacent to the travelway that is free of roadside objects, with a preferred width of 
30 feet. In terms of how to best accomplish this goal, AASHTO’s Roadside Design 
Guide, the central authority on the design of safe roadsides, states that: 
Through decades of experience and research, the application of the forgiving 
roadside concept has been refined to the point where roadside design is an integral 
part of transportation design criteria. Design options for reducing roadside 
obstacles, in order of preference, are as follows: 




2. Redesign the obstacle so it can be safely traversed. 
3. Relocate the obstacle to a point where it is less likely to be struck. 
4. Reduce impact severity by using an appropriate breakaway device. 
5. Shield the obstacle with a longitudinal traffic barrier design for redirection 
or use a crash cushion. 
6. Delineate the obstacle if the above alternatives are not appropriate (2002a, 
p. 1-2). 
 
 Thus, while livability advocates encourage the use of “Trees. Big trees” (Whyte, 
1980, p. 308) along the edge of the travelway, conventional design practice strongly 
discourages such roadside treatments, preferring instead to set roadside objects back as 
far as possible from the edge of the travelway, or, at a minimum, ensuring that objects 
located in the clear zone can be easily traversed by an errant vehicle. Figure 1-3, below 
shows illustrative examples of how conventional urban arterial engineering addresses the 
design of urban roadsides. These roadways use the minimum sidewalk specifications (4 
ft) listed in the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials’ 
(AASHTO) A Policy on the Geometric Design of Highways and Streets (the “Green 
Book”), with landscaping, lighting and other roadside elements placed behind the edge of 
the right-of-way. This design economically uses the sidewalk as part of the roadway’s 
clear recovery zone, but at the expense of the comfort and livability of the street as a 




Figure 1-3: Roadside Design Practice and the Design of Pedestrian Facilities 
 
The widespread adoption of such design practices have led livable street 
advocates to assert that  “the real problem in the United States is lack of willingness to do 
anything that infringes on the prerogatives of motor vehicle users” (Pucher and Dijkstra, 
2000, p. 15), and that “because pedestrian-friendly streets are not specified in the 
manuals, they are simply not possible, despite all evidence encouraging their use” 
(Duany, Plater-Zyberk & Speck, 2000, p. 70). In short, there is an inherent tension 
between the roadside design applications sought by livable streets advocates, and those 
promoted by conventional roadside design practice and guidance.  
 
Context-Sensitive Solutions, Livable Streets, and Traffic Safety 
Despite the criticisms of livable streets advocates, many within the transportation 
design profession have increasingly recognized the need to better integrate the design 
 
Conventional Pedestrian 




concerns of urban stakeholders into design practice. Context-sensitive solutions have 
emerged as an attempt to better incorporate the needs and concerns of project 
stakeholders into specific design solutions (FHWA, 1997; TRB, 2002). While this 
approach is commendable for its attempt to broaden the types of issues considered in the 
design process, context-sensitive solutions cannot address the fundamental safety issues 
surrounding the design of livable streets. Context-sensitive solutions “refer to an 
approach or process as much as… an outcome” (Transportation Research Board [TRB], 
2002, p. 4).  The problem that emerges is that the determination of whether a particular 
design solution is appropriately safe is ultimately a matter of professional engineering 
judgment, not a product of public involvement activities. Indeed, “one of the strongest, if 
unwritten, rules of scientific life is the prohibition of appeals to… the populace at large in 
matters scientific” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 168). Thus, despite the best intent of designers, 
context-sensitive solutions cannot resolve the impasse between urban advocates and 
design engineers regarding the placement of streetscape features adjacent to the 
travelway.   
But what is the nature of this impasse? Is it not possible to design streets to 
enhance community livability while maintaining a substantive concern for the safety of 
motorists? Are there perhaps opportunities for doing so that have been overlooked? 
Given the increased emphasis placed on the design of roadsides to enhance community 
livability, as well as the need to more clearly understand the safety effects of urban 
roadside design applications more broadly, this dissertation examines the subject of 





 Because of the potential breadth of this research effort, it is important to begin by 
delineating what this study focuses on, and what it does not. Specifically, this study 
focuses on the design of roadsides, which is the area between the outside travel lane and 
the edge of the right-of-way.  While this study will consider other related geometric 
elements that have an effect on roadside safety and livability, such as lane and median 
widths, this study is not principally oriented towards the design of those elements.  
Second, this study is specifically interested in the design of roadsides in urban 
areas. A focus on urban areas necessitates a clear definition of what an “urban area” is. 
While such a definition would seem obvious on its surface, the professionally-adopted 
definition of an urban environment is vague. At present, the current definition of an urban 
area is established in the U.S. Code (Section 101, Title 23), which states: 
The term urban area means an urbanized area or, in the case of an urbanized area 
encompassing more than one State, that part of the urbanized area in each such 
State, or an urban place as designated by the Bureau of the Census having a 
population of five thousand or more and not within any urbanized area, within 
boundaries to be fixed by responsible State and local officials in cooperation with 
each other, subject to approval by the Secretary. Such boundaries shall, as a 






This definition is inclusive of a wide range of physical environments, and includes design 
conditions that range from central business districts to the suburban hinterland (see 
Figure 1-4). Because the definition of “urban” as used in the literature on roadside design 
refers to this broad range of environments, the term “urban” in this research is likewise 
used inclusively unless otherwise noted.  
 
 
Figure 1-4: Three Minor Arterials in “Urban” Areas 
 
Next, this dissertation focuses specifically on those roadways where urban 
stakeholders often express the greatest concerns about livability issues – typically those 
roadways classified as minor arterials, collectors and local roadways. While highways, 
freeways and other high-speed, limited access roadways may have important effects in 
the overall livability of an urban area, these roads are typically reserved for high-speed 





Finally, it is important to define concisely what is meant by safety. For this study, 
the term “safety” refers specifically to crashes and their corresponding injuries and 
fatalities. Defining safety in terms of crashes, injuries and fatalities provides a 
straightforward metric1 by which to measure and evaluate a roadway’s safety 
performance. This study treats safety as a measurable design outcome, not a latent 
characteristic of a roadway. Thus, the relative level of safety for a roadway is determined 
not by whether it incorporates specific design treatments presumed to enhance safety, but 
instead on measurements of crashes, injuries and fatalities.  
Research Approach and Data Sources 
 This research uses a variety of data sources to understand and analyze roadside 
safety. First, the literature and guidance on the subject of roadside design is a key data 
source. An early review of this literature revealed that there was a need to review it 
critically. The literature on which contemporary roadside design guidance and practice is 
based has focused largely on rural environments; there have been surprisingly few studies 
of roadside safety in urban environments. Further, much of the literature that has 
examined the subject of urban roadside safety does not support the design practices 
recommended in guidance documents such as the Roadside Design Guide.  Thus, this 
literature is reviewed for not only what its authors have formally recommended, but also 
for the accuracy, validity, and generalizability of their conclusions.  
                                                 
1 An important issue is whether crashes are measured in absolute numbers – i.e., crash totals – or else in 
rates, which are the numbers of crashes and injuries per vehicle mile traveled. This issue will be discussed 




  Given the limited and contradictory empirical evidence on the safety 
performance of conventional roadside design practices in urban environments, it was 
important to re-examine the historical foundations of these practices to better understand 
the theoretical assumptions on safety that led to their widespread adoption. This approach 
is useful both for clarifying possible misconceptions regarding what is meant by a “safe” 
roadside, as well as for defining the theoretical assumptions that guide current practice in 
terms that can be empirically tested and validated.  
 Several data sources were used in the course of this research. First, Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System [FARS] and General Estimates System [GES] data were 
analyzed to understand the general characteristics of fixed-object crashes. Nevertheless, 
one of the major shortcomings of FARS and GES data is that they do not allow these 
crashes to be readily geo-located, thus preventing researchers from analyzing the specific 
characteristics of sites where crashes occurred. To overcome the limitations of FARS and 
GES data, crash data supplied by the Florida Department of Transportation for District 5 
were also analyzed. Unlike FARS and GES data, these data provided information on the 
exact location of specific crash events, thereby permitting detailed site investigations. 
Using these data in conjunction with intensive site investigations and field analyses 
allowed this study to further examine the environmental factors that may influence a 
roadway’s safety performance across an urbanized metropolitan area, making this the 





 This dissertation is comprised of three major sections. The first section (Chapters 
1-3) introduces the topic of roadside safety in urban environments. This introductory 
chapter has briefly discussed the central issues surrounding the design of livable 
roadsides in urban environments. Chapter 2 examines FARS and GES data to describe 
the characteristics of roadside crashes in urban environments, followed by a detailed 
discussion of conventional roadside safety practice in Chapter 3. 
 The second section (Chapters 4-6) examines the theory and empirical evidence 
that drives roadside safety practice, paying particular attention to whether the existing 
empirical evidence supports the design practices recommended in current design 
guidance. Chapter 4 details existing empirical research on the subject of roadside safety, 
as well as its historical and theoretical underpinnings. After detailing the theoretical 
propositions that direct contemporary urban roadside design practice, Chapter 5 subjects 
them to a suite of empirical tests aimed at understanding their applicability to urban 
environments. Finally, Chapter 6 then seeks to move beyond hypothetical “best 
practices” to better understand the specific nature of roadside crashes in urban 
environments. 
 The third and final section of this research (Chapters 7-8) seeks to better develop 
practice of urban roadside design based on the empirical findings presented in Chapters 5 
and 6. Chapter 7 outlines a new approach to addressing safety that better accounts for 




driver psychology and behavior. Chapter 8 concludes this study by providing a summary 
of the overall research effort and future research directions.
 15 
CHAPTER 2 
ROADSIDE SAFETY IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 This chapter uses 2002 Fatality Analysis Reporting System [FARS] and General 
Estimates System [GES] data to provide an aggregate portrait of the current state of 
roadside safety. After discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the use of these 
data sources, it proceeds to describe the current state of roadside safety, both at an 
aggregate level, as well as for urban areas specifically.  
 
About the Data – Sources and Limitations 
The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s [NHTSA] Fatal 
Analysis Reporting System [FARS] provides a 100% count of fatal crashes that occurred 
on US roadways, and is thus the most reliable source of national data on transportation-
related crashes. Unfortunately, FARS data do not provide information on non-fatal 
crashes. Because information on injurious and property-damage only [PDO] crashes is 
essential for understanding a roadway’s safety performance, this research also uses 
General Estimates System [GES] data to supplement the information provided in FARS.  
The General Estimates System is an NHTSA-produced product that uses a sample 




crashes at the national level.2 While samples are useful for deriving an understanding of a 
broader population that cannot be surveyed in its entirety, an issue that emerges in the use 
of samples is whether or not they accurately reflect the actual characteristics of the 
sampled population. To evaluate the reliability of GES data, I compared GES estimates 
of fatalities in 2002 with the actual number of fatalities recorded in FARS. The difference 
was substantial. While FARS reports 38,500 fatal crashes in 2002, GES estimates report 
only about 26,000. The reason for this difference is unknown. Despite the possible 
inaccuracy of GES data, it is currently the only national source of data for injury and 
PDO crashes, and is consequently analyzed in this chapter. Nevertheless, readers are 
cautioned that results derived from GES data may under-report the actual numbers of 
injurious and PDO crashes.  
A second shortcoming of these two data sources is that their categories do not 
always overlap on variables of interest. While FARS data uses the urban and rural 
designations employed in conventional traffic engineering practice, GES data categorizes 
environments based on their population size, which may obscure the results. Thus, while 
urban areas in FARS are census-designated places with a population of 5,000 or more, 
urban areas in GES data are areas with a population of 25,000 or more. As a result, there 
is no information on injurious and PDO crashes in areas for areas with populations 
between 5,000 and 25,000.  
                                                 
2 The 2002 GES data used here were obtained by collecting police reports for 410 police jurisdictions in 60 
locations through the United States. These data are then weighted to derive national estimates of fatal, 




A third issue that prevents idealized comparisons is that GES data, unlike FARS 
data, does not provide information on a roadway’s functional classification. Thus, while 
this study is specifically interested in roadways classified as minor arterials, collectors 
and local roads, such information is not available for non-fatal crashes. GES data only 
indicates whether or not a roadway is on the National Highway System, rather than 
providing a means for distinguishing freeway-type roadways from other roadway classes. 
Thus, all analysis of the safety performance of lower-speed roadways is limited to fatal 
crashes exclusively.  
A fourth and somewhat less important issue is that specific field definitions do not 
always align between the data sources. For example, while utility and light poles are 
treated as independent fixed-object categories in FARS, they are categorized with sign 
posts in GES. To address categorical inconsistencies between the data sources, variable 
categories have been aggregated together to allow fatal (FARS), injurious and PDO 
crashes (GES) to be consistently analyzed.  
Further, it must be acknowledged that all of this data is derived from police 
accident reports, and observations are necessarily limited to those crashes that were 
officially reported. Crashes that may have occurred, but which did not result in the filing 
of a police report, are not included in this analysis. Further, police reports may be subject 
to field coding and data entry errors, which may result in data inaccuracies. Nevertheless, 
until the methods for recording crash data are improved, any analysis of crash data are 




For the following analysis, all data on fatal crashes come from FARS and should 
be regarded as highly reliable. Data on non-fatal injuries and PDO crashes are derived 
from GES data, and the data inaccuracies resulting from sampling error and non-aligning 
categorical definitions should be considered when interpreting GES-based statistics.  
 
General Characteristics of Fixed-Object Crashes 
 Before examining the nature of roadside crashes specifically, it is useful to first 
consider the current state of traffic safety more generally. In 2002, there were roughly 6.3 
million crashes, roughly 833,000 of which involved an injury, and 38,500 of which 
included a fatality. As shown in Table 2-1, multiple-vehicle crashes were the single 
largest crash type. Over 4,500,000 multiple vehicle crashes occurred in 2002, 500,000 of 
which involved at least one injury, and 16,000 of which were fatal. Fixed object crashes 
were the second largest crash category, with almost 1 million fixed-object crashes 
occurring, 200,000 of which were injurious, and 12,000 that were fatal. 
Culverts, ditches and curbs were the roadside features most likely to be involved 
in a fixed object crash, followed by utility and light poles, trees and guardrails (see Figure 
2-2). While fewer total tree crashes were reported, crashes involving trees are more likely 
to result in an injury or a fatality than the other object types. Indeed, more than a quarter 






Table 2-1: Crashes by Crash Type and Severity, 2002 
  No Injury Injury 
Fatal 
(FARS) Unknown Total 
Motor Vehicle 
Collision 
3,180,449   
(76%) 
498,789   
(60%) 
15,790    
(41%) 
986,844      
(78%) 
4,681,872   
(74%) 
Fixed Object 
564,812      
(14%) 
190,469    
(23%) 
12,008   
(31%) 
178,514      
(14%) 
945,803      
(15%) 
Pedestrian/Bicyclist 
7,332           
(0%) 
65,168       
(8%) 
5,157     
(13%) 
43,487          
(3%) 
121,144        
(2%) 
Overturn 
42,578          
(1%) 
56,947       
(7%) 
4,308     
(11%) 
25,173          
(2%) 
129,006        
(2%) 
Other Causes 
377,270        
(9%) 
21,671       
(3%) 
1,228      
(3%) 
31,117          
(2%) 














Table 2-2: Fixed Object Crashes and Severities, 2002 
Fixed Object No Injury Injury Fatal (FARS) Unknown Total 
Culvert/Ditch/Curb 123,097 (22%) 54,531 (29%) 2,402 (20%) 36,883 (21%) 216,913 (23%) 
Utility/Light/Sign Poles 119,141 (21%) 35,637 (19%) 1,974 (16%) 37,346 (21%) 194,098 (21%) 
Tree/Shrubbery 72,147 (13%) 37,431 (20%) 3,277 (27%) 26,932 (15%) 139,787 (15%) 
Guardrail 66,186 (12%) 18,007 (9%) 1,099 (9%) 20,591 (12%) 105,883 (11%) 
Building/Fence/Wall 52,151 (9%) 11,390 (6%) 669 (6%) 15,866 (9%) 80,076 (8%) 
Embankment 28,555 (5%) 17,839 (9%) 1,312 (11%) 14,076 (8%) 61,782 (7%) 
Bridge 11,632 (2%) 4,460 (2%) 398 (3%) 2,681 (2%) 19,171 (2%) 
Other Fixed Object 91,903 (16%) 11,174 (6%) 877 (7%) 24,139 (14%) 128,093 (14%) 






Roadway Class and Alignment 
 An area of specific interest to this study is whether fixed-object crashes are 
associated with particular roadway classes and alignments. While detailed information on 
a roadway’s alignment is not provided by either FARS or GES, FARS does report 
whether a crash occurred on a straight or curved roadway section. A large percentage of 
these crashes (42%) occurred on curved sections, despite the fact that most roadway 
sections are straight (see Table 2-3).  
 
Table 2-3: Fixed Object Crashes By Road Alignment, 2002 
Fixed Object Straight Curved Pct. Curved 
Tree/Shrubbery 1735 1524 46.8% 
Culvert/Ditch/Curb 1457 934 39.1% 
Embankment 680 627 48.0% 
Guardrail 610 485 44.3% 
Utility/Light/Sign Poles 882 611 40.9% 
Building/Fence/Wall 399 268 40.2% 
Bridge 265 131 33.1% 
Other Fixed Object 798 545 40.6% 
Total3 6826 5125 42.9% 
 
 Non-Interstate arterials were the most dangerous roadway class, in terms of 
absolute numbers of fatalities, with 17,000 fatal crashes occurring in 2002. Interstate 
                                                 
3 Note: for 57 crashes, information on roadway alignment was not known. These crashes were not included 




roadways were the safest roadways, with 5,000 fatal crashes, while roughly 8,000 fatal 
crashes occurred on both collector and local roadways (see Table 2-4). Nevertheless, 
merely looking at absolute counts of crashes fails to account for exposure. To develop a 
more meaningful comparison of the relative hazard of these roadways, exposure rates, 
derived by dividing the number of fatal crashes by the number of vehicle miles traveled 
(VMT) for each of roadway class, are included in Table 2-5. After accounting for 
exposure, Interstates and other arterials perform similarly with respect to fatal fixed 
object crashes, with 23 and 29 fatal crashes per 100 million vehicle miles traveled 
(MVMT), respectively, while local roadways and collectors both have between 80 and 90 
crashes per 100 MVMT. 
 
Table 2-4: Fatal Crashes, by Crash Type and Roadway Class, 2002 
 Fixed-Object Rollover Other Total 
Interstate 1,532 1,058 2,313 4,903 
Other Arterial 3,940 1,247 11,987 17,174 
Collector 3,261 1,094 3,933 8,288 
Local 3,166 878 3,824 7,868 
Unknown 109 31 118 258 
Total 12,008 4,308 22,175 38,491 







Table 2-5: Fatal Crashes Per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled, by Crash Type and 
Road Class, 2002 
 Fixed-Object Rollover Other Total 
Interstate 23 16 34 73 
Other Arterial 29 9 89 128 
Collector 80 27 96 203 
Local 88 25 107 220 
Total 43 15 80 138 
 
Demographic Factors 
 While FARS does not provide information on the characteristics of at-fault 
drivers, it does provide basic demographic characteristics of the individuals involved in  
fatal fixed-object crashes. An examination of their demographic characteristics is 
revealing. Men are almost three times as likely to be killed in a fixed-object crash than 
women, with the number of males killed in fixed-object crashes exceeding that of women 
for all age groups except those aged 15 and younger, where the number of fatalities are 
approximately equal.  
 Younger drivers are disproportionately involved in fatal fixed-object crashes. 40% 
of total fixed-object fatalities involve individuals between the ages 16 and 25, with males 
in this age group accounting for roughly a third of the total fatal crashes. The number of 
fixed object crashes for each age group declines until the 70 and older category, at which 





Persons Killed in Fixed-Object Crashes,  




































































 Figure 2-1: Persons Killed in Fixed Object Crashes, by Age and Sex, 2002 
 
That there is an increase in fixed-object fatalities for the 70 and older group is not 
surprising. Aging is associated with a well-documented decline in perceptual and motor 
abilities, both of which result in a decline in one’s ability to operate a motor vehicle 
(Dewar, 2002a; Simoes and Marin-Lamellet, 2002). The reasons why younger drivers are 
disproportionately involved in fatal crashes are less clear. A common explanation is that 




high-risk driving behavior than are older drivers (Basch et al., 1987; Dewar, 2002a; 
Fuller, 2002; Jonah, 1997). A lack of driving experience, and thus a latent inability to 
recognize the actual hazards associated with specific behaviors, is further used to explain 
the over-involvement of young drivers in crashes (Gregersen, 1997; Groeger, 2000; 
Groeger, 2002; Delhomme and Meyer, 1997). 
The over-involvement of men in fatal fixed-object crashes is also not entirely 
clear. Part of the reason may be that men tend to travel greater distances than women, are 
more likely to drive under higher-risk conditions (rush hour, late at night, and under 
adverse weather), and are more likely to drive while intoxicated (Dewar, 2002b). The 
differences may also be attributable in part to differences in driving styles. Women are 
more likely than males to provide adequate headways between vehicles, as well as to 
avoid higher-speed, rural travel (Polus et. al, 1988).  
Alcohol and Fixed-Object Crashes 
  Alcohol use has been shown to result in declines in perceptual abilities, motor 
skills, information processing, and reaction times (Muskowitz, 1988). Driving while 
under the influence of alcohol is commonly cited as a major cause of crashes and injuries, 
and it appears to play a role in fatal fixed object crashes as well. For crashes where 




crashes were riding in a vehicle where the driver was under the influence of alcohol.4 
Alcohol was more likely to be a contributing factor in fatal fixed-object crashes for males 
than females. 54% of males killed in fixed-object crashes were in a vehicle operated by a 
driver under the influence of alcohol, compared to only 30% of females (see Table 2-6).  
 
Table 2-6: Police Reported Alcohol-Involvement in Fatal Fixed-Object Crashes, 2002 
 Known Alcohol Involvement Reported Alcohol Involvement 
Alcohol Involvement Male Female Total Male Female Total 
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 While this information of often used to impute alcohol involvement rates for all 
crashes (NHTSA, 2002), one should be cautious about attempting to generalize based on 
this information. Information on whether the driver was under the influence of alcohol is 
not reported for more than half of all fixed-object crashes, and there is no reliable means 
for determining the reasons for these omissions. While this might be attributable to mere 
                                                 
4 FARS data reports alcohol involvement in a fatal crash based on the persons killed in a crash, not for the 
crashes themselves. Correspondingly, the total of persons killed in fatal fixed-object crashes (16,966) 




omissions on the part of the recording officer, it is equally likely that the officer did not 
suspect that alcohol was a factor, and chose not to conduct an alcohol test. In either event, 
this is mere speculation; all that can be stated with certainty is that alcohol was a known 
factor in 23% of fixed-object fatalities, and can be definitively ruled out as a factor for an 
additional 25%. Alcohol involvement for the remaining 52% of these crashes is not 
known.  
 
Comparing Fixed-Object Crashes in Urban and Rural Environments 
While such aggregate statistics are useful for developing a general sense of the 
nature of fixed-object crashes, this study is interested in the roadside safety performance 
of urban areas specifically. As shown in table 2-7, fixed-object crashes are more likely to 
occur in urban areas, but are less likely to involve an injury or a fatality. Indeed, while the 
absolute number of fixed-object crashes was 20% higher for urban areas, twice as many 
fatal fixed-object crashes occurred in rural environments than in urban ones. Further, 
these statistics only report total crashes; once one accounts for exposure (based on the 
vehicle miles traveled in each environment) rural areas are consistently more likely to 







Table 2-7: Fixed Object Crashes in Urban and Rural Areas, 2002 
  Urban Rural 
Fatal 4,112 7,874 
Injury 95,350 95,118 
PDO 320,794 244,016 
Total5 420,256 347,008 
 
Table 2-8: Fixed Object Crashes per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled in Urban and 
Rural Areas, 2002 
 Urban Rural 
Fatal 25 71 
Injury 569 861 
PDO 1,914 2,208 
Total 2,507 3,140 
 
That rural fixed-object crashes tend to be more severe is not particularly 
surprising; rural travel is generally characterized by lower levels of congestion and higher 
overall traffic speeds, and increased speed logically results in increased crash severity. 
While this explains increases in severity, it does not explain the increased frequency. Part 
of the explanation may be attributable to the nature of rural travel. Unlike urban travel, 
rural travel is characterized by longer trip distances in relatively homogeneous 
environments, the combination of which can result in a condition cognitive psychologists 
refer to as “highway hypnosis.” When placed in highly predictable environments with 
little environmental stimuli, drivers tend to automatize the driving task and reduce visual 
                                                 




search and processing (Dewer, 2002c; Roge et. al, 2002; Steyvers 1993). This state 
results in a reduction in the driver’s attentiveness to external stimuli and reduced reaction 
times, the combination of which would seem to explain the increased likelihood of fixed-
object crashes in rural areas.  
Fixed-Object Crashes on Low-Speed Urban Roadways 
 The relative hazard of rural areas is even more pronounced when one examines 
lower-speed roadways specifically. For roadways classified as minor arterials, collectors 
and local roads, rural areas are more likely to involve a fatal fixed-object crash than their 
urban counterparts, even before accounting for exposure (see Table 2-9).6 In absolute 
terms, all types of fatal crashes except those involving pedestrians are more common in 
rural environments. Likewise, all individual categories of fixed-object crashes occur more 




                                                 
6 The Bureau of Transportation Statistics, which provides data on vehicle miles traveled at the national 
level, does not distinguish between principal and minor arterials. Nevertheless, they do distinguish between 
collectors and locals, allowing exposure rates for fixed-object crashes to be developed for these road 
classes. For rural collector roadways, there are 110 fixed object-related fatalities per 100 MVMT, and 160 
per 100 MVMT miles traveled for rural local roads. Comparatively, there are 30 fixed-object fatalities per 
100 MVMT on urban collectors, and 40 per 100 MVMT on urban local roadways. The difference is a 





Table 2-9: Fatal Crashes on Low-Speed Roadways 
   Urban Rural 
  
Minor 
Arterial Collector Local Total 
Minor 




























245     
(6%) 
442    
(6%) 





103     
(3%) 
49      
(5%) 
148    
(5%) 
300   
(4%) 









696   
(23%) 















66       
(2%) 
30      
(3%) 
156    
(5%) 
252   
(3%) 
104     
(3%) 
216    
(3%) 
304    
(7%) 




















Summary: Considering the Characteristics of Fixed-Object Crashes 
 While fixed-object crashes accounted for only 15% of the total crashes in 2002, 
they accounted for almost a quarter of the total injury crashes, and roughly a third of all 
fatal crashes. Thus, while fixed-object crashes may not be the most common crash type, 
they are very likely to involve an injury or a fatality. Ditches, culverts and curbs are the 
objects most likely to be involved in a fixed-object crash, although trees are the fixed 
object associated with the greatest number of fatal fixed object crashes.  
Males are almost three times as likely as females to be involved in a fatal fixed-
object crash, and drivers between the ages of 16 and 25 account for 40% of the total 




fixed-object fatalities involving a driver under the influence of alcohol. Since alcohol use 
is not reported for more than half of these crashes, it is highly possible the alcohol may be 
involved in a much larger percentage of these crashes. 
 







Arterial Collector Local Total 
Minor 
Arterial Collector Local Total 
Tree/Shrubbery 
165   
(24%) 
99    
(28%) 














170   
(24%) 












854   
(14%) 
Culvert/Ditch/Curb 
185   
(27%) 















27       
(4%) 
15       
(4%) 
46      
(5%) 
88      
(4%) 









52       
(7%) 
11       
(3%) 
39      
(4%) 
102    
(5%) 
102     
(9%) 
142    
(5%) 
67      
(3%) 
311    
(5%) 
Building/Fence/Wall 
28       
(4%) 
16       
(5%) 
89      
(9%) 
133    
(6%) 
49       
(4%) 
163    
(6%) 
141     
(7%) 
353    
(6%) 
Bridge 
15       
(2%) 
7        
(2%) 
29      
(3%) 
51      
(2%) 
29       
(3%) 
77      
(3%) 
64      
(3%) 
170    
(3%) 
Other Fixed Object 
54       
(8%) 
26       
(7%) 
69      
(7%) 
149    
(7%) 
63       
(6%) 
150     
(5%) 
109     
(5%) 




















 Fixed-object crashes are most likely to occur on roadways classified as either a 
collector or a local roadway, and a large percentage (43%) of fatal fixed-object crashes 




on Interstates than on other roadway classes. When one distinguishes between urban and 
rural environments, however, several notable differences emerge. First, while urban areas 
are associated with higher total numbers of fixed-object crashes, they are less likely to 
involve an injury or a fatality than fixed-object crashes in rural environments. Once one 
accounts for exposure, rural roadways experience a higher total incidence of fixed-object 
crashes, and are much more likely to involve an injury or a fatality.  
   Urban roadways designated as minor arterials, collectors and local roadways are 
much less likely to experience a fatal fixed-object crash than are their rural counterparts. 
This may be attributable to a variety of factors, including lower design speeds, higher 
levels of congestion (and thus lower operating speeds), as well as differences in the 
nature of rural and urban travel. Urban travel tends to be characterized by shorter, intra-
regional trips on roadways that are often familiar to the road user. Conversely, rural 
roadways serve longer trips, greater volumes of inter-regional travel, and greater volumes 
of truck and freight-related travel. Given that these travel characteristics differ, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that their safety performance should differ as well.  
   
  






ROADSIDE SAFETY: STATE-OF-THE-PRACTICE 
 
  The previous chapter detailed the general characteristics of fixed-object crashes. 
It found that young male drivers were over-represented in fixed object crashes, that a 
disproportionate share of fixed-object crashes were associated with curved roadway 
alignments and that, in general, urban environments were less likely to experience a 
fixed-object crash than rural environments, particularly for lower-speed roadways such as 
minor arterials, collectors and local roads. Further, while ditches, culverts and curbs were 
the objects most likely to be associated with a fixed-object crash, trees involved the 
greatest numbers of fixed-object fatalities. This chapter details the design strategies 
currently used to address these crashes.    
Recommended practices on the design of safe roadsides are well established in 
contemporary design guidance. Beyond guidance documents such as AASHTO’s A 
Policy on the Geometric Design of Highway and Streets (henceforth the “Green Book”) 
(2001) and the Roadside Design Guide (2002), recommendations on the design of safe 
roadsides are further enumerated in supplemental guidance, such as the AASHTO 
Highway Safety Design and Operations Guide (1997), as well as in more recent TRB 
publications targeted at implementing AASHTO’s Highway Safety Plan (2004a; 2004b). 




point of departure for this research effort, this chapter synthesizes this broad literature to 
understand the current state-of-the-practice regarding the design of safe roadsides. 
 Considered holistically, the literature on roadside safety establishes three general 
strategies (AASHTO, 1997; AASHTO, 2001; AASHTO, 2002a; Cirillo and Opiela, 
1999; Scott, 2000; Transportation Research Board, 2003a; Transportation Research 
Board, 2003b; Transportation Research Board, 2004). First, the ideal scenario is to 
prevent vehicles from leaving the travelway, thereby eliminating the roadside crash 
and thus the injuries and fatalities that may result from them. The second strategy is 
based on the premise that since it is impossible to prevent run-off-roadway events,7 
designers should strive to ensure that roadsides are “forgiving” – that is, that a roadside 
should be designed to eliminate the hazard associated with a run-off-the road event, 
should one occur. Under current practice, the ideal is to provide a 30 ft “clear recovery 
zone” adjacent to the roadside to allow errant vehicles to come to a controlled stop prior 
to encountering a fixed-object.  
Nevertheless, under many situations, a clear runout zone is impossible or 
impractical to provide. In urban areas, right-of-way is often limited by existing 
development, preventing the possibility of providing an adequate clear runout zone. In 
other cases, fiscal constraints may prevent the provision of a clear runout zone. With 
limited budgets for acquisition and improvements, transportation agencies must allocate 
their resources towards those projects that best benefit the public interest. Thus, while the 
                                                 




provision of a clear runout zone may be desirable from a safety perspective, the relative 
risk posed by fixed-object crashes for a specific segment of a roadway may not warrant 
the expenditure of money for right-of-way clearance and acquisition when compared 
against other competing agency objectives. Under these circumstances, design practice 
recommends strategies targeted at minimizing the severity of a run-off-roadway 
crashes, typically by ensuring that any object located in the runout zone is traversable by 
motor vehicles. The sections below detail each of these three strategies, as well as the 
specific practices used to implement them. 
 
Strategy 1: Keep Vehicles From Leaving the Travelway 
 The logic behind keeping vehicles on the travelway is simple: if a vehicle doesn’t 
leave the travelway, it will not be involved in a roadside crash. Unlike identifying 
appropriate clear zone widths or determining the crash effectiveness of impact cushions, 
however, these strategies are often oriented towards the behavior of the driver.8 The 
design of runout zones and impact cushions can be determined using the laws of physics; 
strategies aimed at keeping the driver on the roadway are targeted at modifying the 
behavior of the driver are reliant upon psychology and social science. The problem that 
emerges is that, beyond the limited descriptive information provided in Chapter 2, there 
                                                 
8 A potential exception to this is the use of guardrails, which keep the vehicle on the travelway by 
providing a physical barrier that prevents vehicles from encroaching on the roadside. Nevertheless, since 
roughly 11% of all fixed-object crashes involve guardrails, these features are better described as strategies 
intended to minimize the severity of a crash, rather than a strategy that keeps the vehicle on the travelway, 
since guardrails themselves constitute a fixed object hazard. Correspondingly, guardrails are included as 




is little substantive understanding of the behavioral factors that result in a run-off-
roadway event. Indeed, the Roadside Design Guide’s treatment of this subject is so brief 
as to be included here in its entirety: 
There are many reasons why a vehicle will leave the pavement and encroach on 
the roadside, including: 
•  driver fatigue or inattention 
•  excessive speed 
•  driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol 
•  crash avoidance 
•  roadway conditions such as ice, snow or rain 
•  vehicle component failure 
•  poor visibility (p. 1-2) 
 
Currently, there are three practices aimed at keeping vehicles on the roadway: 
straightening curves,9 denoting hazards through the use of signs and pavement markings, 
and applying rumble strips to a roadway’s shoulder (TRB 2003a; TRB, 2003b). Each of 
these practices is briefly detailed below. 
                                                 
9 The reason for an emphasis on curve elimination is attributable to the nature of existing crash data. 
Secondary sources of crash data used in most safety analyses, such as FARS, provide limited information 
on a roadway’s geometric design characteristics other than recording whether or not a curve was present.  
As researchers have largely chosen to use these readily-available data sources, rather than physically 
collecting data on a roadway’s geometric design characteristics, a heightened emphasis has been placed on 




Practice 1.1: Straightening Curves 
 As noted previously, as well as in other works on roadside safety (Bryer, 1993; 
TRB, 2003a; TRB 2004b; Turner and Mansfield, 1990; United States Department of 
Transportation [USDOT] 1987), curved roadway alignments are disproportionately 
represented in fixed object crashes. As a result, design practice encourages straightening 
curves, where possible, although the high cost of curve realignment strategies is widely 
recognized (Bissell, 1999; Institute of Transportation Engineers [ITE], 2002; Krammes, 
1999;TRB 2003a; TRB 2003b). 
Practice 1.2: Increase the Driver’s Awareness of Hazards through Signing and 
Marking Applications 
Because of the high cost of realigning the horizontal curvature of a roadway, 
roadside safety practice is often instead oriented toward delineating potentially hazardous 
objects and environments. The objective of this approach is to increase the driver’s 
awareness of an oncoming curve or other hazard, typically through the use of posted 
advisory speeds, pavement markings, chevrons, and other advance warning signs (Bissell, 
1999; FHWA, 1990; Krammes, 1999; ITE, 2002; TRB, 2003a; TRB, 2003b). While such 
practices make sense, on an intuitive level, the inconsistency of posted advisory speed 
practices (Chowdhury et. al., 1998), and indeed, the inconsistency of posted speed limit 
practices in general (Fitzpatrick et. al., 2003; Fitzpatrick et. al., 1996; Kubilins, 2000; 
Tarris et al., 2000), have led many drivers to disregard signs. While it is tempting to 
attribute this to recklessness and irresponsible driver behavior, there is growing evidence 




displayed through sign applications. Al-Madani and Al-Janahi (2002) found that drivers 
only comprehend about half of the signs placed along a roadway. Further, even when 
drivers are attempting to adhere posted speed limits, they naturally increase their 
operating speed to a roadway’s design speed when their attention is diverted from 
actively monitoring their speedometer (Recarte and Nunes, 2002). Overall, this suggests 
that signs and pavement markings may have only a moderate effect in preventing run-off-
roadway events.  
Practice 1.3: Use Rumble Strips to Alert the Driver to a Run-Off-Roadway Event 
The third practice recommended for preventing run-off-roadway events is the use 
of rumble strips along the shoulder of a roadway. Rumble strips are grooves placed into 
the roadway aimed at alerting the driver of potentially hazardous conditions. While 
rumble strips do not result in reduced speeds (Ewing, 1999), they cause a vehicle to 
vibrate and make noise when a vehicle crosses over them, thereby signaling to the driver 
that he or she is leaving the travelway. While in many conditions the sound made by a 
vehicle crossing rumble strips does not exceed a roadway’s ambient sound (FHWA, 
2000) the vibration they produce appears to be successful at alerting the driver that they 
are leaving the travelway. Indeed, several recent studies of the effectiveness of rumble 
strips found that can decrease the number of run-off-road crashes from between 30 and 
85 percent (TRB, 2003b; FHWA, 2002). 
While shoulder based-rumble strips have proven effective in reducing run-off-




be limited. The appropriate use of rumble strips to alert the driver of a run-off-roadway 
event requires a paved shoulder adjacent to the travelway. While this condition is readily 
met on Interstates, freeways and rural arterials, urban roadways are often curbed and lack 
shoulders, thus limiting the use of rumble strips as a safety countermeasure.  
Further, even when shoulders are available on urban roads, they are regularly used 
to accommodate bicyclists (AASHTO, 1999), a factor that raises questions about the 
appropriateness of rumble strip treatments. Rumble strips are not only physically 
unpleasant for bicyclists, they can also lead to the loss of control of the bicycle (Moeur, 
1999). Thus, rumble strip applications may be contextually inappropriate in environments 
when bicycle use is either expected or encouraged.  
 
Strategy 2: Eliminate the Hazard Associated With a Run-Off-Roadway Event 
  The majority of the guidance on roadside safety is focused on the idea that safety 
can be best ensured by designing roadways to be safe for run-off-roadway events, should 
they occur (American Association of State Highway Officials [AASHO], 1967, AASHO, 
1974; AASHTO, 2001; AASHTO, 2002a; TRB, 2003a: TRB, 2003b; USDOT, 1987). As 
stated in the Roadside Design Guide “regardless of the reason for a vehicle leaving the 
roadway, a roadside environment free of fixed objects with stable, flattened slopes 
enhances the opportunity for reducing crash severity.” (AASHTO, 2002a, p. 1-2).  
Correspondingly, current design guidance emphasizes the importance of ensuring 




objective, two key practices are recommended. The first is to provide a clear runout zone 
adjacent to the travelway, and the second is to ensure that ditches, slopes and curbs are 
designed to accommodate a run-off-roadway event. 
Practice 2.1: Provide a Clear Runout Zone Adjacent to the Travelway  
Current practice calls for the establishment of a clear runout zone adjacent to the 
travelway that will permit vehicles to come to a controlled stop prior to encountering a 
fixed object. The preferred width for a clear recovery zone is 30’, with adjustments for 
sideslope (AASHTO, 2002a, TRB, 2003b). While 30 feet is regarded as desirable, it is 
viewed as a preferred design minimum, with the most recent guidance stating: “The wider 
the clear zone, the safer it will be” (TRB, 2003b p. V-43).  Clear zones can entail a 
combination of a paved shoulder and an unpaved area adjacent to the travelway that is 
free of roadside obstacles, although the design preference is for a paved shoulder. Under 








Figure 3-1: Illustrative Clear Zones 
 
Practice 2.2: Design Accommodating Slopes, Ditches and Curbs  
 A second issue in the design of roadsides is to design slopes, ditches and curbs to 
accommodate run-off-roadway events. Much of the guidance is principally concerned 
with the influence of these features on rollover crashes. 11% of all fatal crashes involve a 
rollover event (see Table 2-1), and the largest number of rollovers occurs after a vehicle 
strikes an embankment or ditch (TRB, 2003b; Viner, 1995). The principal cause of 
rollover crashes is a vehicle “tripping” on an element in the roadside, such as a ditch or 
an embankment. To prevent vehicle tripping, design guidance recommends softening 
pavement “drop offs” (i.e., the point where the paved and unpaved portions of the 




Nevertheless, such considerations relate more to the design of rural roadways than 
to urban ones. First, rollovers tend to be primarily a rural problem; in 2002, for example, 
there were 3,500 fatal rollover crashes in rural areas, compared to 800 for urban areas, 
only 300 of which occurred on roadways classified as minor arterials, collectors or local 
roadways. Accounting for exposure (based on VMT), rollovers were 6.5 times more 
likely to occur in a rural environment than an urban one (source: FARS).  
Second, urban areas have greater concentrations of roadside development, and a 
corresponding increase in impervious surface areas. As a result, curb and gutter 
applications are typically used to address stormwater runoff (see Figure 3-2), and 
concerns surrounding the use of curbing differ markedly from the design of slopes and 
ditches. Thus, this section is concerned largely with the design of curbs, rather than with 
the design of slopes and ditches.  
 
 





The concerns surrounding curbs are twofold. First, conventional curb applications 
have relatively little ability to redirect an errant vehicle back into the travelway, 
particularly at higher speeds (Wezeker and Nkunga, 2003). As a result, the Roadside 
Design Guide states that: 
One common misconception is that a curb with a 0.5 m [1.5 ft] offset behind it 
satisfies the clear roadside concept. Realistically, curbs have limited redirectional 
capabilities and only at low speeds, approximately 40 km/h [25 mph] or lower. 
Consequently, the designer must strive for a wider clear zone that is reflective of 
the off-peak operating speed (85th percentile) or design speed, whichever is 
greater… serious consideration should be given to providing a full width paved 
shoulder10 and offsetting any curbing to the back of the shoulder (AASHTO, 
2002a, p. 10-2) 
 
Shoulder treatments between the travelway and the curb can take the form of either a 
dedicated, marked shoulder or a wide outside travel lane (see Figure 2-3). The design 
guidance recommends a height of 4 inches for a vertical curb [1V:1H], and 6 inches for 
sloping curbs [1V:2H], and that curbs should be offset from 1 to 2 feet from the edge of 
the travelway (AASHTO, 2001).11 A second concern in the design of curbing is that “an 
out of control vehicle may… become airborne as a result of an impact with a curb” 
                                                 
10 A full width shoulder is 10 ft in areas with little or no truck traffic, and 12 ft otherwise (AASHTO, 2001). 
11 Nevertheless, it must be observed that a curb will redirect an errant vehicle when the curb height exceeds 




(AASHTO, 2001, p. 324). To address this concern, vertical curbs are discouraged for 
roadways with speeds greater than 45 mph. 
 
Figure 3-3: Wide Outside Lane and Dedicated Shoulder 
  
Strategy 3: Minimize the Severity of Unpreventable Crashes 
While the provision of a clear runout zone is the preferred practice for addressing 
roadside safety, in many cases it may not be practical to provide one. In urban areas, for 
example, there is often limited right-of-way available for the establishment of a clear 
runout zone due to the density and location of roadside development.  To address these 
deficiencies, two practices are recommended: the first is to design roadside features to be 
traversable by errant vehicles, and the second is to shield objects that cannot be made 




Practice 3.1: Ensure Roadside Objects are Traversable by Errant Vehicles 
This practice begins by testing roadside features for their crash-worthiness, either 
by physically replicating a crash at specially-designated crash test sites, or by using 
computer applications, such as LS-DYNA, to simulate the crash. NCHRP 350 (TRB, 
1993) provides detailed specifications on the methods for testing an object’s crash 
performance, including variables such as the design vehicle, angle of impact, soil 
conditions and other factors, and ongoing research continues to update these test 
procedures (see, for example, Mak and Bligh, 2002a; 2002b).  
The current standard for breakaway hardware, as contained in the Roadside 
Design Guide and NCHRP 350, is that breakaway features function omni-directionally to 
ensure that the feature is traversable from any angle of impact. To prevent vehicle snags, 
the stub height, after breakaway, should not exceed 4 inches.  
While breakaway features may minimize the severity of the initial impact, the 
dislocation of the breakaway feature from its base may create a secondary impact as the 
post falls on the vehicle. Thus, breakaway poles and similar features must be designed to 
prevent intrusion on the passenger compartment of the vehicle, either by minimizing the 
weight and load of such features, or by providing a secondary hinge, at least 7 ft above 
the ground, that permits the vehicle to pass safely beneath the post upon impact. The 
current edition of the Roadside Design Guide (AASHTO, 2002) provides detailed 
specifications for these devices.   
Of particular importance to this study, however, is the treatment of trees located 




width greater than 4 inches are regarded as being fixed-object hazard, and design practice 
discourages the placement of trees that exceed this width in the clear zone (USDOT, 
1987, Turner & Mansfield, 1990; AASHTO, 2002a, TRB, 2003a, TRB, 2003b).  
Practice 3.2: Shield Hazardous Objects 
Where the roadside cannot be made clear of obstructions, or where slopes 
adjacent to the travelway are hazardous, the objects and/or roadside should be shielded 
using guardrails. While guardrails themselves constitute a major fixed-object hazard (9% 
of all injurious and fatal fixed-object crashes involve guardrails), the benefits of shielding 
objects appear to outweigh their hazards in certain conditions, such as when a steep slope 
is adjacent to the travelway (Michie and Bronstad, 1995). Thus, design guidance 
encourages shielding roadside objects or features using guardrails and other barrier 
treatments when the roadside cannot be made traversable. Like the design of traversable 
hardware, guardrails are subject to NCHRP 350 tests prior to field application, and 
detailed design specifications for these features are included in the Roadside Design 
Guide (AASHTO, 2002). 
 
Roadside Design Guidance: A Summary 
Roadside safety practice is currently focused on three key strategies. The first is to 
prevent vehicles from leaving the travelway. While this is the strategy that will have the 




events, it is currently the least developed. At present, design strategies aimed at 
preventing run-off-roadway events are largely limited to the use of signs and pavement 
markings to identify hazardous conditions or the use of rumble strips to alert the driver 
that (s)he is leaving the travelway. To date there is little understanding of the pre-crash 
behaviors that result in run-off-roadway events, or how to design roadways to prevent 
these behaviors from occurring. As such, this would appear to be an important 
opportunity for enhancing roadside safety, and one that will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters.  
The second strategy is to minimize the hazard associated with a run-off-roadway 
event. The logic behind this approach is that since many run-off-roadway events cannot 
be prevented, the design objective should be to minimize the consequences of leaving the 
travelway. For this reason, contemporary roadside design practice encourages the 
provision of roadside that is free from hazardous slopes or fixed objects. 
The third and final strategy is applicable when a clear roadside cannot be 
provided. In this case, design practice recommends that all objects in the clear recovery 
area be traversable by errant vehicles or shielded through the use of guardrails. Of the 
three strategies, this is the most thoroughly developed, with roadside features being 
subject to extensive crash testing prior to their application in the field. 
When one considers the guidance on roadside safety holistically, however, two 
key design considerations are absent from the recommended practices. First, there is little 
discussion on how to integrate these design practices into urban environments. As stated 




the principles and guidelines for roadside design presented in… this Guide 
discuss roadside safety considerations for rural highways, Interstates and 
freeways, where speeds are generally higher, approaching or exceeding 80 km/h 
[50 mph], and vehicles are operating under free-flow conditions (AASHTO, 2002, 
p. 10-1). 
Despite this important caveat, these principles are assumed to be applicable to all design 
contexts. As stated in AASHTO’s Highway Safety Design and Operations Guide: “for all 
types of highway12 projects, clear zones should be determined or identified and forgiving 
roadsides established” (1997, p. 14).  
 Next, and perhaps most surprisingly, there is almost no information on how to 
design roadsides to accommodate pedestrian and bicycle activity. Other than noting that 
shoulders may be used by bicyclists and pedestrians (TRB, 2003b), pedestrian and 
bicyclist issues are almost entirely absent from roadside design guidance, despite the 
obvious fact that the roadside is where most pedestrian and bicyclist activity occurs.
 In conclusion, the guidance on roadside safety indicates that the provision of a 
clear zones and forgiving roadside features will enhance a roadway’s safety, regardless of 
a roadway’s functional class or environmental context. Nevertheless, there is little 
information that will allow one to determine the degree to which safety will be enhanced 
through the implementation of roadside safety principles in urban environments. To 
better gauge the applicability of these practices in an urban context, the next chapter of 
                                                 
12 In conventional engineering parlance, all roadways are referred to as “highways.” High-speed limited 




this dissertation examines the empirical and historical basis of contemporary roadside 





THE PASSIVE SAFETY PARADIGM 
 
The positive coefficient on shoulder widths is troubling; one normally expects a wider shoulder to 
be a safety feature. 
 - Ivan, Pasupathy and Ossenbruggen, 1999 
 
 The previous chapters of this dissertation discussed the basic characteristics of 
fixed-object crashes, as well as how contemporary design practice seeks to address them. 
Specifically, contemporary roadside design encourages the provision of a “forgiving” 
roadside, which entails providing a roadside that is free of fixed-object hazards, or, at a 
minimum, by ensuring that any roadside object placed adjacent to the right-of-way is 
traversable by errant vehicles. While such an approach would seem to go a long way 
towards minimizing the severity of run-off-roadway events, it results in design treatments 
that are viewed with hostility by many urban advocates (see Figure 1-3). Rather than 
embracing clear zone principles, livability advocates instead encourage the placement of 
trees and other roadside features in a “pedestrian buffer zone” between the sidewalk and 
the vehicle travelway, an approach that obviously violates the basic tenets of 




livability are often incompatible with those intended to address the safety of run-off-
roadway events (see Figure 4-1).  
 
    
Figure 4-1: Safe or Livable? Two Competing Design Objectives 
  
Yet a key question remains: are livable street treatments less safe, in terms of 
crash frequency and severity, than more conventional roadside design applications? This 
chapter begins the second section of this dissertation, which examines the empirical basis 
for the contemporary approach to addressing roadside safety in urban environments. It 
begins by summarizing the findings of empirical studies that have examined the crash 
frequency and severity. Crash impact studies, which examine the “crashworthiness” of 
vehicles and roadside features through hypothetical crash conditions (either on specific 
testing grounds of through computer applications such as LS-DYNA) are excluded from 
analysis. Instead, what is sought is an understanding of how roadside safety practices 




conditions, as well as how these have (or have not) influenced the development of 
roadside design guidance.  
 
The Empirical Evidence on Geometric Design and Roadside Safety 
Much of the early literature on roadside safety is primarily descriptive in nature. 
Perhaps the earliest study on run-off-roadway events examined median encroachment 
rates13 for a 25-mile section of a highway in Illinois, finding that encroachment rates 
were roughly 0.75 per 100 vehicle kilometers traveled (Hutchinson and Kennedy, 1967). 
Foody and Long (1974) measured the location of roadside crashes, reporting that 37% of 
fixed-object crashes occurred between 6 and 12 feet from the edge the traveled way, and 
that 81% occurred within 20 feet. Hall et. al., (1976) examined utility pole crashes, and 
found that most utility pole crashes occurred along curves and within 11.5 feet of the 
travelway. Zeigler (1986) examined tree-related crashes in rural Michigan and found that 
85% occurred within 30 ft of the travelway. Turner and Mansfield (1990) replicated 
Zeigler’s study for the City of Huntsville, Alabama, and found that the majority of trees 
involved in crashes had a caliper width of 12 inches or greater, that 60% were located 
along a horizontal curve, and that 80% occurred within 20 feet of the travelway.  
 These early descriptive studies generally conclude by recommending the 
elimination of roadside objects located within 30 feet of the vehicle travelway and along 
                                                 
13 While this dissertation is not specifically interested in median design, Hutchinson and Kennedy’s study 
played a profound role in shaping contemporary roadside design guidance and, as such, is included here. I 




curves. While these studies are useful for understanding the general characteristics of 
roadside crashes, such analyses do not lead to the conclusion that eliminating roadside 
objects with any or even all of the described characteristics will have any effect on a 
roadway’s crash performance. Such conclusions can only be made by analyzing the 
comparative safety performance of roadways with clear runout zones, and those without, 
or else by conducting detailed before-after analyses at locations where roadside features 
have been either placed in a roadway’s clear zone, or else removed from it.  
In one of the earliest studies to conduct such an analysis, Zegeer, Deen and Mayes 
(1981) examined the safety performance of a variety of lane and shoulder widths14 on 
two-lane rural highways. The authors found that crash rates decreased as shoulder widths 
increased, but only until shoulders reached a width of between 7 and 9 feet. The authors 
found that crash rates increased as shoulders exceeded 9 feet, suggesting a “U” shaped 
relationship between shoulder widths and crash rates.   
The authors observed the same phenomenon for lane widths as well, with crash 
rates decreasing until lanes reached a width of 11 feet, and increasing as lane widths 
approached and exceeded the more common 12-foot standard. The authors further 
examined crash rates for roadways with a combination of lane and shoulder widths. Of 
these, the safest roadways, with less than half the crash rates of any other lane and 
shoulder width combination, were roadways with 11-foot lanes and 9-foot shoulders.  
                                                 
14 Because of the difficulty in obtaining data on clear zone widths (Lee and Mannering, 1999), most authors 




Finally, the authors examined the relationship between average annual daily 
traffic (AADT) and crash rates. While crash rates for multiple-vehicle crashes, measured 
as crashes per million vehicle miles traveled (MVMT), remained relatively constant for 
all levels of AADT, single vehicle crashes dropped dramatically once traffic volumes 
exceeded 500 AADT. These findings are consistent with the descriptive statistics 
reported in Chapter, 2, which found that urban areas, which tend to have heavier traffic 
volumes than rural areas, also have lower fixed-object crash rates.  
 Benekohal and Lee (1991) conducted before-after analyses of 17 “3R” 
(resurfacing, restoration and reconstruction) projects located on two-lane rural highways 
in Illinois that improved lanes and shoulders and eliminated roadside objects such as 
trees. The authors used a quasi-experimental design to examine the changes in two crash 
categories, single vehicle fixed-object crashes, as well as a crash category defined as 
“related crashes,” which included single vehicle fixed-object crashes, as well as overturn, 
head-on and sideswipe crashes. Each of the 17 projects was compared against control 
sites consisting of sections of the same roadway either immediately in advance of the 
improved site, or immediately following it.15 When all 17 sites were considered 
collectively and compared against the crash performance of the control groups, these 
projects showed a net reduction in both single vehicle fixed-object crashes and related 
crashes, with t statistics of –1.195 and –1.745, respectively.16 
                                                 
15 The authors do not provide the criteria used in determining which section of the roadway was used as the 
control site. 




When the projects are considered individually, however, their safety benefits are 
much less clear. Only 7 of these 17 projects actually resulted in a reduction in fixed-
object crashes; 4 reported no change, and 6 showed increases in fixed-object crashes. For 
related crashes, 10 projects resulted in crash reductions, two reported no change, and five 
resulted in an increase in related crashes. In short, these results suggest that the safety 
benefits of these projects are inconclusive.  
 Ivan, Pasupathy and Ossenbruggen (1999) modeled single and multiple-vehicle 
crashes on two-lane rural roadways in Connecticut as a function of a roadway’s level-of-
service (LOS) and its geometric characteristics. Lower levels-of-service (i.e., increased 
congestion) were found to be associated with a statistically-significant reduction in the 
number of single-vehicle crashes. For multiple-vehicle crashes, LOS had a mixed effect, 
with LOS C and D entering with negative coefficients, depending on how the model was 
specified,17 but failed to enter significantly in any of the authors’ model runs. In general, 
however, the authors found that increased levels of congestion are associated with a 
decrease in single-vehicle crashes, while it seemed to have no discernable effect on 
multiple-vehicle crashes, similar to the findings of Zegeer et. al. (1981) described above. 
 Shoulder widths were found to have differing effects on single-vehicle and 
multiple-vehicle crashes. In the authors’ model explaining single-vehicle fixed object 
crashes, shoulders widths entered negatively at a statistically-significant level, indicating 
that wider shoulders were associated with a decrease in single-vehicle crashes. 
                                                 
17 The model was specified using level-of-service A as a base condition. A negative coefficient for level-of-
service C, for example, indicates that there are fewer multiple-vehicle crashes for this operating condition 




Nevertheless, wider shoulders were shown to result in an increase, also at a statistically-
significant level, in multiple vehicle crashes, thus offsetting reductions in single-vehicle 
crashes.  
 In a follow-up study that also examined two-lane rural highways in Connecticut, 
Ivan, Wang and Bernardo (2000) sought to further investigate single-vehicle crashes as a 
function of shoulder widths, lighting conditions, time-of-day, and land use effects. The 
authors find that “the shoulder width coefficient has the wrong18 sign – we expect crash 
rate to decrease as shoulder width increases” (p. 793). Lighting conditions did not prove 
significant, although there were generally more crashes at night.  
The authors’ results on land use influences are highly interesting. To 
operationalize land use, the authors used the number of driveways for specific land use 
types along each section of roadway. They found that the number of gas station 
driveways reduced single-vehicle crashes, while driveways for apartments and other land 
uses were associated with statistically-significant increases in single-vehicle crashes. 
Finally, the number of intersections along a roadway was associated with a statistically-
significant reduction in single-vehicle crashes. The authors do not elaborate on the 
implications of these findings other than remarking that “the best single-vehicle crash 
models tell us that sites with a lot of gas station driveways and street intersections tend to 
have fewer single-vehicle crashes” (p. 793).  
                                                 
18 This does not indicate that the sign is wrong, but instead that there is currently not an adequate theory for 




 Milton and Mannering (1998) modeled crash frequencies on principal arterials 
(Interstates, freeways and other limited-access facilities) in the state of Washington as a 
function of its traffic volumes and geometric characteristics. Based on the results of a 
negative binomial model, the authors found that crash frequencies increase with increases 
in AADT and the number of lanes. Curiously, although the authors had data on actual 
shoulder widths, they chose to aggregate it into a dummy variable that simply indicated 
whether or not roadways had shoulders 1.5 m (5 ft) wide.19 Principal arterials with 
shoulders greater than 5 feet were found to be safer than those with shoulders less than 5 
feet.  
A highly interesting finding of this research is that curves, by themselves, were 
not shown to result in an increase in crash frequency. Indeed, sharp curves (measured by 
the authors as having a radius of less than 2900 ft) were shown to result in a statistically-
significant decrease in crashes. Instead, the variable that proved significant in explaining 
curve-related crashes was the presence of a long, straight tangent on the approach to a 
curve, indicating that the curve itself is not the hazard, but a curve located after a straight 
(high-speed) approach. Similarly, Shankar, Mannering and Barfield (1995) examined the 
crash performance of the Snoqualmie Pass (US 90) in Washington State, finding that 
fixed-object crashes decrease as the number of curves with a design speed below 60 mph 
increase.  
                                                 
19 The authors provide no justification for this decision. Based on Zegeer and Parker’s findings that the 
safety benefits of shoulders maxes out at roughly 9 feet, it is possible that this measure may have been 




 In a study of predominantly rural, two-lane roadways in the state of Illinois, 
Noland and Oh (2004) modeled crashes as a function of a roadway’s geometric 
characteristics using a negative binomial model. The authors found that wider shoulders 
were associated with a decrease in the number of crashes that occurred, but that they were 
also associated with an increase in fatal crashes, although the authors note that this is not 
at a statistically-significant level.20 
Urban Roadside Safety 
Most studies addressing geometric design and roadside safety issues focus on 
two-lane rural highways. Nevertheless, several studies have examined the subject of 
roadside safety in urban environments. Naderi (2003) examined the safety impacts of 
aesthetic streetscape treatments placed along the roadside and medians of five arterial 
roadways in downtown Toronto. Using a quasi-experimental design, the author found 
that the inclusion of features such as trees and concrete planters along the roadside 
resulted in statistically-significant reductions in the number of mid-block crashes along 
all five roadways, with the number of crashes decreasing from between 5 and 20 percent 
as a result of the streetscape improvements. While the cause for these reductions is not 
clear, the author suggests that the presence of a well-defined roadside edge may be 
leading drivers to exercise greater caution. 
                                                 
20 Stating that it is not “statistically significant” does not address the degree of statistical confidence for the 
estimate. The t-statistic was 1.4 (n=404), which corresponds to a one-tailed p-value of 0.08. Stating this 




Ossenbruggen, Pendharkar and Ivan (2001) examined sites with urban, suburban 
and residential characteristics in New Hampshire, and hypothesized that the urban 
“village” areas, with greater traffic volumes and more pedestrian activity, would be 
associated with higher numbers of crashes and injuries. Instead, they found the opposite: 
the village areas, which had on-street parking and pedestrian-friendly roadside 
treatments, were two times less likely to experience a crash event than the comparison 
sites. The authors associate these crash reductions with the characteristics of the roadside 
environment, which included sidewalks, mixed land uses and other “pedestrian-friendly” 
roadside features. The authors also attributed the safety performance to reduced speeds, 
noting that “since no speed limit signs are erected at village sites, it suggests [speeds] are 
self regulating” (p. 496).  
Lee and Mannering (1999) examined run-off-roadway crashes for one direction of 
a 60-mile section of an arterial roadway in Washington State. Using a negative binomial 
model, and evaluating urban and rural crashes separately, the authors sought to associate 
crash frequencies with the characteristics of the roadside environment. While their model 
for rural areas performed as expected, with trees and other features being associated with 
statistically-significant increases in the number of roadside crashes that occur, their 
model for urban areas produced radically different results (see Table 4-1). Not only were 




statistically-significant levels,21 indicating that the presence of trees in urban areas was 
associated with a decrease in the probability that a run-of-roadway crash would occur.  
 





Constant -1.983  
   
Roadway Characteristics   
Broad lane indicator (1 if lane is greater 
than 3.69 meters, 0 otherwise) 1.684 3.984 
Median width (in meters) -0.017 -3.781 
   
Roadside Characteristics   
Bridge length  4.610 2.145 
Distance from outside shoulder edge to 
guardrail  0.113 3.655 
Fence length  5.781 2.870 
Number of isolated trees in a section -0.093 -1.857 
Number of miscellaneous fixed objects in a 
section) -0.094 -2.140 
Number of sign supports in a section -0.080 -3.515 
Shoulder length  -1.042 -1.461 
 
  Other roadside features proved to be statistically related to crash reductions as 
well. The number of sign supports was associated with crash reductions, as was the 
presence of miscellaneous fixed-objects, a variable that included the presence of such 
roadside features as mailboxes. Further, wide lanes and shoulders were associated with 
                                                 




statistically-significant increases in crash frequencies. Roadways with lane widths of 12 
feet or greater were associated with statistically-significant increases in roadside crashes, 
as was an increase in the distance between the outside of a roadway’s shoulder and an 
adjacent guardrail.   
A Summary of the Empirical Evidence 
 One examining the empirical evidence on roadside safety is necessarily led to the 
conclusion that contemporary roadside safety practices have an ambiguous effect on 
crash performance, at best. Wider shoulders have not been definitively shown to enhance 
safety, nor has the elimination of sharp curves. The only study to specifically model clear 
zones in urban environments, rather than shoulders (Lee and Mannering, 1999), found 
that widening clear zones resulted in increases in urban run-off-roadway crashes, rather 
than reductions.  Indeed, the weight of the evidence suggests that seemingly hazardous 
roadside applications, such as the placement of aesthetic streetscape features adjacent to 
the vehicle travelway, enhances safety, particularly in urban environments.  
Clear zones are not the only design area where such safety anomalies appear. 
Hauer (1999a) re-examined the literature on lane widths, and found that there was little 
evidence to support the assertion that widening lanes beyond 11 feet enhances safety. 
Instead, the literature has almost uniformly reported that the safety benefit of widening 




and exceed the more common 12-foot standard.22 Indeed, there are a host of safety 
anomalies in the existing design literature, but the problem is that: 
Studies that find unexpected or unconventional results tend to dismiss these 
results as aberrations and have not examined them in further detail…. The results 
of many of these studies lead us to conclude that the impact of various 
infrastructure and geometric design elements on safety are inconclusive. Most 
studies using sophisticated statistical techniques either find no association, or an 
unexpected association from infrastructure changes assumed to be beneficial 
(Noland & Oh, 2004, p. 527). 
 
Thus, a key question emerges: why does contemporary design guidance 
recommend practices that the best available evidence suggests may have an ambiguous or 
even negative impact on safety, and paradoxically, to do so under the auspices that they 
constitute a safety enhancement? The answer to this question lies in the historical 
foundations of contemporary safety practice, and is the subject of the next section of this 
chapter.  
 
                                                 
22 Hauer does comment that “I am not convinced that if research was done on current data, that 12 foot 
lanes would be found to be less safe than 11 foot lanes. Much has changed since then; trucks grew to be 
larger and research methods improved. However, at the time the Policy was written, the aforementioned 




The Passive Safety Paradigm 
Transportation engineering, like engineering practice more broadly, is a scientific 
discipline, and understanding it as such helps clarify the inconsistencies between what is 
contained in the design guidance, and what exists in the literature. As Kuhn has detailed 
in his classic work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), scientific disciplines 
adopt paradigms to guide research and practice. Paradigms are theoretical worldviews 
that provide researchers with rules and methods that direct research into a phenomenon of 
interest. While theoretical, an interesting characteristic of paradigms is that they are 
rarely stated as an overt set of theoretical propositions. As Kuhn has written, “to the 
extent that normal research work can be conducted by using the paradigm as a model, 
rules and assumptions need not be made explicit” (p. 88).  
Instead, paradigms are implicitly embedded in the problems, methods, and 
reference works that are transmitted from one generation of scientists to another, 
typically through textbooks and, in the case of transportation engineering, transportation 
design guidance. These works gloss over contradictions and inconsistencies in the 
prevailing paradigm, presenting the current state of the practice as a unified whole. As a 
result,  “students and professionals come to feel like participants in a long standing 
historical tradition. Yet the textbook-derived tradition in which scientists come to sense 
their participation is one that, in fact, never existed” (p. 138).   
Paradigms are highly useful for advancing a scientific disciplines because they 
provide researchers a focus for their work, enabling them to make rapid advancements in 




research is that a paradigm can lead researchers to disregard contradicting, but potentially 
important, research findings because they lack a theoretical basis for interpreting their 
results. Instead, these findings are treated as anomalies, and are either given little 
attention or disregarded altogether. 
A central argument of this dissertation is that contemporary roadside design 
practice (and indeed, design practice more broadly) is driven by a guiding “paradigm,” or 
theoretical worldview, about the relationship between roadway design and safety. 
Because of this safety paradigm, key relationships between geometric design and crash 
performance have been systematically ignored in the existing design guidance, resulting 
in design practices that produce less-than-optimal safety results. 
Lee and Mannering’s (1999; 2002) treatment of their research findings is 
particularly useful as an illustration of the powerful influence that the current paradigm 
plays on the interpretation and reporting of research results.23 As detailed previously, the 
authors’ results for rural areas supported the prevailing paradigm on roadside safety 
practice, with wider lanes, shoulders and clear zones resulting in crash reductions. 
Conversely, their results for urban areas found that these features resulted in crash 
increases. Such findings, while seemingly anomalous, have substantial life safety 
implications that should have warranted serious consideration. Yet this did not occur. 
Instead, when faced with the choice of considering the possibility that trees and other 
roadside features might enhance safety in urban environments, as evidenced by their 
                                                 
23 This work was selected for focused consideration both for its methodological rigor and the 
appropriateness of its research methods. As such, its conclusions are therefore highly compelling and 




research findings, or the paradigm-supporting conclusion that these objects should be 
universally removed, the authors concluded their work by stating, without qualification, 
that “the results show that run-off roadway accident frequencies and severities can be 
reduced by widening lanes, bridges and shoulders [and] relocating roadside fixed objects” 
(p. 103).  
 This 1999 work was subsequently published in the journal Accident Analysis and 
Prevention (Lee and Mannering, 2002) under the auspices of developing cost-
effectiveness measures. While the authors provide a detailed discussion of the overall 
research effort, including how they developed the specific models used to examine each 
design environment, they only noted that “there was a significant difference in the factors 
that determined run-off-roadway accident frequencies… in urban and rural areas” (p. 
153). The nature of these differences (i.e., that contemporary roadside design practices 
were found to negatively affect roadside safety in urban environments) is not reported. 
Indeed, one reading the article would not know that the authors had arrived at such a 
finding. Instead, the authors simply state that “to save space, we only present detailed 
model results from the rural frequency model estimation” (p. 153).24  
Thus, the anomalous findings for urban environments are entirely removed from 
consideration, allowing the authors to again conclude that “our results show that run-off-
roadway accident frequencies can be reduced by… decreasing the number of isolated 
trees along a section and increasing the distance from the outside shoulder edge to light 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, the reader is then referred to an unpublished dissertation (Lee, 2000) for the urban 
specifications, rather than the published report that is readily available online from the Washington State 




poles” (p. 160). Again, the authors do not qualify these recommendations by noting that, 
while using the exact same data sources and analysis techniques from which their 
reported findings are drawn, that they found the exact opposite to be true for urban 
environments. 
That Lee and Mannering would opt to withhold anomalous research findings is 
not entirely surprising when one considers the nature of paradigm-based research.  Kuhn 
writes that research conducted within a prevailing paradigm “often suppresses 
fundamental novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments” 
(1962, p. 5). Yet this probably overstates the case. More accurately, the problem is better 
described as one of interpretation. Most paradigm-driven research begins by assuming 
not only basic theoretical propositions, but major conclusions as well, taking the form of 
“puzzle-solving,” where major conclusions are already known (i.e., that the provision of 
clear zones will enhance safety), and where the major research objective is to more 
clearly specify these intended research results through the development of increasingly 
sophisticated data collection and modeling techniques. Thus, most paradigmatic research 
is targeted towards “achieving the expected in a new way” (Kuhn, p. 36).  
As an illustration of this puzzle-form, one need only consider the general 
characteristics of the literature on roadside safety, which is focused on the development 
of increasingly elaborate models for deriving cost-benefit estimates of providing clear 
zones, not on evaluating the appropriateness of clear zone practices. The guiding question 
driving most roadside safety research is not whether clear zones enhance safety, but by 




& Ross, 1995; Milton and Mannering, 1998; Zegeer, Deen and Mayes, 1981). 
Researchers conducting research under such an assumptions are generally not prepared to 
comprehend why such features may have a negative effect on safety. It violates their 
basic theoretical position on the subject.  
Which leads to a key question: if a paradigm is indeed driving contemporary 
roadside safety practice, what does it assume about the nature of roadside crashes, and 
why have transportation practitioners and researchers found it so compelling that they 
would allow it to co-opt the findings of a growing body of empirical evidence?  
Contemporary Safety Practice: An Historical Examination  
 The central thesis of Kuhn’s (1962) work is that advancements in science emerge 
out of “scientific revolutions” that rapidly and dramatically alter the theoretical landscape 
of scientific practice. The revolutionary nature of scientific practice is rarely recognized 
because these changes occur infrequently, as well as because “the depreciation of 
historical fact is deeply, and probably functionally, ingrained in the ideology of the 
scientific profession” (p. 138).25 There has yet to be a single work that has detailed the 
basis for the contemporary approach to addressing safety through design, or indeed, even 
a detailed articulation of the theoretical propositions on which contemporary safety 
practice is based. Because such information is essential for both understanding how 
                                                 
25 Kuhn observes that scientific textbooks usually treat history in a brief note in an introductory chapter. 
The Roadside Design Guide is an excellent illustration of this phenomenon. The entire history of the 
development of roadside design guidance is contained in the first two paragraphs of the document, and only 




safety is currently addressed through design practice, as well as how it might be 
improved, the remainder of this chapter examines the origins of the contemporary 
approach to safe transportation design, paying specific attention to the problems it was 
attempting to solve, as well as the means by which it sought to solve them. It then 
concludes by detailing the theoretical propositions that shape the current safety paradigm.  
 
A Passive Approach to Transportation System Safety 
 While the transportation profession has always had at least a nominal concern for 
road safety, the contemporary approach to addressing safety through design received its 
theoretical basis as part of the transportation safety movement of the 1960s. This 
movement dramatically redefined the way safety was perceived and addressed, resulting 
in the creation of most of the contemporary features of the transportation safety 
landscape. The Highway Safety Act of 1966, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), the inclusion of air bags in new-production motor vehicles, the 
crash testing of vehicles and roadside hardware, and the existence of safety-related design 
guidance such as the Roadside Design Guide are all products of the transportation safety 
movement of the 1960s.  
 If any one person could be said to be the “founding father” of contemporary 
safety practice, it is William Haddon, who, importantly, was not trained as an engineer, 
but as a medical doctor and an epidemiologist. William Haddon was the first 
commissioner of NHTSA, and later the director of the Insurance Institute of Highway 




well as so lasting, is that he was the first to formally introduce the principles of 
epidemiology to the area of road safety.  
 As a profession, epidemiology is based on the work of John Snow, an English 
physician who sought to address an outbreak of cholera that plagued London in the 
1850s. While current medical theory asserted that the spread of cholera was associated 
with “vapors,” Snow hypothesized that cholera was not airborne, but was instead 
transmitted through polluted water supplies. Using what was at the time a highly-
elaborate, data-driven analysis, Snow mapped out the locations of affected households, 
and determined that these households were indeed sharing a common water source. In an 
episode that has since become legendary, Snow sought to resolve this problem in one 
particularly hard-hit neighborhood by implementing a strategy that was both simple and 
radical: rather than encouraging residents to adopt behavioral modifications, such as 
using an alternate water source or boiling infected water before drinking it, Snow simply 
removed the handle from the pump of the affected well (Rosenberg, 1962).  
 John Snow’s approach to addressing London’s cholera epidemic resulted in the 
creation of a new health-related discipline – epidemiology. What distinguishes 
epidemiology from other health-related disciplines is its focus on the health and well-
being of populations, rather than individuals. Such a focus naturally leads away from the 
consideration of the behavior of individuals, and towards a consideration of the broader 
environmental factors that lead to injury and illness. William Haddon, who received a 




epidemiological approach. In so doing, he radically altered the transportation safety 
landscape.   
 In the 1950s, transportation safety practice was focused largely on preventing 
crashes through strategies aimed at educating the driver on safe operating behavior, as 
well as through the development, adoption, and enforcement of traffic laws. This 
approach was principally behavioral in orientation, with the objective being to reduce 
crashes, and thus injuries and fatalities, by preventing the behaviors that produced them. 
The development and codification of the nation’s traffic safety laws, as well as the 
Manual for Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), are largely products of this era. 
Yet Haddon, an epidemiologist by training, believed that it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to prevent drivers from engaging in these behaviors, because “the driver [is] 
unreliable, hard to educate, and prone to error” (Gladwell, 2001, p. 53).  
Instead, Haddon proposed a passive approach: rather than relying on behavioral 
modifications to prevent crashes, Haddon believed the safety objective should instead be 
to enable a “crash without an injury” by physically engineering safety features into 
vehicles and their environments. Through crash testing and the use of safety features such 
as air bags, Haddon believed that safety engineers could ensure that vehicle occupants 
were safe during a crash event, even if the crash could not be eliminated. The key piece 
of reasoning behind Haddon’s approach, and the one that subsequent transportation 
professionals would find so compelling, is the following: drivers will err, make mistakes, 
and generally engage in behaviors that result in crashes. Such errors and behaviors cannot 




safe during a crash event, engineers can render driver behavior irrelevant. Thus, the 
proper design goal for engineers is not to address driver behavior, which is irrational and 
unpredictable, but to instead to design vehicles and roadways to ensure that drivers will 
be safe when a crash event occurs.  
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who first met Haddon while conducting a public 
meeting on the subject of traffic safety for the state of New York, found Haddon’s 
approach compelling: what if transportation professionals could design vehicles and 
roadways to eliminate the injuries and fatalities that result from a crash event? The life 
safety implications were enormous. Haddon’s ideas formed the basis of Moynihan’s 1959 
article, Epidemic on the Highways, which provided one of the earliest written accounts of 
the passive approach. In this work, Moynihan wrote that: 
For clinical medicine, disease is described as it occurs in individuals; for epidemiology, 
disease is described as it occurs in an aggregation of individuals, with as much attention 
being paid to the environment in which it occurs – the highway – and the agent through 
which it is transmitted – the automobile – as to the “host” – the driver – who gets the 
disease (Moynihan, 1959 in Weingroff, 2003). 
 
The life safety implications of this approach were also not lost on Ralph Nader. 
While working with Moynihan in the U.S. Department of Labor, Nader was exposed to 
Haddon’s passive safety philosophy, which formed the basis of his 1965 publication 
Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-in Dangers of the American Automobile. Nader 




prevention and accident prevention – [are] fundamentally ‘engineering’ problems. That 
is, concentration on the hostile environment… is almost invariably more productive than 
trying to manipulate the behavior of people” (p. 201).  
While Nader’s book is probably best known for the repeal of the Corvair, its more 
lasting effect was to generate a public outcry about the “designed-in dangers” of the 
nation’s automobiles and transportation system, leading both the U.S. Senate and 
AASHO (later AASHTO) to hold special hearings on the subject of transportation safety 
in 1966. It was during these hearings that transportation safety practice was redefined, 
leading to the adoption of the Highway Safety Act and the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, as well as forming the intellectual background for the profession’s 
first design guidance that specifically addressed the subject of transportation safety, 
1967’s Highway Design and Operational Practices Related to Highway Safety 
(AASHO). 
The 1966 Highway Safety Hearings 
Given the litigious nature of contemporary design practice,26 it is perhaps ironic 
that the philosophical basis of contemporary design practice is derived from the musings 
of a lawyer. Yet Nader’s testimony before the AASHO and Senate committees had an 
enormous effect on the safety practices that were to follow. 
                                                 
26 Turner and Blashke (1995) estimate the dollar amount of pending lawsuits against departments of 





Nader’s firmly held belief was that pre-1960s safety practice was misguided in its 
focus on driver behavior. In testimony that would later provide the basis for the 
engineering concept of the “design driver,”27 Nader argued that “even if people have 
accidents, even if they make mistakes, even if they are looking out the window, or they 
are drunk, we should have a second line of defense for these people” (Quoted in 
Weingroff, 2003, p. 154). To provide this second line of defense, Nader proposed two 
guiding design principles. The first was that “safety measures that do not rely on or 
require people’s voluntary and repeated cooperation are more effective and reliable that 
those that do;” and second, that “the sequence of events that leads to an accident injury 
can be broken by engineering measures even before there is a complete understanding of 
the causal chain” (Quoted in Weingroff, 2003, p. 154). 
Given their subsequent influence on design practice, the implications of these 
principles warrant a brief elaboration. Embedded in these notions is the idea that driver 
error is unpreventable, and that the best means to address this error is through 
engineering measures that are not reliant on driver behavior for their success. Also 
embedded in these principles is the idea that safety can be addressed without addressing 
the behavioral causes of crashes, or even by empirically analyzing actual crash events. 
Instead, Nader is proposing that designers should address safety through the metaphorical 
application of the engineering concept of “design failure” by assuming a worst-case-
scenario condition, such as a high-speed run-off-roadway event, and then designing 
                                                 
27 The “design driver” is a hypothetical worst-case behavioral scenario, such as “a little-old lady driving in 
the rain at high speeds on an unfamiliar road after having too much to drink.” The point of this concept is 




vehicles and roadways to ensure safety during this failure state.28 In Nader’s 
conceptualization of the problem, there is no consideration of the possibility that such 
practices might encourage drivers to adopt behaviors that increase their likelihood of 
being involved in a crash event. By Nader’s reasoning, a design that minimizes the 
consequences of extreme crash events should logically reduce the consequences of all 
lesser events as well, and thereby enhance a roadway’s safety.  
While Nader and Haddon were responsible for developing the theoretical basis for 
contemporary safety practice, Kenneth Stonex 29 was singularly responsible for defining 
how these principles would ultimately be incorporated into roadway design practice. One 
of the key safety problems identified by the AASHO Committee was the large number of 
fatalities associated with single vehicle run-off-roadway events, which amounted to 
roughly 30-35 percent of the national totals (Stonex, 1960).30 To address this issue, the 
committees heard testimony from Stonex, who was a General Motors employee 
responsible for designing the “Proving Ground,” an experimental “crash-proof” highway 
that had 100-foot clearances on either side of the travelway (McLean, 2002; Weingroff, 
                                                 
28 Also important here is where the failure is presumed to rest – which is on the driver. Since roadways are 
designed for these hypothetical design conditions, the designer assumes that safety has been adequately 
addressed. Correspondingly, when crashes do occur, the majority (95%) are attributed to “driver failure,” 
rather than design failure, thus suggesting that the designer did all that should have been done to adress the 
crash (Carsten, 2002; Hauer, 1999b).  
29 In an acknowledgment of Stonex’s influence on current design practice, the Transportation Research 
Board issues a “Kenneth A. Stonex Award” for professionals who have made a substantive contribution to 
the area of transportation safety.  
30 It is worth observing that in 2002, there were 15,500 fatal single vehicle run-off-roadway crashes, or 40% 




2003).31 Based on his experiments at the Proving Ground, as well as the general 
observation that the Interstate system reported fewer fatalities than other roadway types, 
Stonex was of the opinion that “what we must do is to operate the 90% or more of our 
surface streets just as we do our freeways… [converting] the surface highway and street 
network to freeway and Proving Ground road and roadside conditions” (Quoted in 
Weingroff, 2003, p. 147).  
With respect to single-vehicle crashes, Stonex found that roughly 80 percent 
errant vehicles came to a stop within 33 feet of leaving the travelway (Stonex and Skeels, 
1963). Based on this work, the AASHO committee concluded that eliminating fixed-
objects within 30 feet32 of the travelway would eliminate most fixed object crashes. It is 
important to observe that these findings were based solely on the observation of 56 run-
off-roadway events at the Proving Ground, as well as tire markings along the median of a 
25-mile (40-km) section of a highway in Illinois.33 No comparative examination of the 
relative crash performance of roadways with clear roadsides, and those without, were 
used in the adoption of this standard, nor was its applicability to other roadway classes or 
uses considered. Nevertheless, the 30-foot clear zone standard (with adjustments for 
sideslope) was subsequently incorporated into AASHO’s 1967 publication, Highway 
Design and Operational Practices Related to Highway Safety, as well as the revised and 
                                                 
31 An approach Nader openly criticized, not for its ineffectiveness, but for its attempt to shift the costs of 
safe design from motor vehicle manufacturers to the public, since infrastructure improvement costs are 
borne entirely by the public (Nader, 1965).  
32  Interestingly, Stonex’s 33 foot finding was rounded down to 30 feet, rather than up to 35, but this 
reduced width was nevertheless assumed to reduce 80% of run-off-roadway crashes.   
33 This study by Hutchinson and Kennedy (1967), while examining medians rather than roadsides, 
nevertheless serves as the basis for the roadside encroachment estimates used in the current ROADSIDE 
program. McLean (2002) re-analyzed these findings and found that they grossly over-estimate run-off-




expanded 1974 edition, and remains in the subsequent editions of the Roadside Design 
Guide (AASHTO, 1974; 2002; McLean, 2001; Weingroff, 2003).  
The Passive Safety Revolution 
Prior to the 1960s, safety was primarily addressed through attempts to educate 
drivers and enforce safe driving behavior. There is only limited discussion of the 
relationship between design and safety in the early design guidance. With respect to the 
selection of a roadway’s design speed, the controlling element in its design, the first 
edition of the Green Book states that the “design speed selected for a highway is 
determined by consideration of the topography of the area traversed, economic 
justification based on traffic volume, cost of right-of-way and other factors, traffic 
characteristics, and other pertinent factors such as aesthetic considerations” (AASHO, 
1940, p. 2). Safety is not included among the design criteria. Instead, safety is addressed 
by first determining the intended operating speed for the roadway, and then designing the 
roadway to ensure “safe and uniform vehicle operation” (p. 2).  
Sorenson (1984) examined the pre-1945 design guidance, and found that the 
discussion of safety differed markedly from contemporary practice. Indeed, the early 
perspective on safe roadway design was that safety could best be ensured by designing 
roadways to prevent, rather than forgive, unsafe driving behavior. Consider Harger and 
Bonney’s (1927) recommendation on how to address safety at sharp curves: “it is 
important that the driver is prepared to handle this difficult maneuver. This can be 




of the roadway leading up to the dangerous location” (p. 114). The recommendation here 
is to design a roadway to increase the driver’s preparedness for the oncoming curve 
through strategies aimed at both reducing approach speeds (shifts in horizontal 
alignment) as well as the subtle restriction of sight distances – both practices that current 
designers would regard as detrimental to a roadway’s safety performance. Yet in the early 
literature, there is no embedded assumption that drivers will necessarily leave the 
travelway, nor an assertion that higher design speeds and “forgiving” environments 
equate to enhanced safety performance. Indeed, the early edition of the Green Book 
cautions the designer that the provision of “wider lanes and shoulders may invite higher 
speeds” (1940, p. 2).  
The passive safety revolution fundamentally altered this view on roadway design, 
resulting in a dramatic change in design practice. The passive approach to transportation 
safety begins from the perspective that drivers will err, combined with the observation 
that there are fewer crashes on Interstates than on other roadways. Collectively, this 
resulted in the theoretical assertion that “highways built with high design standards put 
the traveler in an environment which is fundamentally safer because it is more likely to 
compensate for the driving errors he will eventually make” [emphasis added] (AASHTO, 
1974, p. 15).  
This perspective is still evident in the most recent edition of AASHTO’s Green 
Book, which remarks that “it is not generally possible for a design or an operational 




be as forgiving as practical to lessen the consequences of such failures.” (2001, p. 54). To 
ensure that roadways are safe for these deficient drivers, the Green Book states that 
the objective in design of any engineered facility used by the public is to satisfy the 
public’s demand for service in a safe and economical manner. The [highway] facility 
should, therefore, accommodate nearly all demands with reasonable adequacy and also 
should not fail under severe or extreme traffic demands… every effort should be made to 
use as high a design speed as practical to attain a desired degree of safety” (p. 66-67). 
 
 Since a roadway’s design speed is the controlling element in its design, embedded 
in the Green Book is the idea that by designing for the “failure state,” which is defined as 
high-speed, “extreme” driving behavior, the designer has ensured that a roadway is 
appropriately safe. Thus, designs that accommodate high-speed vehicle operations are 
viewed as being safety enhancements, allowing most transportation departments to list 
the provision of a “safe and efficient” transportation system as a single agency goal.  
 Robert Noland (2001) recently sought to understand whether conventional design 
practices enhance safety once one controls for intervening factors such as increased seat 
belt use and changes in demographic characteristics of the population. Using a negative 
binomial model, Noland found that “changes in highway infrastructure that have occurred 
between 1984 and 1997 have not reduced traffic fatalities and injuries, and have even had 
the effect of increasing total fatalities and injuries”  (Noland, 2001, p, 23). Noland and 
Oh (2004) repeated this analysis, reporting that “this paper has analyzed HSIS data for 




design is beneficial to safety. Our results tend to reject this hypothesis in contrast with 
standard assumptions in the traffic safety literature” (2004, p. 532).  
 Robert Noland is not the first to question contemporary safety practice. Ezra 
Hauer, perhaps the leading authority on the subject of highway design and safety, has 
recently written that: 
Our claim to professionalism in road safety is weak because our substantive professional 
knowledge in this field is underdeveloped. We have painstakingly developed standards 
and warrants to guide nominal safety considerations. Our knowledge of substantive safety 
consequences is lagging behind” (p. 8, 1999b).  
 
The empirical evidence on roadside safety specifically, and contemporary safety practice 
more generally, leads one to ask several important questions: do “forgiving” design 
practices necessarily equate to enhanced safety?  Further, is it true that forgiving design 
practices are appropriate in all design contexts? Might there be a better means of 






TESTING PASSIVE SAFETY 
  
Scientific honesty consists in specifying, in advance, an experiment such that, if the result 
contradicts the theory, the theory has to be given up. 
 - Irme Lakatos, 1974, p. 112 
 
 Chapter 4 examined the research on roadside safety, finding little empirical 
evidence to support the claim that clear zones enhance safety in urban environments. 
Instead, contemporary safety practice is based on the theoretical assertion that safety can 
be best ensured through the use of “fail-safe” designs. This approach, termed “passive 
safety,” begins by assuming that drivers will err in the course of their travel, and that the 
best means for addressing driver errors is to ensure that roadways and roadside 
environments are designed to minimize the consequences of high-speed, “extreme” 
driving behavior.  
The use of these extreme behaviors as the base design condition seems inherently 
logical from an engineering perspective. Structures such as bridges, for example, are 
designed to bear a specific minimum structural load. Identifying a “fail state” threshold 
value provides designers with a design value that can be used ensure a given level of 




engineering perspective encourages the identification of the “failure” condition (for the 
purposes of this study, a high-speed, run-off-roadway event), and to design a roadway to 
ensure that the roadway is safe in such an event. Thus, just as a bridge that can bear a 60-
ton load can also bear a 30-ton load, the passive safety perspective assumes that a 
roadway designed to be safe for 60 mph operating conditions is also safe for 30 mph 
operating conditions. Collectively, this sort of engineering reasoning has resulted in a 
professional tendency to adopt above-minimum design values as a strategy for enhancing 
a roadway’s safety (Ewing and King, 2002).  
While the engineering logic behind this approach has a high degree of face 
validity, it is not at all clear that human performance has the same characteristics as the 
performance of a structure. A key assumption embedded in the passive approach is that 
by designing for high-speed run-off-roadway events an adequate level of safety has been 
provided. Indeed, the Roadside Design Guide states that “regardless of the reason for a 
vehicle leaving the roadway, a roadside environment free of fixed objects with stable, 
flattened slopes enhances the opportunity for reducing crash severity” (AASHTO, 2002a, 
p. 1-2).  
Embedded in this approach is another assumption, which is that “forgiving” 
designs do not encourage behaviors that increase a driver’s probability of being involved 
in a run-off-roadway event. Driver error is instead treated as a randomly occurring event 
that is beyond the scope of control of the designer. But it overlooks several important 
questions: first, how do “average” drivers adapt their behavior to the use of forgiving 




widening lanes and shoulders and eliminating roadside objects, designers are encouraging 
“non-design drivers” to engage in behaviors that result in crashes and injuries?  
If the passive safety assertion that “the wider the clear zone, the safer it will be” 
(TRB, 2003, p. V-43) is true, then one would expect that increases in fixed-object offsets 
will result in fewer roadside crashes and injuries, or, in other words, that there should be 
a negative relationship between a roadway’s paved shoulder width and fixed object offset 
and its crash performance. Further, such practices should also not be offset in increases in 
other crash types that may be influenced by the design of the roadside environment. This 
chapter explicitly tests whether this theoretical assertion is applicable to the safety 
performance of urban arterial roadways.  
 
Methods and Data Sources  
 This analysis uses crash data for the Florida Department of Transportation 
[FDOT] District 5 for the 1999-2003 period, combined with line charts of a roadway’s 
geometric design characteristics and field measurements of shoulder widths and fixed-
object offsets. These data sources were used for several key reasons. First, a major 
problem with national data, such as FARS, is that it only provides information on fatal 
crashes, thus preventing injurious and non-injurious crashes from being considered in the 
crash totals. A second and even more critical flaw with FARS data is that it provides only 
limited information on the geometric and environmental characteristics of the site in 
which a crash occurred, and does not readily permit field investigations of specific crash 




roadside features on crashes frequency and severity. FDOT data, by comparison, provides 
not only information on all crashes – fatal, injurious and property-damage-only, but also 
route and milepost numbers that allow the crash locations to be specifically identified.   
 The ability to geo-locate specific crashes using FDOT data also allows this study 
to overcome a barrier common to most studies of roadside safety, which is that there is no 
readily-available secondary data source that provides detailed information on the 
characteristics of the roadside environment, thus preventing the roadside environment 
from being specifically modeled in analyses of roadside safety (Council and Stewart, 
1996; Hadi et. al., 1995; Lee and Mannering, 1999; Miaou, 1997). This limitation is 
readily evident in the roadside safety literature; typically, shoulder widths are used in lieu 
of the actual offset distances between the edge of the travelway and the location of the 
nearest fixed object. An accurate analysis of the safety effects of clear zone practices 
requires not just information on shoulder widths, but also on fixed-object offsets. Thus, 
while FDOT does not provide information on the roadside environment, the ability to 
geo-locate crashes allows this data to be collected through field observations and 
measurements.  
 FDOT District 5 was selected for both theoretical and logistical reasons. From a 
theoretical perspective, District 5 was valuable because it contained a large number of 
small metropolitan areas. Small metropolitan areas are desirable for analysis because they 
provide a high-degree of design variation along relative short roadway lengths, thus 




roadway’s crash performance, since shorter roadways will include a more homogeneous 
driver population and similar weather events. 
Further, since this study is interested in the safety performance of livable street 
treatments, roadways that included such treatments were specifically targeted for this 
analysis. Prior to conducting field investigations, it was impossible to determine whether 
a specific roadway incorporated a livable street treatment. Nevertheless, since pre-
automobile developments were necessarily designed around pedestrian, rather than motor 
vehicle, travel (Muller, 1995), the presence of a historic district along the length of a 
roadway is a useful indicator of a possible livable street treatment, prior to confirmatory 
field observations. FDOT District 5 includes a high concentration national-register-
designated or national-register eligible historic districts, including DeLand, Kissimmee, 
Leesburg, Maitland, Mt. Dora, Ocala, Sanford, and St. Cloud, among others. 
Beyond the theoretical usefulness of such an area, it also helped resolve a major 
logistical problem of this research, which was the need to manually collect field data on 
the road and roadside environment. Because of the high concentration of potentially 
relevant roadways, an examination of District 5 helped minimize the total travel needed 
to collect data for multiple sites. Further, because these roadways traveled across small 
metropolitan areas, I was able to collect field observations for a broad spectrum of urban 




 An additional logistical advantage was that the Florida Department of 
Transportation, in response to concerns about the safety of one of the roadways in this 
district (Colonial Drive in Orlando),34 had already aggregated five years of crash data into 
a single crash database. A key concern in any study of crash performance is the effect of 
regression-to-the-mean on study outcomes. Crash performance naturally varies over time, 
and the safety performance for any single year may fail to accurately capture the actual 
safety trends of a specific roadway. To address this issue, most safety studies recommend 
the use of a minimum of 3-years worth of crash data. The Florida DOT data, which 
provides a 5-year crash history for these roadways, is thus able to overcome potentially-
biased results associated with regression-to-the-mean.  
 
Modeling Crash Frequency and Severity 
 As detailed in the literature in Chapter 4, conventional studies on roadside safety 
analyze the relationship between geometric design and crash performance using 
multivariate statistical applications. Nevertheless, much of the existing literature is 
focused on rural-roadways generally, and two-lane rural highways specifically. Further, 
where urban areas are considered, they are typically aggregated together with data for 
rural roadways, preventing a thorough consideration of how, if at all, their safety 
performance may differ. To date, only Lee and Mannering (1999) have modeled urban 
roadside safety using an appropriate multivariate statistical technique, and although 
                                                 




finding important differences between roadside crash frequency in urban and rural 
environments, have not examined the nature of these differences. Thus, the first phase of 
this analysis begins by modeling the crash performance of urban roadways to determine 
if these authors’ findings were anomalous, or if they might perhaps be part of a broader 
safety pattern.  
 Design and Methodology 
A sizable portion of current safety literature is focused on the development of 
appropriate crash modeling techniques. To date, much of this literature is focused on the 
development of an appropriate alternative to linear regression models. Many early safety 
studies sought to apply linear regression models of crash rates to determine the crash 
reduction potential of various geometric elements, an approach that has been increasingly 
criticized as inappropriate. As Jovanis and Chang (1986) show, the variance of crash 
frequency increases with vehicle kilometers traveled, thus violating the linear regression 
model’s assumption of homoskedasticity.  
 Researchers have increasingly advocated techniques that are more appropriate for 
count data. Miaou and Lum (1993) compared Poisson regressions with conventional 
applications of linear regression models, and found that Poisson regression models were 
more appropriate for analyzing crash data. Yet a major shortcoming is that Poisson 
models assume that the mean and the variance are equal. In practice, crash data are 
overdispersed, with the variance exceeding the mean. To address this problem, a 




address overdispersion, with researchers consistently recommending the use of negative 
binomial models under these conditions (Karlaftis and Tarko, 1998, Lee and Mannering, 
1999; 2002; Milton and Mannering, 1998; Noland, 2001; 2003; Noland and Oh, 2004). 
The negative binomial is similar to the Poisson, except that it relaxes the assumption that 
the mean and variance are equal by incorporating a Gamma-based error term into the 
model (Milton and Mannering, 1998; Shankar et. al., 1995).35 Correspondingly, this study 
employs a negative binomial model to analyze crash performance.  
 
Candidate Site Selection 
While the presence of a national-register designated or eligible historic district 
along a roadway’s length was useful for determining whether it was worth further 
investigation, this criteria, by itself, did not lead to a roadway’s inclusion in this study 
(see Table 5-1 for a list of roadways that were investigated). Instead, the criterion for 
inclusion was whether the roadway incorporated a livable streetscape treatment along its 
length, with a livable streetscape treatment being defined as one that included both dense 
roadside development adjacent to the travelway, as well as aesthetic buffer features, such 
as landscaping or on-street parking, separating the pedestrian realm from adjacent motor 
vehicle traffic. In most cases, livable street treatments were not included on state 
roadways, either because the DOT constructed bypass routes around the downtown 
                                                 
35 The application of these models to safety analyses is well covered in the literature, both in textbooks, 
such as Cameron and Trivedi (1998) as well as in the recent safety literature (Milton and Mannering, 1998, 




business district (see Figure 5-1),36 or because ownership of the livable street section was 
ultimately transferred to the local jurisdiction (see Figure 5-2).  
Of the seventeen roadways visited for this study, only five met the livable street 
criteria – State Routes 15 and 44 in Deland, State Route 40 in Ocala, State Route 19 in 
Eustis, and State Route 526 (Robinson) in Orlando. SR 19 and 526 were ultimately 
excluded, however, because of their individual characteristics. SR 19 was excluded 
because, unlike the other roadways considered in this study, it splits into two one-way 
pairs as it approaches downtown Eustis, only half of which (Bay Street) contains a livable 
streetscape application. The operational characteristics of one-way streets are markedly 
different than conventional two-way applications, which can have an effect on a 
roadway’s crash performance. To prevent these differences from undermining the 






                                                 
36 While the cynical observer might argue that the decision to bypass these downtown districts is the sole 
reason for their current existence, the reality is that the Florida DOT is to be commended for not attempting 
to place a state highway through these excellent examples of Florida’s historic past. Indeed, St Cloud 





Table 5-1: Sites Visited During Field Investgations 
City 
State 




Apopka     
 SR 500 Orange Blossom Trail No Suburban arterial 
DeLand     
 SR 44 New York Ave Yes Candidate site 
 SR 15 Woodland Blvd Yes Candidate site 
Eustis     
 SR 19 Bay Street Yes One-way street 
 SR 44 Orange Ave No Suburban arterial 
Kissimmee     
 SR 600 Orange Blossom Trail Yes 
Livable section de-designated 
to local government – no crash 
data for the segment 
Kissimmee-
St. Cloud     
 SR 500 
Vine St/Space Coast 
Pkway/13th St No Suburban/rural arterial 
Maitland     
 SR 600 N. Mills Rd/N. Orange Av. No Suburban arterial 
Mt. Dora     
 SR 46/500 US 441 No Downtown bypass route 
Ocala     
 SR 40 Silver Springs Boulevard Yes Candidate site 
 SR 500 Pine Avenue No Suburban arterial 
Orlando     
 SR 526 Robinson Yes Little design variation 
 SR 600 Mills No 
Suburban arterial with some 
urban characteristics 
 SR 500 Orange Blossom Trail No 
Suburban arterial with 
aesthetic treatment 
 SR 50 Colonial Drive No 
Suburban arterial with some 
urban characteristics 
Sanford     
 SR 600 N. Orange Av No Suburban arterial 






Figure 5-1: Downtown St. Cloud and Mt. Dora – Bypassed by the DOT 
 
 






Figure 5-3: One-Way in Eustis 
 
SR 526 (Robinson Street), on the other hand, is bi-directional, traveling east and 
west through downtown Orlando to connect two major north-south arterials, Orange 
Blossom Trail (SR 500) with Mills Ave (SR 600). While this roadway contains design 
characteristics of value for assessing the safety effect of placing roadside object adjacent 
to the travelway (see Figure 5-4), it is only 2 miles in length and contains little variation 
in shoulder width (there is no shoulder) or fixed object setback (5 feet or less).37 
Correspondingly, it was excluded from this analysis.  
 
                                                 
37 Despite the limited offset distance depicted in Figure 5-4, not a single tree-related crash was reported for 









Ultimately, three streets were included in this phase of the analysis effort, State 
Routes 15 and 44 in DeLand, and State Route 40 in Ocala. Each of these roadways 
connects the historic downtown core of a small urban area with suburban and rural 
environments, and each contains a high degree of design variation along its length, 
ranging from pedestrian-oriented livable street treatments in the downtown core, to 
suburban and rural designs as these roadways extend out from the city center (see Figure 
5-5). Both DeLand and Ocala contain historic districts listed on the National Register of 
Historic Places, with all three of these roadways providing arterial access into and 





Figure 5-5: Design Variation in the Urbanized Areas of SR 15 (Woodland Blvd) and SR 




Variable Definitions: Dependent Variables and Hypothesized Relationships 
There are several dependent variables of interest to this phase of the analysis. The 
first is a measurement of the frequency and severity of fixed-object crashes occurring 
along each of the three candidate roadways. Passive safety practice assumes that by 
widening the distance between the outside of the vehicle travelway and the nearest 
roadside fixed object will enhance safety by allowing errant vehicles to come to a stop 
before encountering a fixed object. If so, than roadways with wider clear zones should 
report fewer total fixed-object crashes and fewer injurious fixed-object crashes than those 
without. 
For clear zones to be truly shown to enhance safety, however, it is not enough that 
they simply report a reduction in fixed-object crashes and injuries; they must also be 
shown not to be associated with increases in crash types that may be influenced by the 
design of the roadside. Thus, total midblock crashes are also analyzed. A midblock crash 
is defined as any crash that was not located at, or influenced by, an intersection or 
driveway. The midblock crash variable used in the following analysis consequently 
includes not only fixed-object related crashes, but also multiple-vehicle and vehicle-
pedestrian crashes as well. If it is true that passive safety practices enhance safety, then 
the reduction in fixed-object crashes should also result in a net decrease in midblock 
crashes, since fixed-object crashes will be reduced from the midblock totals without 





These two crash types (fixed-object and midblock) must further be divided into 
two categories: total crashes and injurious crashes. Total crashes are simply a measure of 
total crashes, without regard to a crash’s actual severity. Yet a crash that results only in 
property damage must be regarded as less important than a crash event that leads to death 
or injury. Thus, in addition to total crashes, injurious crashes, defined as a crash involving 
at least one injury or fatality, are also considered. Table 5-2, below, details each of the 
dependent variables, as well as the expected relationship they will have with an increase 
in paved shoulder widths and fixed-object offsets, assuming passive safety assumptions 
are true. 
 
Table 5-2: Crash Types and Currently Hypothesized Relationships With Increases in 
Paved Shoulder and Clear Zone Widths 
  Total Injurious 
Fixed Object Decrease Decrease 
Midblock Decrease Decrease 
   
 
Independent and Control Variables 
 The independent variables of interest to this study are shoulder widths and fixed-
object offsets, both of which were obtained through field measurements of the actual 
roadside environment in these locations. Yet the effects of the roadside environment 
cannot be considered independently of other cross-sectional effects, such as the number 




notable curvature, thereby eliminating the need to include this variable in the model. As 
recommended by Hauer (1997) average daily traffic is included in the model as a control 
variable to account for the effects of traffic volume on safety performance. Posted speed 
limits may also have an influence on safety, and are thus included in the models as a 
control variable as well. Further, as suggested by Ossenbruggen et. al (2001) and Naderi 
(2003), the overall configuration of these features in urban environments may play a key 
role in determining their safety effects. Correspondingly, this model also includes a 
dummy variable to determine whether the roadway segment was designed as a 
pedestrian-oriented livable street treatment.  
 
Operationalizing the Unit of Analysis 
 While the unit of analysis for this study is crash frequency and severity, it is 
necessary to convert roadways into individual units of observation that can be specifically 
analyzed (Babbie, 2001). Since geometric configurations vary along the length of a 
roadway, two specific approaches are available. The first is to identify evaluation 
segments based on the consistency of their geometric characteristics. The problem that 
emerges in such an approach, however, is that the roadway segments will be of varying 
lengths; since the length of a roadway segment is itself predictive of the number of 
crashes that may occur, such a unit of observation is undesirable.  
The alternative is to use a fixed-length section as the unit of observation. The 
major disadvantage of the use of a fixed-length sections is that the geometric design 




subject has found that the advantages of using fixed-length sections outweigh the 
problems associated with basing segment lengths solely on a roadway’s geometric 
characteristics (Lee and Mannering, 2002; Shankar et. al, 1995). Thus, fixed-length 
sections are used for this analysis. 
A second question of interest is the determination of the appropriate length of 
these segments. To date, there is no generally accepted method for determining the 
appropriate segment length. Shankar et. al. (1995) use 6 km [3.75 mile] sections, while 
Lee and Mannering opt for 805m (0.5 mile) sections. In the former case, section length 
was determined by its divisibility into the total roadway length; in the latter, it was 
chosen because the selected length produced the greatest number of significant variables.  
As neither approach has any meaningful theoretical basis, 0.25-mile (402 km) segment 
lengths are used in this analysis both because this unit corresponds well with pedestrian 
walking distances (and, interestingly enough, the lengths of the livable street sections, 
which are perfectly divisible into 0.25), as well because it helps minimize the number of 
roadway segments with internal design variation. Thus, the unit of observation is the 
number of total and injurious midblock and fixed-object crashes occurring along quarter-
mile segments of State Routes 15, 44 and 40 in the urban areas of DeLand and Ocala. 
A third issue relates to how geometric design features are to be aggregated to the 
individual segment. Neither of these earlier studies detailed how the authors aggregated 
their data when there were variations in the geometric design characteristics of the 
roadway. Two alternatives are available; the first is to average the design variations 




the majority of the segment to the segment as a whole. This study opted for the latter 
approach to ensure that the segment was as technically-accurate as possible. In either 
event, the short lengths of these segments (0.25 miles), produced relatively few instances 
where there where variations within an individual segment.  
A final issue, and one which is not addressed in the literature, is how to code the 
widths of lanes, shoulders and object offsets when they vary along a roadway segment. 
Nevertheless this proved not to be an issue with these roadways since most roadways 
used standard cross-sections, with both sides of the roadway using the same number of 
lanes, lane and median widths, shoulder widths, and object offsets. In the handful of cases 
where this proved not to be the case, the more conservative value was used.  
Model Results 
 Before proceeding to the model results, it is important to first clarify the statistics 
of interest. While most studies using negative binomial models simply report estimated 
coefficients and z or t38 statistics for variables that were significant at the 95% confidence 
level, this approach fails to take full advantage of the information actually contained in 
the data. Typical null hypothesis tests for statistical significance assume that if a variable 
cannot be shown to be statistically significant at a 0.05 level that one should then assume 
that the there is no relationship between the variables. Yet, as Hauer (2004) has shown, 
                                                 
38 While t is commonly reported (see, e.g., Lee and Mannering, 2002), z is the correct statistic when using 
100% counts of crashes. Thus, z, rather than t, is the statistic reported here. Nevertheless, the t distribution 




this practice can lead to the adoption of design strategies that result in increased crashes 
and injuries because it treats results that are not significant at the 95% confidence level as 
having no effect on safety.  
This problem can be readily illustrated using Noland and Oh’s (2004) finding that 
fatalities increased with an increase in shoulder widths, but then remarking that this 
finding was “not at a statistically-significant level.” While this assertion is technically 
correct, it leads many readers to thereby infer that since the authors are not 95% confident 
in the results, that they should assume that there is no relationship between fatalities and 
shoulder widths. In fact, the t-statistic for this variable was 1.4 (n=404), which 
corresponds to a one-tailed p-value of 0.08. Stating this statistic another way, one can be 
92% confident that wider shoulders will result in an increase in fatalities. Clearly, it is 
inaccurate to assume that a 92% level of confidence equates to no effect.  
 Hauer (2004) has found such interpretations to be so endemic to safety analyses 
that he advocates abandoning null hypothesis testing in favor of crash averages and 
confidence intervals. While this may be extreme, it is a well-founded point. 
Consequently, this study reports not only coefficients and significance levels for variables 
that enter significantly into the models, but for all modeled variables as well.39 Further, it 
also reports 95th percentile confidence intervals, since such statistics are much more 
                                                 
39 The current convention of only reporting variables that enter significantly at the 95% level is further 
indicative of the atheoretical nature of much of contemporary safety practice. Appropriately used, statistical 
models should be used to test an existing theory (the choice of independent variables is necessarily a theory 




useful for gauging the actual safety impacts of a specific design treatment than are simple 
z statistics. 
 Before proceeding to the model results, one further caveat is warranted. It is 
important to note that these models are theoretically driven. The objective here is not to 
develop a “best fit” model, but to instead determine whether the passive safety 
assumptions that drive contemporary safety practice are empirically validated. Thus, this 
analysis attempts to determine whether, when using appropriate data and analysis 
methods, current passive safety practices can be shown to enhance safety in urban 
environments. In other words, if it is true that wider clear zones necessarily enhance 
safety, then fixed object offsets and shoulders widths should result in a reduction in crash 
frequency and severity for both fixed-object and midblock crashes.  
 
Geometric Design and Roadside Safety 
 The following analysis models roadside safety as a function of a roadway’s 
geometric design. Roadside safety is here defined as a crash involving a roadside feature, 
including ditches, curbs, culverts, utility poles, and trees. The full geometric 
characteristics of a roadway are considered, including the number of lanes, their widths, 
as well as characteristics of the roadside environment, including the width of the paved 
portion of the shoulder and the distance of a fixed-object from the outside edge of the 
pavement (measured from either the outside edge of the travel lane or the outside edge of 
the paved shoulder, where a paved shoulder is provided). Since traffic volumes, the 




effect on a roadway’s safety performance, these variables are included here as control 
variables. Finally, a dummy variable indicating whether the segment incorporates a 
pedestrian-friendly livable street treatment is also included.  
 Table 5-3 presents the negative binomial model of total roadside crashes. The 
only passive safety variable that was related to declines in crash frequency at the 95% 
confidence level was the median width of a roadway. Moving beyond significance levels, 
however, and examining the signs of the coefficients and their confidence intervals, ADT 
entered with the expected sign, suggesting that roadside crashes increase with traffic 
volumes. The number of lanes was associated with an increase in roadside crashes, while 
lane widths and fixed-object offsets were both negatively associated with roadside 
crashes.  
  
Table 5-3: A Negative Binomial Model of Total Roadside Crashes 
 Coefficient Z Statistic 95% Confidence Interval 
ADT 0.0000267 1.05 -0.000023 0.0000764 
Speed Limit -0.019414 -0.62 -0.0811245 0.0422957 
# Lanes 0.0281937 0.13 -0.4062023 0.4625897 
Lane Width -0.099938 -0.62 -0.4157851 0.2159087 
Median Width -0.027056 -1.79 -0.0567412 0.0026294 
Paved Shoulder Width 0.0546558 0.85 -0.0716248 0.1809365 
Object Offset -0.038137 -1.51 -0.0874755 0.0112013 
Livable -1.532556 -2.33 -2.823685 -0.2414263 
 
N = 109 





Of the roadside variables, shoulder widths entered positively at the 80% 
confidence level, a finding that contradicts conventional roadside design guidance, but 
which is consistent with earlier research. More interesting, however, were the results for 
the fixed-object offset and livable street variables. Here, fixed-object offsets entered 
negatively with a z statistic of  -1.51, which corresponds to the 93% confidence level, 
indicating that safety is generally enhanced by widening the unpaved fixed-object offset 
along these roadways. While such a finding is supported by conventional design 
guidance, the livable street variable also entered significantly, and at the 0.009 level of 
confidence, which indicates that, in addition to being negative, one can be 99% certain 
that this finding is not the result of random chance. In other words, one can be highly 
confident that the presence of a livable street treatment will reduce the likelihood of a 
roadside crash.  
From a passive safety perspective, livable street designs, which incorporate 
roadside objects adjacent to the travelway to buffer the pedestrian from oncoming traffic, 
should be associated with roadside crash increases, not decreases. That this variable 
should emerge with a negative coefficient, and at a statistically-significant level, suggests 
that there is more at work in the design of safe roadside than simply assuring that errant 
vehicles can safety recover before encountering a hazardous fixed object. 
 While this model explains roadside crash frequency, what about roadside crash 
severity? As shown in Table 5-4, below, the model for roadside crash severity behaves 
similarly to that of roadside crash frequency, although with two notable exceptions. First, 




providing no variation that could be modeled) resulted in an over-inflated beta coefficient 
(-15 roadside injury crashes), and thus a reduced level of significance (z = 0.02). 
Adjusting for this lack of variation by adding a single injurious crash into one of the 
livable street cases produces a more meaningful beta coefficient of -2, and a z statistic of 
-1.75. The significance of fixed-object offsets increases to -1.65, which is statistically-
significant at the one-tailed level, but less so than the adjusted livable street variable.  
 
Table 5-4: A Negative Binomial Model of Injurious Roadside Crashes 
 Coefficient Z Statistic 95% Confidence Interval 
ADT 0.0000473 1.42 -0.0000181 0.0001127 
Speed Limit 0.0069163 0.15 -0.0824729 0.0963055 
# Lanes -0.1565274 -0.53 -0.7346002 0.4215455 
Lane Width -0.0976583 -0.41 -0.5621938 0.3668772 
Median Width -0.0268853 -1.32 -0.0668325 0.0130619 
Paved Shoulder Width 0.0807912 0.92 -0.0917357 0.253318 
Object Offset -0.0537517 -1.65 -0.1176546 0.0101512 
Livable -2.020123 -1.75 -4.284908 0.2446612 
 
N = 109 
Log Likelihood = -107 
  
Considered holistically, there is a seeming paradox indicated here, with roadside 
safety being enhanced by both widening object offsets, as well as by reducing them 
through the use of livable streetscape treatments. Again, it would appear that factors other 





Considering Net Safety Performance: An Analysis of Midblock Crashes 
 For passive safety assumptions to be empirically validated, it must be shown that 
they not only reduce roadside-related crashes, but also that they do lead to an increase in 
other related crashes. In other words, these practices should result in a net decrease in 
midblock crashes because they both reduce run-off-roadway events, while having little or 
no effect on the frequency and severity of other related crashes. As currently assumed, 
the “second line of defense” afforded by the provision of clear zones should reduce the 
frequency and severity of roadside-related crashes, while having no effect on multi-
vehicle or vehicle-pedestrian crashes. Thus, one would expect these practices to result in 
a net decrease in midblock crashes, defined here as all crashes not located in, or 
associated with, a driveway or intersection. Excluding the performance of intersections, 
which can be affected by such features as traffic control devices and traffic volumes on 
intersecting streets, wider clear zones should equate to enhanced midblock safety 
performance. 
 As shown in Table 5-5, the passive safety assumptions do not hold. While wider 
lanes are associated with increased midblock safety performance, neither shoulder widths 
nor fixed-object offsets were shown to reduce crashes. Both variables entered with 
positive coefficients, suggesting that, on average, these features actually increase the 
likelihood of a midblock crash. Conversely, the livable streets variable again entered with 
a negative coefficient, and with a z statistic of -1.66. Of the control variables, ADT 
entered at a statistically-significant level, as did lane and median widths, with both of 
these variables associated with statistically-significant reductions in midblock crash 





 Table 5-5: A Negative Binomial Total Model of Midblock Crashes 
 Coefficient Z Statistic 95% Confidence Interval 
ADT 0.0000603 4.46 0.0000338 0.0000868 
Speed Limit 0.0052272 0.29 -0.0305573 0.0410116 
# Lanes 0.1758359 1.33 -0.0827752 0.434447 
Lane Width -0.4355661 -3.39 -0.687361 -0.1837712 
Median Width -0.0226616 -2.68 -0.039212 -0.0061113 
Paved Shoulder Width 0.0034967 0.09 -0.0695613 0.0765546 
Object Offset 0.0033041 0.24 -0.0239571 0.0305653 
Livable -0.649918 -1.66 -1.416271 0.1164354 
 
N = 109 
Log Likelihood = -240 
 
 The net effect of conventional roadside safety practices on reducing injurious 
midblock crashes is likewise ambiguous. While wider lanes were associated with 
substantial reduction in midblock injury crashes, the same cannot be said for widening 
shoulders and fixed-object offsets. Based on the model results, one can be 92% confident 
that providing or widening paved shoulders in urban areas will actually increase 
midblock crash injuries. Further, while fixed-object offsets entered with a negative 
coefficient, it entered at such a low level of statistical significance as to be insubstantial. 
The 95th percentile confidence interval shows that the average safety benefit of increasing 
the offset to roadside fixed objects is approximately zero (see Table 5-6). In other words, 
unpaved fixed-object offsets had no effect, either positive or negative, on the number of 





Table 5-6: A Negative Binomial Model of Injurious Midblock Crashes 
 Coefficient Z Statistic 95% Confidence Interval 
ADT 0.0000539 3.9 0.0000268 0.000081 
Speed Limit -0.0009352 -0.05 -0.0388115 0.0369412 
# Lanes 0.1742244 1.27 -0.0936884 0.4421372 
Lane Width -0.4142634 -2.93 -0.6916505 -0.1368763 
Median Width -0.0237771 -2.65 -0.0413807 -0.0061735 
Paved Shoulder Width 0.0545745 1.39 -0.022513 0.1316621 
Object Offset -0.0007401 -0.05 -0.0293898 0.0279096 
Livable -0.5258942 -1.28 -1.329347 0.2775581 
 
N = 109 
Log Likelihood = -204 
  
While shoulder and offset widths entered positively into the model, the livable 
street dummy variable again entered negatively, with a z-statistic of -1.28. Although not 
significant at the 0.05 level, it does indicate that we can be 90% confident that such 
treatments will reduce total injurious midblock crashes. Further, it is worth noting that the 
presence of a livable street treatment, unlike either paved shoulders or fixed-object 
offsets, was consistently shown to lead to reductions in both crash frequency and severity 
and that, considered on the whole, one would expect such treatments to enhance a 
roadway’s midblock and roadside crash performance.  
The same cannot be said of widening shoulders and fixed-object offsets. As 
shown in Table 5-7, below, widening shoulders had no effect on total midblock crashes, 




Thus, this study, like many previous studies on this subject, finds that the empirical 
evidence does not support passive safety assumptions.  
 
Table 5-7: Estimated Effect of Various Roadside Design Strategies on Total and Injurious 
Crash Frequency, and Corresponding Test Statistics.  
 
Measure Paved Shoulders Object Offsets Livable Street Treatments 
Total Roadside Crashes Increase (0.93) Decrease (-1.45) Decrease (-2.33) 
Injurious Roadside Crashes Increase (0.94) Decrease (-1.65) Decrease (-1.75) 
Total Midblock Crashes No effect (0.09) Increase (0.24) Decrease (-1.66) 
Injurious Midblock Crashes Increase (1.39) No Effect (-0.05) Decrease (-1.28) 
 
  But if the provision of paved shoulders and clear zones is not a guaranteed means 
of enhancing safety, why might this be the case?  While other researchers have arrived at 
similarly anomalous conclusions, the reasons for such findings have remained largely 
unexplored. To better develop the theory and practice of roadside design, the next chapter 
of this dissertation moves beyond aggregate statistical applications to more thoroughly 




CHAPTER 6  
EXPLORING URBAN ROADSIDE SAFETY: A FIELD INVESTIGATION 
 
 While Chapter 5 sought to test the theory that governs contemporary roadside 
safety practice, this chapter seeks to better understand the nature of urban roadside 
crashes and injuries. Of particular interest is the relative safety performance of livable 
streetscape applications. These treatments utilize designs that are deliberately 
“unforgiving” by design. That they should be the only roadside design strategy to 
consistently report crash reductions suggests that other factors are involved in the design 
of safe roadsides than simply ensuring that they are forgiving to errant motorists. Thus 
this chapter moves beyond conventional safety expectations to better understand the 
nature of roadside crashes in urban environments. 
 
A Mixed-Methods Approach 
Despite the volume of literature and guidance on the subject of roadside safety, 
there have been very few studies that have actually examined the locations where run-off-
roadway crashes have occurred. Most contemporary studies on the subject employ 
secondary data sources to develop models of roadside safety performance, rather than 
conducting detailed field investigations of crash sites. Thus, in addition to collecting field 
measurements of a roadway’s geometric design and fixed object offsets, this study also 




Contemporary passive safety practices assume that roadside fixed-object crashes 
are random events that can be attributed to the driver error; indeed, up to 95% of all crash 
events are attributed to driver error, rather than to the roadway’s design (Carsten, 2002; 
Hauer, 1999b). Yet detailed site investigations suggest there is nothing random about the 
majority of these crashes. Before proceeding to the results of this analysis, however, it is 
essential to begin by briefly discussing the overall field analysis effort, which employs a 
combination of quantitative field measurements as well as qualitative observations. The 
sections below detail the methodological approach that guided the field analysis effort, 
followed by a detailed discussion of the results and findings.  
Field Measurement Methodology 
Multivariate statistical models are useful for identifying broad trends in large 
datasets, but they do not provide detailed qualitative information on the phenomenon 
being observed. In addition to obtaining field measurements, this study also identified the 
locations of tree and utility pole crashes along these three roadways. Trees and utility 
poles were selected for specific analysis because they could be readily identified. Signs 
and ditches, the two other prevalent crash types along these roadways, were much harder 
to identify, ditches because it is impossible to determine where, exactly, such a crash 
occurred (ditches are typically used for roadside drainage, and extend linearly along the 
length of the travelway), and signs because, in most cases, they occurred near 
intersections where multiple signs were present, making it difficult to isolate the specific 
sign involved in the crash. Trees and utility pole crashes, on the other hand, were much 




the milepost number listed in the crash data, making the object involved in the crash 
readily identifiable.  
  Crashes for this analysis were further restricted to roadside crashes only. Crashes 
involving a medians were beyond the scope of this study. Thus, the totals for tree-related 
crashes were reduced from 25 to 20. As no poles were located in medians for these 
roadways, pole-related crash totals were not affected. In short, 51 candidate pole and tree 
crash locations were selected for specific field investigation.  
Of these 51 objects, the locations of 40 (78%) were precisely located, although for 
the remaining eleven, the specific tree or pole involved in the crash could not be precisely 
identified. The inability to locate a specific crash appears to be the result of one or more 
of two possible reasons. First, in some locations, individual trees could not be identified 
due to the density of the tree cover adjacent to the roadside (see Figure 6-1). In other 
others, the object could not be identified because no tree or pole could be found at the 
location listed for the milepost. Whether the inconsistency between the data and the site 
location was a product of data coding errors, or else a subsequent elimination of the 





Figure 6-1: A Tree Crash Location that Could Not Be Exactly Identified 
 
Qualitative Observational Data 
During the course of examining and measuring these roadways, I was also an 
active participant on them, driving and walking along many high-crash locations for 
roughly 10 hours a day for a 14-day period. As such, I both observed and (unwittingly) 
participated in many driving events that cast an important light on the nature of run-off-
roadway crashes. Thus, in addition to simply reporting the results of my field 
measurements, I also include qualitative field observations and ad-hoc follow-up 
investigations that help illuminate the nature of run-off-roadway crash events. While 
these observations and analyses are qualitative in nature, the inadequacy of the current 




effort. This approach, termed participant observation, is uncommon in the field of 
engineering, but is well established in the social sciences, where it is regarded as a 
superior data source for investigating complex phenomenon. Indeed, as Becker and a 
Geer (1970) write: 
The most complete form of sociological datum, after all, is the form in which the 
participant observer gathers it: an observation of some social event, the events 
which precede and follow it, and explanations of its meaning… before during and 
after its occurrence. Such a datum gives us more information about the event 
under study than data gathered by any other sociological method (p. 133). 
 
 As detailed by Patton (2002) participant-observation has many advantages over 
conventional quantitative analyses. First, unlike many quantitative analyses that rely 
heavily on variables included in pre-existing data sources, field observations place the 
researcher in direct contact with the environment or social setting where the phenomenon 
of interest occurs, thereby providing a richer source of data than is contained within a 
given quantitative data set. Further, because it frees a researcher from prior 
conceptualizations (as determined by the operationalization of specific data variables), it 
allows him or her to be discovery-oriented, identifying and examining phenomenon that 
often escape more rigidly-quantified studies. Indeed, as will be discussed in the sections 
that follow, my experience provided key insights into the nature of these crashes that 
have been overlooked in conventional studies relying exclusively on quantitative 




researcher to use personal insights and reflections to develop a more complex 
understanding of a phenomenon of interest.  
Despite these advantages, a major concern is the role of the researcher in the 
selection, analysis and interpretation of the qualitative data. To address concerns about 
researcher bias in the use of personal observation, I have deliberately sought to 
triangulate my findings, combining quantitative data with qualitative observations and 
insights that elaborates their meaning. Thus, my personal observations are limited 
exclusively to those findings suggested by the data, and are conveyed as illustrative cases 
intended to elaborate on the meanings and implications of the quantitative findings.  
 
Examining Object Offsets 
 Previous studies on roadside safety that have included field measurements have 
largely used these findings to estimate threshold values for fixed-object offsets. Turner 
and Mansfield (1990), for example, found that roughly 80% of all tree-related crashes in 
the City of Hunstville, Alabama occurred within 20 feet of the right of way, data that 
were similar to Ziegler’s (1987) findings of tree-related crashes in rural Michigan. A 
similar analysis was conducted on the data used in this analysis, which likewise found 
that 80% of roadside crashes involving roadside trees occurred within 20 feet of the 
travelway (see Figure 6-2). Further, such statistics are even more pronounced when one 
examines crashes involving utility and light poles – fully 90% occurred within 20 feet of 
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Figure 6-2: Tree-Related Crashes by Roadside Offset 
 
In previous studies, such statistics are used to suggest that roadways with wider 
fixed-object offsets are less likely to experience a crash event; since only 20% of the 
crashes occur when offsets are greater than 20 feet, the assumption is that 80% of 
roadside crashes can be eliminated through the provision of a 20-foot wide clear zone. 
Yet one should be cautious about such interpretations of these statistics. The fact that a 
small percentage of crashes occur on roadway segments with offsets greater than 20 feet 
may simply be a result of the fact that there are few roadway segments that have offsets 
more than 20 feet. None of these earlier studies has compared their statistics against the 
















0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40















Figure 6-3 Pole Crashes by Roadside Offset 
 
When one compares the cumulative frequency distributions of total roadside 
crashes to the cumulative frequency distribution for roadside offsets, the slopes are very 
similar (see Figure 6-4). Roadside crashes along segments with widths up to 15 feet 
almost perfectly matches the slope of the number of segments with these offset widths, 
which suggests that the probability of a fixed-object crash is roughly constant for all 
roadways with offsets up to 15 feet. As clear zones widen from 15 to 30 feet, there 
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Figure 6-4: Total Fixed Object Crashes and Offset Frequency 
 
 
Further, when one limits this analysis to only injurious roadside crashes, the 
slopes become almost identical. As shown in Figure 6-5, below, the slopes of injurious 
roadside crashes almost exactly matches the distribution of segments with specific fixed-
object offset widths. Stating these statistics another way, widening clear zones beyond 15 
feet appears to have a slight effect on reducing crash frequency, but almost no effect on 
the probability of an injurious or fatal crash. Note that these findings are very similar to 
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Figure 6-5: Injurious Fixed Object Crashes and Offset Frequency 
 
 
Considering the Causes of Roadside Crashes 
If forgiving roadside design does little to explain the safety performance of urban 
roadways, how is the designer to design safe roadsides in these environments? A major 
problem with the conventional literature on roadside safety is that it is oriented towards 
understanding the degree to which such practices enhance safety, paying little attention to 
the factors that actually lead to a run-off-roadway event. Indeed, there is nothing in the 
literature to suggest that these crashes are attributable to anything other than random error 




purely the result of random and unpreventable errors on the part of the driver, or might 
there perhaps systematic patterns to these crashes that would allow them to be addressed 
through enhanced design practices?   
One of the most interesting findings of the field analysis effort was that there was 
indeed a systematic regularity to the locations involving tree and pole crashes. As shown 
in Table 6-1, 83% of identified trees and utility poles – and 65% of the total – were 
located at driveways or intersections. This is a substantially high proportion, particularly 
when one considers the fact that intersections and driveways comprise a small percentage 
of the length of any given roadway.  
 
Table 6-1: Location of Pole and Trees Involved in Fixed-Object Crashes 
Location Pole Tree Total Pct. (Identified) Pct. (Total) 
Intersection 22 5 27 67.5% 52.9% 
Driveway 4 2 6 15.0% 11.8% 
Midblock/Not at Intersection 3 4 7 17.5% 13.7% 
Not Located 4 7 11  21.6% 
Total 33 18 51  100.00% 
 
Figure 6-6, below, shows a highly representative example of an urban run-off-
roadway crash. At this location, and indeed at majority of crash locations that I visited, 
the offending fixed object is located behind a side street or driveway, suggesting that the 
crash is not so much a product of a random run-off-roadway event, but instead the result 




a vehicle making a right-turn from the main arterial is headed directly into the utility pole 
located behind the side street; the only thing preventing a head-on crash with this utility 
pole is the ability of the driver to successfully negotiate the turn.  
 
 
Figure 6-6: A Representative Urban Fixed-Object Crash Location 
 
But if such a high proportion of these crashes are associated with driveways and 
intersections, a key question is this: why have researchers not identified this trend earlier? 




accident reports, which are used to develop the datasets used in conventional crash 
analyses. To evaluate the accuracy of the data for these roadways, I compared my own 
field observations with the information included in the FDOT dataset.  As shown in Table 
6-2, our findings agreed for only half of the total cases. While I could not locate 11 of 
these fixed objects (22%), part of these were attributable to the density of tree cover 
along the roadside. More important, however, is the discrepancy between the actual 
location of an object, and its reported location in the police-reported crash statistics. 
While I located 33 crashes at a driveway or intersection, the police-reported data included 
only 25. Of these, my field observations and the police-reported data agree for only 19 of 
the cases, although 3 were coded as having occurred at a driveway or intersection where I 
was unable to locate the specific object.  
 
Table 6-2: Location of Pole and Tree Crashes – Field Observations vs. Police Reports.  
  Police Reported Location   
Field Identification Intersection Driveway Not at Intersection Total 
Intersection 19 1 7 27 
Driveway 2 0 4 6 
Not At Intersection 0 0 7 7 
Not Located 2 1 8 11 
Total 23 2 26 51 
 
Assuming that crashes involving trees or poles that I could not specifically locate 
occurred at the reported location, this places 36 roadside crashes behind a driveway or 




rule-of-thumb correction factor for estimating the number of crashes that occurred at a 
driveway or intersection. In this case, intersection crashes were under-reported by 44%. 
To convert reported intersection-related crashes to the observed totals, one can multiply 
the reported total by 1.44 to arrive at actual totals. To equalize the totals, the difference 
between the reported and actual intersection crashes can be subtracted from the number 
of crashes reported as having occurred midblock/not at an intersection.  
I further sought to determine whether the same role of intersections and driveways 
held constant for all roadside crashes occurring on each of these three roadways (see 
Table 6-3). As reported in the police statistics, roughly half of all roadside crashes 
occurred at an intersection or driveway – the same percentage as reported in the crash 
data for tree and pole crashes. Thus, assuming the same 1.44 correction factor, the total 
number of intersection and driveway-related crashes would appear to be roughly 70%. 
Regardless of whether the actual number is 50% or 70%, these figures nevertheless raise 
an important concern – specifically, that a startlingly high proportion of roadside crashes 
involve intersections and driveways.   
 
Table 6-3: Location of All Roadside Crashes, Reported and Adjusted 
 Police-Reported Intersection-Adjusted 
Location Count Pct. Count Pct. 
Not at Intersection 57 52% 34 31% 
Intersection/Driveway 52 48% 75 69% 





Turning Movements and Run-off-Roadway Events 
 The high percentage of run-off-roadway crashes occurring at driveways and 
intersections suggests that turning maneuvers are responsible for many roadside crashes. 
Typically, most basic examinations of crash data look only at the vehicle maneuver 
information encoded into crash databases, an analysis approach that is misleading. For 
example, knowing that a vehicle is traveling straight ahead is useful, but it is also 
necessary to know the direction in which the vehicle was traveling. As I discovered from 
my analysis of the FDOT data, while the majority of these vehicles were listed as 
traveling “straight ahead” (73%), a substantial proportion was listed as traveling straight 
ahead in the direction of the side street. In other words, the crash occurred after the 
vehicle had completed (or attempted to complete) a turning maneuver and was 
consequently traveling straight ahead in the direction of the side street, not the main 
arterial. Thus, in attempting to understand the possible influence of turn-related driving 
maneuvers on fixed-object crash events, I have combined turns and “wrong direction” 
crashes into a single category, with a “wrong direction” crash identified as a crash that 
was both located at an intersection and which was also traveling in the direction of the 
side street, rather than the main arterial.  
To illustrate this phenomenon, Figure 6-7 shows the location of a crash involving 
a tree (pictured in foreground). In this case, the crash is recorded as having occurred been 
a “straight-ahead” crash, but the direction of the crash was east – the direction in which 
the side street departs from the main arterial (SR 15, in this case). This information, 




turning maneuver,40 is indicative of the need to look at not only the police-reported 




Figure 6-7: A Left-Turn Crash Involving a Tree, Reported as “Straight Ahead” 
  
Table 6-4, below, shows the results of this analysis for all crashes occurring on 
these roadways. In this case, 54% were identified as either engaging in a turning 
maneuver, or else just having completed a turning maneuver and thus traveling in the 
                                                 




“wrong” direction.” These percentages are similar (54% vs. 48%) to the raw number of 
crashes identified as having occurred at a driveway or intersection. This suggests that the 
same correction factor may apply, raising the number of roadside crashes associated with 
a turning maneuver to 78%. Regardless of whether a correction factor is appropriate, it 
can be definitively stated that at least half of these crashes involved a turning movement, 
although the results of the field analysis suggests this percentage may be as high as 75%.  
  
Table 6-4: Vehicle Maneuver/Direction Prior to a Fixed-Object Crash 
Direction Count Percent 
Straight Ahead 40 36.7% 
Wrong Direction/Turn 59 54.1% 
Other/Unknown 10 9.2% 
Total 109 100.0% 
 
The Anatomy of a Roadside Crash: A Qualitative Discussion 
Quantitative data are limited in their ability to explain the factors that result in a 
fixed-object crash event. In the course of collecting field data, I visited many locations 
where these crashes occurred, and in doing so, came close to being involved in one 
myself, an experience that provided insights into the precipitating causes of run-off-
roadway crashes. This experience, while purely qualitative, proved to be much more 




My near run-off-roadway event occurred at the intersection of Heavensgate 
Road41 and SR 15 in DeLand. This roadway is located just outside the urban area 
boundary that delimits the study area used for this analysis. At this location, SR 15 is a 4-
lane, median-separated arterial with a posted speed limit of 55 mph. Figure 6-8, below, 
faces south towards downtown DeLand, the direction in which I was traveling at the time 
of the event. In this case, I was traveling slightly less than the posted speed limit (roughly 
45-50 mph) and attempting to locate Heavensgate Road. 
 
 
Figure 6-8: SR 15 and Heavensgate Road 
                                                 




After reading the sign,42 I reduced my operating speed to turn from SR 15 onto 
Heavensgate Road, and soon discovered that although I was traveling well below the 
posted speed limit, I was still traveling much too fast to safely negotiate the turn, with my 
vehicle trajectory aimed directly towards the ditch located behind the arterial. While I 
was able to avoid crashing into the ditch through a combination of hard braking and sharp 
turning, I must re-iterate that I attempted this maneuver at less than the posted speed 
limit, during the day, and on dry pavement. Under less ideal conditions, this maneuver 
may very well have had a dramatically different outcome. 
The nature of this crash is radically different than that assumed in the hypothetical 
design scenarios used in crash testing and simulations. Because passive safety practice 
assumes that run-off-roadway events are the product of random error on the part of the 
driver, these crashes are generally assumed to occur at midblock locations. Thus, the 
procedure for simulating a crash event proposed under NCHRP 350 encourages the use 
of a 25-degree angle for crash testing (TRB, 1993), and more recent research, also using 
hypothetical scenarios, rather than real-world observations, has further recommended 
reducing the crash angle to 20 degrees (Mak and Bligh, 2002). Yet the angle of impact 
for this crash would not have been 20- or 25-degrees, but head-on.  
Despite the attention paid to the provision of clear zones and forgiving roadsides, 
current roadside safety practices would have had exactly no effect on reducing the 
roadside hazard of this location – the hazard here was not the “random” driver error 
                                                 




assumed by passive safety principles, but instead a roadside hazard that was 
systematically designed into the roadway under the auspices of enhancing its safety. Two 
factors are involved – the first is the posted (and thus operating) speed of the primary 
arterial, and the second is the placement of the roadside hazard. 
 
Design Speed 
The first factor was the posted speed of SR 15 (55 mph), which is altogether too 
high to allow a driver to successfully to negotiate a turn onto this side street. While the 
engineer responsible for the design of the arterial may assert that the design of side streets 
is the responsibility of the local jurisdiction, the reality is that the prevailing design speed 
for the arterial strongly influences the speed at which the driver will attempt to negotiate 
a turn. Asserting that the designer of the driveway or intersection is solely responsible for 
this crash events results in design practices that systematically incorporate driver error 
into the roadway’s design. 
There is a double-hazard involved here. On one hand, a driver attempting to 
safely negotiate this turn must decelerate well below the posted speed limit to 
successfully negotiate the turn. Yet the problem that emerges is that drivers approaching 
from the rear expect lead vehicles to be traveling at or near the roadway’s prevailing 
operating speed (which often differs dramatically from a roadway’s posted speed). My 
casual observation of mid-day operating speeds for this section of SR 15 was that the 
typical vehicle was traveling at roughly 70 mph. Requiring a driver to decelerate to 20 




turning vehicle and a vehicle approaching from the rear. As is patently obvious, such 
dramatic differentials between lead and following vehicles creates a latent opportunity for 
a rear-end collision. Further exacerbating the problem is the expectation of following 
vehicles that the lead vehicle will travel at or above the posted speed limit. Following 
vehicles appear to be largely unprepared to quickly react to decelerations on the part of a 
lead vehicle.  
Additionally, the drivers of lead vehicles preparing to negotiate a turn are likewise 
aware of the potential for a rear-end collision, an awareness that results in a willingness 
to undertake higher-than-desirable turning maneuvers to avoid being rear-ended by an 
approaching vehicle. Thus, in an attempt to avoid an immediate hazard – a rear-end 
collision – drivers may engage in behaviors that can lead to a run-off-roadway event.  
These hazards are also socially-reinforced. One thing I noticed during the course 
of traveling along this roadway was drivers following a lead vehicle were highly 
impatient when the lead vehicle attempted to decelerate in front of them, responding by 
hitting their horn (indicating an inter-personal offense), as well as taking aggressive 
reactionary maneuvers, such as rapidly shifting to the inside lane to pass the decelerating 
vehicle. This latter maneuver thus creates the possibility of a sideswipe crash, as a 
reacting driver that shifts into the inside lane may thus crash into a third vehicle already 
traveling in this location. Thus, the use of high design speeds in areas where driveways 
and intersections are present seem to result in the increased possibility of not only run-






By itself, attempting to undertake the turn at a high speed would not be 
particularly hazardous, provided the area behind the side street were free of fixed-objects 
or other roadside hazards. In this case, a driver would simply leave the travelway behind 
the side street or intersection. Yet the second problem that arises is that current roadside 
design practices can result in the placement of roadside objects in the location where 
they are most likely to be struck. Currently, the professional assumption is that the farther 
back an object is placed from the primary arterial, the safer the roadway will be. There is 
no consideration of the roadside safety hazard posed by drivers attempting to accomplish 
turning maneuvers from arterials to side streets in the literature.  
For Heavensgate Road, the object that posed the greatest potential hazard was 
neither the mailbox nor the sign post, both located within the “clear zone,” but the ditch, 
which was located 36 feet from the edge of the travelway, exceeding even the 
recommended clear offset distance by 6 feet. A safety audit of this location, were one 
conducted, would not have identified the ditch as being a potentially hazardous roadside 
feature, but would instead have concluded by recommending the elimination of the 
mailbox and sign post – eliminations which would have had exactly no effect on the 
actual crash performance of this location. Indeed, between 1999 and 2003, neither the 
pole nor the signpost were involved in a crash event, while two injuries were associated 
with a vehicle crashing into the seemingly “safe” ditch located directly behind 




This is far from the only location where such hazards emerge. Figures 6-6 and 6-7 
both depict variations on the same theme – a turning maneuver that places a fixed-object 
directly in the vehicle’s trajectory. In Figure 6-7, like the Heavensgate Road example 
above, the object involved in a roadside crash in not the one located nearest to the 
travelway, but instead the tree set back 20 feet from the main thoroughfare. Again, a 
safety audit of this location would identify the utility poles and shrubbery as being 
hazardous, but would leave the real hazard – the tree on the side street –fully intact.  
Considering the Overall Design Implications 
 The results of these findings have two important implications on roadside safety, 
both of which have been suggested above. The high percentages of intersections and 
turning maneuvers associated with these crash events (between 65-83%), suggests that 
run-off-roadway events are not simply the result of random driver error, but may in fact 
be hazards that have been systematically designed into the roadway under the auspices of 
enhancing its safety. From a safety perspective, there is a clear need to more thoroughly 
examine the role that intersections and turning maneuvers have on roadside safety, 
paying particular attention to how the combination of an arterial’s design and operating 
speeds influence both the speed at which a driver attempts to negotiate a turn, as well as 
how to design intersections and driveways prevent these events. Assuming that the 
combination of a high design speed and a wider roadside object offset enhances safety is 
not sufficient for ensuring that a roadside is safe. As detailed in the examples above, a 
safety audit based on passive safety assumptions would have done little to address the 




 A further implication of these findings is that the assumptions on which most 
conventional roadside crash tests are based may be inadequate for addressing real-world 
crashes. NCHRP 350 currently recommends the use of a 25-degree crash angle when 
modeling the performance of roadside features such as guardrails (TRB, 1993), and 
recent work on the subject has recommended further reducing the measured angle of 
impact to 20 degrees (Mak and Bligh, 2002). These angles are based on the assumption 
that run-off-roadway events involve random midblock encroachments onto the roadside. 
Yet this study finds that these events are typically not random, and are more likely than 
not to involve a vehicle striking an object on the side street, rather than an object located 
midblock on the major roadway. In these cases, the angle of impact is not 25 degrees, as 
currently assumed, but head on.  As such, there may be a need to update NCHRP 350 
standards. 
 
Reconsidering Livable Streets  
Unlike clear zones and paved shoulders, livable street treatments were found to be 
consistently associated with reductions in both roadside and midblock crashes. In other 
words, these treatments reduced not only the probability of a roadside crash, but also the 
likelihood that reductions in roadside crashes were offset by increases in other crash 
types influenced by the design of the roadside environment.  Stated simply, such 





In this study, four individual livable streetscape applications were identified, two 
on SR 15 (Woodland Blvd) in Deland, and one each on SR 44 (New York Ave) and SR 
40 in Ocala. All four livable sections roughly correspond to the boundaries of four unique 
national-register designated historic districts, and incorporate streetscape treatments 
aimed at enhancing the pedestrian character of the street.  Table 6-5, below, provides a 
summary of these streets.  
It is important to recognize that these roadways incorporate streetscape treatments 
that are seemingly undesirable from a conventional roadside safety perspective. In these 
cases, roadside objects are deliberately located adjacent to the travelway to buffer the 
pedestrian environment from oncoming traffic, and are intentionally “unforgiving” by 
design. Further, the widest offset on any of the four roadways is 4 feet, much less than the 











Table 6-5: Livable Street Sections 
Livable Street Section Illustrations 
SR 15, Downtown DeLand 
•  Length: 0.5 Miles 
•  2 x 12 ft Lanes 
•  4 ft Object Offset 
•  Center Turn Lane at 
Intersections 
•  Intermittent On-Street 
Parking 
 
   
SR 15 Stetson Campus 
•  Length: 0.5 Miles 
•  2 x 12 ft Lanes 
•  4 ft Object Offset 
•  10’ Paved Median 
•  Tree-Lined Along Length 
 
   
SR 44, Downtown DeLand 
•  Length: 0.75 Miles 
•  2 x 11 ft Lanes 
•  2 ft Object Offset 
•  Intermittent On-Street 
Parking 
   
SR 40, Downtown Ocala 
•  Length: 0.25 Miles 
•  4 ft Object Offset 
•  4 x 12 ft Lanes 
•  13 ft Raised Median 
•  Boulevard-type Access Lane 
on South Side of Street  






A key question for this study is whether these design applications are more or less 
safe than one would expect when compared against the typical crash performance of the 
urban sections of the roadways on which they are located. To evaluate this, I normalized 
crashes for both the livable sections individually, as well as the three urban roadways as a 
whole, by the number of crashes per 100 million vehicle miles traveled43 on these 
roadways during the 5-year period, thereby developing a measure of exposure that could 
be used to directly compare safety performance. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize 
that VMT does not have a linear relationship with crash performance (Ivan et. al., 1999), 
which may be attributable to the fact that high levels of congestion during peak periods 
can have the dual effect of both increasing the denominator of the measure (vehicle miles 
traveled) while simultaneously reducing operating speeds, the combination of which may 
underestimate a roadway’s actual hazard during low-volume, free-flow travel periods 
(such as late night travel). As a secondary means for comparing their relative safety 
performance, I also evaluated them based on the number of crashes per mile, a metric 
which makes no assumptions about the relationship between traffic volumes and safety 
performance.  
Table 6-6, below, reports the results of this analysis. As is readily evident, the 
livable sections are markedly safer than the urbanized portions of these roadways as a 
whole. Collectively, livable street sections reported 67% fewer total roadside crashes per 
vehicle mile traveled, and 100% fewer injurious roadside crashes. Comparing crashes per 
mile, the livable sections had 50% fewer total crashes, and 100% fewer injurious crashes. 
                                                 
43 Vehicle miles traveled is computed as the average daily traffic for the roadway or roadway section * the 




In short, there can be no doubt that livable street treatments are safer than one would 
expect from baseline roadway averages, particularly for injurious crashes. Indeed, that 
not a single injurious roadside crash occurred on these roadways during the 5-year 
evaluation period is a profoundly important finding. 
 
Table 6-6: Roadside Crash Performance of Urban Roadways vs. Livable Sections 
   Crashes Per 100 MVMT Crashes Per Mile 













SR 15 Total Roadside 7.1 3.2 -55.0% 3.5 1 -71.7% 
  Injurious Roadside 4 0 -100.0% 2 0 -100.0% 
SR 44 Total Roadside 11.4 6.1 -46.3% 5.5 1.3 -75.7% 
  Injurious Roadside 5.8 0 -100.0% 2.8 0 -100.0% 
SR 40 Total Roadside 15 15.7 4.0% 3.5 8 128.6% 
  Injurious Roadside 9.2 0 -100.0% 2.1 0 -100.0% 
Averages Total Roadside 10.1 3.3 -67.3% 4 2 -50.0% 
  Injurious Roadside 5.7 0 -100.0% 2.3 0 -100.0% 
 
Individually, one finding bears noting. Specifically, SR 40 in Ocala reports a 
much higher total percentage (128%) of roadside crashes per mile than the comparison 
roadway. But this may be a misleading estimate. In this case, two crashes occurred on a 
0.25 mile roadway section, thus producing a crash rate of 8 crashes per mile. 
Nevertheless, both of these crashes involved a single median tree, rather than a tree 
located in the “pedestrian buffer zone.” Further, neither of these crashes involved an 




 While most objections raised in the use of livable street applications relate to their 
safety effects, the fact that these roadways to produce substantially fewer roadside 
crashes than their more “safe” counterparts, as well as a complete elimination of 
roadside-related injuries and fatalities, leads to another important question: how do these 
design applications affect midblock crash performance? As shown in Table 6-7, the 
livable sections reported fewer total and injurious crashes than one would expect from the 
baseline roadway averages. Considered in aggregate, one would expect livable street 
applications to produce between 40-55% fewer total midblock crashes, and between 30-
45% fewer injurious midblock crashes. Further, of the midblock injury crashes that 
occurred on the livable roadways, none – whether involving a motorist of a pedestrian – 
involved a fatality. Considered holistically, the safety benefits of these roadways are 
substantial, suggesting that such treatments might not only be a useful strategy for 
enhancing a roadway’s livability, but its safety as well.   
 
Table 6-7: Midblock Crash Performance of Urban Roadways vs. Livable Sections 
   Crashes Per 100 MVMT Crashes Per Mile 













SR 15 Total Midblock 31.9 28.6 -10.5% 16.0 9.0 -43.8% 
  Injurious Midblock 22.7 22.2 -2.2% 11.4 7.0 -38.5% 
SR 44 Total Midblock 37.1 18.3 -50.7% 8.7 4.0 -54.2% 
  Injurious Midblock 27.7 18.3 -33.9% 6.5 4.0 -38.6% 
SR 40 Total Midblock 42.0 15.7 -62.8% 18.0 8.0 -55.6% 
  Injurious Midblock 25.7 7.8 -69.5% 11.0 4.0 -63.6% 
Averages Total Midblock 38.3 23.1 -39.7% 15.2 7.0 -54.0% 




Livable Streets vs. Conventional Urban Arterials 
  The data on both midblock and roadside safety point to a consistent trend – 
specifically, that livable street treatments are not only less hazardous than one would 
expect based on the prevailing design guidance, but that such applications, properly 
designed, might even constitute a substantial safety enhancement. As with run-off-
roadway events more generally, it would appear that the feature that is responsible for the 
improved safety performance of the livable roadways is their operating speed. Regardless 
of the time of day (I had the opportunity to drive these roadways both during the day and 
at night during my field visits), the constrained design environment of the livable 
roadway sections seems to encourage lower overall operating speeds and thus an 
increased ability to quickly respond to potential hazards.  
For the downtown sections of SR 15, SR 44 and SR 40, these low speeds can be 
partially attributed to the frequent spacing of signalized intersections. Yet it does not 
account for the low operating speeds I observed for the livable section of State Road 15 
that travels through the Stetson University campus. There are 6 intersections along this 
stretch of roadway, but only one, at the northernmost edge of the section, contains any 
form of stop control (in this case, a signalized intersection). As a result, the only factor 
influencing a driver’s operating speed is his or her own personal speed preference.44 
Indeed, the roadway’s cross section – two 12 ft lanes and a painted median – is often used 
for arterials with posted speeds of 45 mph and greater. 
                                                 




 Yet one does not observe high operating speeds along this roadway. After 
walking this section to measure its geometric characteristics, I was surprised by how slow 
vehicles seemed to be traveling (see Figure 6-9). To derive an estimate of the roadway’s 
mean operating speed, I conducted an ad-hoc floating car study, getting behind a lead 
vehicle as it entered the roadway section, and following it through to the other end. I 
performed 5 runs along this roadway section between roughly 11:00 am and 12 noon on 
February 15, 2005. While my measurements were not exact (I was monitoring my 
speedometer rather than using an appropriately-instrumented vehicle), the speed of the 
lead vehicle was in all cases between 25-and 30 mph. These speeds were at or even 
slightly below the posted speed limit of 30 mph.  
 
 




 This is a highly interesting finding for a variety of reasons. First, as has been 
evidenced in a variety of works, a key feature of urban travel is that between 50-75% of 
all drivers exceed (and often greatly exceed) posted speed limits (Fitzpatrick et. al., 2003; 
Fitzpatrick et. al., 1996; Tarris et. al, 2000). While 5 runs on a single day is not a truly 
representative sample, it is interesting to note that in no case was a vehicle observed to 
exceed the posted speed limit. These low operating speeds help explain a second 
interesting finding, which is that despite the presence of mature roadside trees located 
directly adjacent to the travelway along this roadway segment’s length, not a single 
roadside crash was reported for this road segment during the 1999-2003 time period, let 
alone an injurious one. Collectively, this suggests that the presence of dense roadside 
trees seems to indicate to the driver that greater caution is warranted, resulting in both 
reduced operating speeds, as well as reduced roadside crash frequencies.  
 Further, while livable street advocates regularly argue for lane narrowing as a 
means of reducing vehicle operating speeds (with a preferred preference for 10 feet),45 it 
should be observed that the lower speeds associated with this roadway cannot be 
attributed to lane widths, which were 12 feet throughout the section. While crossing this 
roadway as a pedestrian was somewhat unpleasant due to the absence of signalized 
intersections, it would nevertheless appear that speed reductions can be achieved without 
narrowing travel lanes. Indeed, as shown in the negative binomial results reported in 
                                                 
45 From the perspective of pedestrian exposure – a second justification used by livable street advocates to 
encourage lane width reductions – the safety benefit associated with narrowing 12 foot lanes to 10 foot 
lanes appears to be minimal. Given that average pedestrian walking speeds are roughly 3.5 feet per second, 
narrowing two 12 foot lanes to two 10 foot lanes reduces the pedestrian’s exposure during the a roadway 




chapter 5, wider lanes appear to be, on the whole, beneficial to a roadway’s safety 
performance. The implication of this finding is that, if speed reduction were indeed a 
design objective, the inclusion of a dense lining of mature roadside trees would appear to 
be a potential means for doing so.  
 
A Summary of the Empirical Evidence Presented in Chapters 4-6 
 This section, comprised of Chapters 4-6, has examined the empirical and 
philosophical basis of contemporary roadside safety practice. Interestingly, it found that 
many of the assumptions that drive contemporary roadside design practice are not 
supported by empirical observations of a roadway’s crash performance. Instead, urban 
roadside crashes instead appear to be strongly associated with vehicle turning movements 
– a factor not currently considered in roadside design practice. 
 Livable street applications – which are discouraged because of concerns about 
their safety effects – were found to not only result in decreased roadside crash frequency, 
but also to eliminate the injuries and fatalities associated with run-off-roadway events. 
Not a single injurious or fatal roadside crash occurred on any of the livable roadway 
sections during the 5-year evaluation period. Further, unlike widening shoulders and clear 
zones, livable street treatments were also found to dramatically reduce midblock, 
multiple-vehicle and pedestrian crashes and injuries as well. 
 Alternatively, neither a roadway’s fixed object offset, nor the provision of a paved 




widening fixed-object offsets was found to reduce fixed-object crashes, it had no effect 
on a roadway’s midblock crash performance, suggesting that reductions in fixed-object 
crashes are being offset by increases in multiple-vehicle and vehicle-pedestrian crashes. 
Paved shoulders were found to lead to increases in both roadside and midblock crashes.  
Collectively, these findings suggest that the current passive safety assumptions 
that guide roadside and roadway design practice may fail to adequately address a 
roadway’s actual safety performance, at least when one measures safety in terms of 
empirical observations of crashes and injuries, rather than hypothetical design scenarios.  
So a final question: if passive safety principles cannot account for a roadway’s 
safety performance, and indeed, may even be detrimental to safety in certain contexts, 
what are the appropriate principles on which to base safe design practice? Because of the 
clear need for a more empirically-justified approach to urban roadway design, the 
remainder of this dissertation outlines a new theory for the design of safe roadways that is 
better supported by both the existing empirical evidence on roadside and roadway safety, 





A POSITIVE APPROACH TO ROAD SAFETY 
 
…competent drivers can be given appropriate information about hazards and inefficiencies to 
avoid errors. 
 - Federal Highway Administration, 1990, p. 1-1 
 
 This chapter begins the third and final section of this dissertation. Chapters 1-3 
outlined the issues surrounding the design of urban roadsides, and detailed how they are 
currently addressed through design practice. Chapters 4-6 examined the theoretical and 
empirical basis for these practices. This chapter proposes an alternative approach to 
transportation safety and roadway design that may not only better address safety, but may 
further enhance a roadway’s livability as well.  
 
Rethinking Driver Error 
As discussed in previous chapters, passive safety begins by assuming a 
hypothetical “worst-case-scenario” design condition, and then attempts to design 
roadways to be as “forgiving” as possible for such an event. The rationale behind this 
approach is that drivers are prone to error and will necessarily engage in behaviors that 
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result in crashes. Thus, by designing all roadways to be “forgiving” for worst-case 
scenario events and behaviors, a designer can assume that he or she has made a roadway 
adequately safe. 
This design approach is successful to the extent that driver errors can be attributed 
to random error, or error that is the result of unpreventable mistakes on the part of the 
driver. While passive safety admits that driver errors may be precipitated by a host of 
factors – driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, driver distraction, or simple 
recklessness – the presumption is that a roadway’s design has little actual influence on 
the probability of a driver committing an error that leads to a crash. Indeed, 95% of all 
crashes are attributed to errors on the part of the driver, rather than errors that are a 
product of the roadway’s design (Carsten, 2002; Hauer, 1999b).  
 The early empirical evidence on the subject of road safety seemed to confirm 
these assumptions. In the 1960s, when the first design guidance on the subject of safety 
was developed, researchers observed that the Interstate highway system, which used high 
design values to accommodate high-speed travel, had fewer crashes per mile traveled 
than other roadway classes. These researchers attributed the Interstate system’s safety 
performance to the use of high design values, assuming that they were “forgiving” to 
unpreventable driver errors. Thus, the concept of “forgiving” design practice emerged as 
a post-hoc explanation for understanding of the safety performance of the Interstate 
system.  
While this logic remains compelling, at least from an engineering perspective, the 
problem is that it overlooks some of the other characteristics of Interstate highways, 
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characteristics that better explain its safety performance than does its use of high design 
values. First, these roadways are designed for a single user type – motorists. Pedestrians 
and bicyclists are legally excluded from the Interstate system. Given that the high vehicle 
speeds that occur on the Interstate system are unaccommodating to pedestrians and 
bicyclists,46 eliminating these users from the system makes sense. Yet it must be 
recognized that eliminating such users dramatically changes a roadway’s operational and 
safety performance.  
Second, and more important from a roadside safety perspective, Interstate 
highways do not provide direct land use access. Access to the Interstate highway system 
is strictly controlled through the design and construction of highway ramps, which are 
designed for vehicle acceleration/deceleration and gradual turning movements. Since 
between 65-85% of all urban run-off-roadway events appear to be associated with turning 
movements at driveways and side streets, roadways where access is controlled through on 
and off-ramps thus eliminate the turning movements that result in run-off-roadway 
crashes. Asserting that the roadside safety performance of these roadways is attributable 
to their use of “forgiving” design values is misleading; Interstates seem to report lower 
rates of roadside crashes simply because they eliminate the vehicle turning movements 
that produce a large percentage of these crashes.  
                                                 
46 Pedestrian survival rate in a crash is strongly influenced by vehicle speed; when a pedestrian crash 
involves a vehicle traveling a 20 mph, pedestrians have roughly a 95% chance of survival; double the 
vehicle speed to 40 mph and a pedestrian has only a 10% chance of survival (Durkin and Pheby, 1992; 
Retting, 1999). To the extent that ensuring pedestrian survival in a pedestrian-vehicle crash event is a 




If the passive safety assumption of random, unpreventable error were true, then 
forgiving design practices should universally result in reductions in roadside crash rates 
on all roadway classes, once one accounts for traffic volumes.  In other words, if driver 
errors are purely a random product of unpreventable behavior on the part of the driver, 
then errors that lead to run-off-roadway events should be expected to occur at relatively 
constant rates along a roadway, and the probability of an error should be simply a 
function of the number of drivers using a roadway. Thus, the relative rate of error can be 
viewed as a design constant, and designs that “forgive” errors should therefore in general 
reduce crashes and injuries, while designs that are less forgiving should be associated 
with higher numbers of crashes and injuries.  
Yet this study did not find that that forgiving roadside designs adequately 
explained a roadway’s safety performance. Instead, a substantial portion of roadside 
crashes appears to be attributable to systematic error. Unlike random error, systematic 
error is the result of mismatch in human-and-machine or human-and-environment 
interactions (Carsten, 2002). From a design perspective, systematic errors occur when the 
design of a roadway produces misleading expectations on the part of the driver, such as 
the expectation that a roadway can safely accommodate high-speed travel. Thus, 
systematic error occurs when there is a mismatch between what the driver perceives as 
safe operating behavior, and the behavior that is actually required to minimize his or her 
likelihood of being involved in a crash.  
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As discussed previously, between 65% and 83% of fixed-object crashes can be 
attributed to a single systematic cause – drivers attempting to undertake higher-speed 
turning maneuvers at driveways and intersections. In these cases, high-speed designs for 
urban arterials, combined with limited turning room on intersecting driveways and side 
streets, result in a latent opportunity for a run-off-roadway event; all that is needed to 
transform this design condition into a run-off-roadway event is a driver willing to attempt 
a turning maneuver at the “safe” operating speed suggested by the design of the arterial.    
 
Systematic Error and Livable Streets 
The role of systematic error in roadside crashes is further highlighted by the fact 
that the livable street treatments considered in this study, which employ “unforgiving” 
designs, reported statistically-significant reductions in both roadside and midblock 
crashes when compared to other urban arterial treatments. These roadways are located in 
historic business district locations that have high numbers of cross-streets and turning 
movements. Yet, unlike the higher-speed roadway sections examined in this study, the 
turning movements that occur in these environments do not result in fixed-object crashes 
because livable design treatments also encourage lower operating speeds, thereby 
eliminating the high-speed behavior that contributes to run-off-roadway events.   
Further, the percentage of injurious urban roadside crashes that may be 
attributable to systematic error is undoubtedly higher than 83%. One of the more 
important findings of this research is that not a single injurious crash involving a 
roadside object occurred on any of the livable street treatments during the 5-year period 
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considered for this study, despite the fact that these objects were located no more than 
four feet from the edge of the travelway. Such a finding underscores the obvious fact that 
impact speed and crash severity are related, but it also raises a second important point: 
specifically, that it may be possible to dramatically reduce or even eliminate injurious and 
fatal roadside crashes.   
Further, such treatments seem to meaningfully address random error as well. 
Assuming that random error cannot be eliminated form the system, then the design 
objective should be to ensure that any crashes and injuries associated with such events are 
not injurious. Given the zero-incidence of injurious roadside crashes and the extremely 
low rates of midblock injuries (18 per 100 MVMT),47 it would appear that these designs 
are effective at reducing the injuries associated with “unpreventable” random error as 
well.  
The success of livable street treatments, like that of the Interstate system, is that 
their design eliminates the precipitating factors that result in roadside crashes. In the case 
of Interstates and freeways, crash frequencies are reduced because the design of these 
roadways eliminates the driveways and intersections that result in turning maneuvers. Yet 
it is patently unreasonable to assume that all roadways, or even all arterial roadways, 
should be designed to prohibit land use access. At the most basic level, the sole purpose 
of a transportation system is to allow travelers to access destinations; most travel does not 
                                                 
47 It is worth observing that this is substantially lower than the crash performance of the Interstate system. 
When one considers only fatal fixed object crashes (thus ignoring all other midblock crashes as well as all 




occur for its own sake. For roadways where land use access and turning maneuvers are to 
be expected, the design objective cannot be to prohibit such maneuvers, as is done on the 
Interstate system, but to instead prevent these maneuvers from occurring at unsafe 
speeds. The lower-speed, “unforgiving” designs embodied by livable street treatments 
appear to be an effective means for reducing turning speeds, thus resulting in improved 
safety performance, despite the fact that they violate the core assumptions of 
contemporary design practice.  
  
Risk, Behavior, and Crash Prevention 
While the empirical evidence on roadside safety seems to contradict conventional 
design practice, it confirms a trend that many researchers and practicing engineers have 
observed for some time, but which to date has received little substantive elaboration: 
specifically, that clear zones and other forgiving design practices have an ambiguous 
relationship to safety in urban environments, and may, in certain design contexts, have a 
negative effect on safety. The passive safety approach presumes that run-off-roadway 
events are random and unpreventable, yet these crashes are much less likely to occur on 
livable street treatments. Why might this be the case? 
 The best possible explanation for the safety performance of the livable street 
treatments considered in this study is that drivers are “reading” the potential hazards of 
the road environment, and adjusting their behavior in response. While the idea that 
unforgiving designs can result in behavioral adjustments, and thus enhanced safety 
performance, contradicts the prevailing theory of safe roadway design, it is supported by 
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research and literature in areas of driver psychology and behavior, which has focused on 
the subject of traffic safety as a means for understanding how individuals adapt their 
behavior to perceived risks and hazards. 
Risk Homeostasis Theory 
Risk homeostasis theory, as developed by Wilde (1982; 1988; 1994), asserts that 
individuals make decisions on whether to engage in specific behaviors or activities by 
weighing the relative utility of an action against its perceived risk. While all actions 
involve some risk, risk homeostasis theory asserts that individuals will adjust their 
behavior to maintain a static level of exposure to perceived hazard or harm. With respect 
to driving behavior, risk homeostasis theory posits that drivers intuitively balance the 
relative benefits of traveling at higher speeds or engaging in other higher-risk driving 
behavior against their individual perceptions of how hazardous engaging in such behavior 
might be. Where hazards are present and visible, such as in the case of livable streetscape 
treatments, risk homeostasis theory would expect drivers to compensate for these hazards 
by modifying their behavior to reduce their risk to an acceptable level. Indeed, the fact 
that livable street treatments did not demonstrate higher rates of midblock and roadside 
crashes and injuries than other roadway sections is readily understandable when one 
considers the common-sense fact that few drivers intend to be killed or injured as part of 
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their driving activity.48 Since the roadside features used in livable street treatments are 
not only clearly visible to the driver, but also expected, drivers behave as reasonable 
people would be expected to: they simply adjust their behavior to avoid crashing into 
them.  
  What is less understandable is that livable street treatments should consistently 
report fewer crashes and injuries than their comparison roadways. Risk homeostasis 
theory would assert that, ceteris paribus, the relative crash performance of a roadway 
should remain constant along its length, regardless of specific design variations, since any 
change in perceived hazard will be offset by corresponding adjustments in behavior. 
Thus, according to risk homeostasis theory, the livable street sections should be no more 
or less safe than their comparison roadways overall.  
Yet as Hauer (1999b) describes, there is an important distinction between safety, 
which is (or should be) an empirical measure of crash performance, and security, which 
is an individual’s subjective perception of safety (or conversely, perceived exposure to 
harm). The presence of features such as paved shoulders and clear zones would appear to 
reduce the  perception of risk, giving drivers an increased but false sense of security, and 
thereby encouraging them to engage in behaviors that may increase their likelihood of 
becoming involved in a crash.49  
                                                 
48 According to the Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS), produced by the 
National Center for Injury and Prevention Control, only 91 suicides were transportation-related. Of the 
roughly 40,000 fatal crashes in 2001, this equates to 0.2% of the totals for that year. 
49 This was also the perspective of the earliest edition of the AASHTO Green Book (1940), which 
cautioned designers about the speed-inducing effects of such design practices. 
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If a roadway’s design can indeed influence drivers’ perceptions of safety, and thus 
their driving behavior, then this would explain why the livable streetscape treatments 
examined in this study resulted in not only fewer fixed-object crashes, but fewer multiple 
vehicle and pedestrian crashes as well. Such treatments appear to help balance a driver’s 
sense of security with the real levels of risk in their environment, providing them with 
more accurate information on the appropriate level of caution, and resulting in behavioral 
adaptations that better prepare them for not only roadside crashes, but the potentially 
hazardous vehicle and pedestrian conflicts that one encounters in urban environments as 
well.   
Risk homeostasis theory would further assert that the use of high design values is 
not “forgiving,” but is instead “permissive.” The use of wide shoulders and clear zones 
can be viewed as a safety enhancement only if driver behavior and driver errors can be 
held constant both before and after a roadside “improvement.” But because behavior is 
directed by a driver’s target risk level, “forgiving” designs may have the effect of 
reducing the perceived risk of traveling at high speeds or being involved in a run-off-
roadway event, thereby encouraging drivers to increase operating speeds and reduce their 
levels of caution. Thus, a risk-centered perspective of safety would expect that the 
provision of paved shoulders and clear zones should have little or no effect on a 
roadway’s safety performance. Indeed, this finding is confirmed by the negative binomial 
results for midblock crashes reported in Chapter 5, which found that the net safety benefit 
of widening clear zones was approximately zero, and that widening shoulders actually 
resulted in increases in midblock crashes.   
 
 149 
Other researchers finding similar safety anomalies in their work have likewise 
suggested that the relationship between risk and behavior accounts for their unexpected 
findings. Ossenbruggen et. al. (2001), speculated that the better safety performance of 
urban villages may be attributable to the fact that the roadside environment “warn[s] 
drivers that they must maintain a low speed and use caution” (p. 496). Noland (2001), in 
explaining why new roadway improvements were shown to result in an increase in 
crashes and injuries suggested that  “higher design standards [allow] drivers to increase 
their speeds on roads and reduce their levels of caution” (p. 24).  
Given the consistency of these findings throughout the empirical literature, a key 
design objective, from the perspective of enhancing a roadway’s safety, would be to 
encourage designs that link drivers’ perceptions of hazard to the actual risks they face in 
a particular design environment. Thus, designs that incorporate clearly visible hazards, 
such as the section of Woodland Avenue that travels through the Stetson University 
campus (see Figure 6-9), would be expected to result in behavioral adaptations that 
reduce systematic errors, and thus a driver’s likelihood of being involved in a crash event. 
Again, the findings of this research confirm these expectations. 
 
Drivers Read the Road  
 The passive approach to road safety begins by designing a roadway to safely 
accommodate high-speed, “extreme” driving events, and then attempts to discourage 
higher-speed travel through the use of posted speed limits. The problem that emerges 
with this approach, however, is that signs and roadways are communicating substantially 
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different information, with the net result being that a majority of drivers learn to 
disregard posted speed limits, since they quickly learn that road signs have little 
meaningful relationship to their likelihood of being involved in a crash or an injury. 
Further, drivers seem to learn to disregard road signs altogether, even when they display 
information that is essential to their safety. Thus, in the absence of aggressive law 
enforcement,50 drivers will increase their operating speeds to the “safe” speed they infer 
from a roadway’s design (Chowdhury et. al., 1998; Fitzpatrick et. al., 2003; 1996; 
Kubilins, 2000; Tarris et. al, 2000).  
A risk-centered approach to transportation design explains why drivers do not 
comply with posted speed-limit practices, as well as a host of other safety anomalies the 
passive approach simply cannot account for, such as Naderi’s (2003) findings on 
aesthetic streetscape treatments, the livable street examples included in this study, or 
indeed, the wide array of safety anomalies present in the roadway safety literature. It 
further explains why midblock narrowings and chicanes, two traffic calming applications 
that modify the roadside in a manner that passive safety would suggest should increase 
crashes and injuries, have been shown to result in substantial (74%-82%) crash 
reductions (Zein et. al., 1997). Indeed, all traffic calming measures appear to reduce 
crashes by reducing speeds and/or increasing driver caution (Ewing, 1999).51 In all of 
these cases, driving behavior can be attributed to a driver’s perception of risk, which is a 
                                                 
50 While Australian practice clearly indicates the success of speed enforcement in ensuring compliance and 
thus reducing crashes (FHWA, 2004), it is by no means clear that the best use of law-enforcement 
personnel is to employ them in the enforcement of roadways that are inappropriately designed.  
51 The safety benefits of traffic-calming applications are widely acknowledged by European designers, who 
view them not as “livability” features, but instead as safety countermeasures (Skene, 1999). I discuss 
European design practice in greater detail later in this chapter.  
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function of what they perceive from the road and roadway environment, resulting in 
behavioral adaptations that seek to maximize the benefits of driving without exceeding 
the level of acceptable risk that a driver is willing to accept for the task. Stated simply, 
drivers “read the road.” 
The Road as Text 
 If drivers “read the road,” then the road and roadway environment can be viewed 
as a “text” that communicates information on safe operating behavior to the driver. To 
date there has been very little meaningful consideration of the effects that a roadway’s 
design may have on the performance expectations of the driver, and indeed, little 
substantive examination into the relationship between design and driver behavior 
(Kanellaidis, 1996; Noland, 2001; Noland and Oh, 2004). What is needed is a design 
approach that meaningfully links the information used by the driver to determine his or 
her operating behavior with the actual behavior necessary to avoid a crash event.  
A useful starting point for the development of such a behavior-centric approach to 
design is the field of semiotics. Literally, the field of semiotics pertains to study of signs 
and their interpretation, yet the field of semiotics is more broadly concerned with how 
meaning is conveyed and interpreted. A sign, from a semiotic perspective, is not simply a 
physical object (such as a road sign), but instead a relationship between an object 
(signifier) and its meaning (signified), as understood by an interpreter (Chandler, 2002; 
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Peirce, 1955; Saussure, 1983).52 As such, its fundamental concern is with communication 
– or the means by which information is expressed and received. Information is not only 
communicated through formal symbolic mechanisms, such as language or writing, but 
through features in the environment53 (Eco, 1976; 1982; Jakobson, 1971; Jameson, 1972). 
Thus, a semiotic approach to roadway design begins from the perspective that roadways 
have a “meaning” that is communicated to, and interpreted by, a driver.  
 
The Physiological Characteristics of Driving and Scene Viewing 
How drivers read the roadway is comprised of both a physiological component, as 
well as a cognitive one. Both are intrinsically related, but to adequately understand what a 
driver reads, it is first essential to detail the physical process through which the driver 
reads it.  
Psychologists use measurements of eye movements (saccades) and visual 
fixations to understand how an individual analyzes and processes visual information. As 
Henderson and Hollingsworth (1998) have found, the physiological characteristics of 
reading and scene processing are very similar in terms of fixations and saccades, each of 
which are discussed briefly below.  
                                                 
52 The terms “signified” and “signifier” refer to a Saussurean model of semiotics, which focuses on the 
relation between the signifier (sign) and the signified (meaning) (Saussure, 1983). An alternative approach 
was developed earlier (1897) by Peirce (1955), and differs in that it presents semiotics as a triangulation 
between a representamen (the form that a sign takes), an interpretant, (the meaning of the sign, as 
interpreted by an individual), and an object (which is the intended meaning of the sign). While the 
Saussurean model is the conventional basis for contemporary semiotics, most semioticians also recognize 
the role of the interpreter as the medium through which semiosis occurs (Chandler, 2002).  




Like reading, saccade movements in scene viewing are directed by an internal 
logic governed by the medium being examined. In reading, saccades are targeted towards 
the next word in the series, where the structure of a written text places the next word in a 
series adjacent to the previous one.54 Such a structural framework is very efficient for 
minimizing the distances between individual saccades. Like reading, there is an 
embedded logic in the selection of saccade targets in scene viewing. While saccades in 
reading are directed towards the next word in a series, saccades in scene viewing are 
oriented towards the “salient” features of a scene.   
To effectively process the complex information presented by a scene, individuals 
cognitively dissect it into specific regions (referred to by psychologists as a salience 
map), each of which is instinctively assigned a salience weight based on whether the 
region is likely to contain sought-after information (i.e., the expectation that a stop sign 
will be based on the right-hand side of an intersection will lead drivers to visually direct 
their eyes towards this location), as well as a region’s degree of visual interest, which is 
determined by variations in color, texture, and contrast. From a biological perspective, 
such a framework of scene processing allows individuals to efficiently process and 
interpret complex scenes (Groeger, 2000; Henderson and Hollingsworth, 1998; Koch and 
Ullman, 1985; Mahoney and Ullman, 1988).  
                                                 
54 In Germanic and Romantic languages (as well as this text), the next word in a series is located to the right 
of the previous word. In Hebrew, words are oriented from right to left, while Asiatic texts are often oriented 
vertically, from top to bottom. In all cases, the physical structure of the text is designed to minimize 
saccade distance by placing the next object of fixation adjacent to the previous one in a pre-defined 
structural order.  
 
 154 
There is a clear structural pattern to the locations of eye fixations used in vehicle 
navigation, locations which thus serve as saccade targets. In vehicle navigation, drivers 
focus on four specific areas - a point of distant fixation for orientation, and short-term 
navigational fixations on the area directly in front of the vehicle, as well as on either side. 
Designs that heighten the salience of the roadside regions naturally increase the driver’s 
attentiveness to these areas (see Figure 7-1), resulting in more “correct” navigation and, 
as a result, fewer “errors” 55 (Cavallo, Mestre and Berthelon, 1997; Groeger, 2000; Liu, 
1998). Further, a highly interesting finding is that studies on the relationship between 
visual activity, driving, and a roadway’s design environment find that drivers are much 
more visually active in urban environments when compared to rural ones, a finding that 
suggests both a heightened awareness to potential hazards, as well as an enhanced 
preparedness to react to them when they occur (Chapman and Underwood, 1998; Roge 
et. al., 2002).  
                                                 
55 Error is reduced in part because the presence of roadside objects aids in a driver’s estimate of time-to-
collision. Individuals estimate the time at which they will collide with an object based not on speed, but 
instead on an object’s perceived rate of expansion. As an object approaches, the edges and texture of the 
object expand from the point of view of the observer, the rate of which is used to derive an estimate of their 
time to impact. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as “local tau” (Tresilian, 1991), and it has been 
observed on not only humans, but in other animals as well (Wagner, 1982; Wang and Frost, 1992). Studies 
of human time-to-collision estimates have found that individuals generally underestimate actual time-to-
collision by about 20-30%, or, in other words, that they have a “built-in” safety margin that causes them to 
err on the side of safety (Cavallo, Mestre and Berthelon, 1997; Schiff and Oldak, 1990). Yet an interesting 
phenomenon is that these estimates will change based on the presence of peripheral objects; where the 
periphery of a visual scene is enriched, drivers will further underestimate time-to-collision, perhaps because 
of the presence of nearby features on which local tau can be readily determined (Cavallo et. al., 1997; 
Larish and Flach, 1990). From a practical perspective, what this means is that the presence of roadside 
objects increases the driver’s preparedness to react to potential collisions by estimating that a crash will 











Figure 7-1:  Navigation Points and Salience in Two Design Environments 
 
Fixations 
Saccades move the eye towards locations upon which it fixates, with the 
presumption being that a visual fixation corresponds with some level of comprehension 
or awareness of what is observed. For both reading and scene viewing, modal fixation 
durations last roughly 300 ms, or 3/10th of one second, although there is greater 
variability in the fixation durations of scene viewing as compared to reading. That this is 
so is perhaps unsurprising; while words have prescribed meanings that may be quickly 
referenced, scenes are often more complex, and may require greater amounts of time to 
comprehend their meaning (Henderson and Hollingsworth, 1998). What is surprising, 
from a cognitive perspective, is not that fixations may have greater variability in reading 
than in scene viewing, but that meaning from a visual region can be inferred, in general, 
within 300 ms. This is remarkably short period of time to cognitively grasp the broad 
array of factors that may have an effect on safe vehicle operation. How can the human 
mind process such a broad array of visual information so quickly?  
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Categorization and Comprehension: A Driver’s View of the Road 
 At the most basic level, individuals process external information by relating it into 
specific cognitive categories. Categorization allows individuals to quickly and efficiently 
process copious amounts of sensory information, and apply it to the situation at hand 
(Rosch, 1978; Van Elslande and Faucher-Alberton, 1997).56 With respect to a roadway, 
what this means is that drivers infer an overall sense of a roadway based on their existing 
knowledge of, and experience with, similar “types”57 of roadways, with a roadway’s 
“type” being inferred by the presence of key visual indicators, such as the presence of 
dense roadside development. In the language of semiotics, such indicators are referred to 
as “indexical signs.” This categorization then produces embedded expectations regarding 
the nature of the roadway, which relate to scripts, or expected patterns of appropriate 
behavior, as well as schemata, or expectations regarding the location, characteristics, and 
behavior of roadway objects or other roadway users (Theeuwes, 1997).  Thus, a 
roadway’s “meaning” is inferred through a cognitive process of sign identification, 
categorization, and association, which when combined produce expectations regarding 
the potential hazards of a roadway environment, as well as the behavior necessary to 
minimize one’s potential exposure to expected hazards, or hazards for which a driver is 
cognitively prepared based on their prior experience with similar roadways.  
                                                 
56 A hiker hearing a rattling sound coming from a nearby bush, for example, would readily equate the sound 
(an indexical sign) with a type of thing that produces such a sound – a rattlesnake. This in turn would be 
immediately related to the class of “hazardous things,” and produce a corresponding reaction – moving 
away from the sound. This is an almost immediate interpretive process that enables an individual to quickly 
react to a potential hazard – a reaction only made possible through the innate tendency of humans to 
quickly synthesize and categorize external information.  
57 Eco (1999) makes the distinction between “types” and “tokens,” where a token is a specific manifestation 
that is observed, while a type is a broader class of things to which the token refers. Thus, an observed 
roadway is a token that relates to a driver’s cognitive understanding of its type.  
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 Taking this information collectively, the cognitive process used by drivers is 
relatively straightforward: drivers gleam an overall sense of a roadway by relating it to 
similar types of roadways they have encountered previously, which produces 
expectations on the potential hazards they can reasonably expect to encounter along such 
a roadway (schemata), as well as the behavior (scripts) that they expect twill minimize 
their exposure to these hazards. These expectations thus allow the driver to obtain visual 
information from the road environment relatively quickly (generally around 300 ms) 
because they are actively searching only for information that is presumed to be necessary 
to avoid unwanted risk.58  
There is thus a communicative process that occurs between the road environment 
and the roadway user that directs the user’s operating expectations for a particular 
roadway and the subsequent behavior he or she perceives as being safe and appropriate. 
Since a roadway is a human-designed product that provides information to a user, then 
this suggests that the design of a roadway results in a communicative event between a 
roadway designer and a roadway user. In other words, the roadway is a text that, when 
successfully designed, provides the roadway user with clear information on safe and 
appropriate behavior. If the communication between the designer and the user is 
successful, the result will be the reduction in the mismatch between driver expectancy 
and actual safety, or a reduction in systematic error.   
                                                 
58 An example of this is the “looked but did not see” crash, a crash type that typically involves pedestrians 
and bicyclists. In these cases, pedestrians and bicyclists are not included in a driver’s schemata, resulting in 
the driver failing to observe them during their visual scans of the road environment. As a result, drivers 
engage in driving maneuvers that result in a collision with an “unobserved” pedestrian or bicyclist. 
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The Functional Classification System and the Language of Design 
 If transportation safety is a product of a driver’s behavior, and if driver behavior 
is the result of a driver being able to correctly infer information from the roadway 
environment, then the key to enhancing safety is to ensure that a roadway is designed to 
effectively communicate information to the driver on safe operating behavior. Effective 
communication, by definition, is the transmittal of information from a sender to a 
receiver, where the information transmitted by the sender is correctly interpreted by the 
receiver. Thus, designs that are successful at addressing transportation safety are those 
where a roadway user can examine the roadway to obtain clear information on safe 
operating behavior.  
  For successful communication between a roadway designer and a roadway user to 
occur, it is necessary that the way a designer conceives a roadway, and thus designs it, is 
reasonably well correlated with how this roadway is perceived and interpreted by the 
driver. In simple terms, there should be a common language of design, where there is a 
meaningful correspondence between the how a roadway is designed, and how the 
roadway user understands it. Thus, a designer’s intention regarding the design and use of 
a roadway should match the way it is read and interpreted by the road user to ensure that 
he or she is receiving correct information on safe operating behavior.  
 But what is the design language used by design engineers? Currently, the design 
of roadways in the United States are directed by the AASHTO functional classification 
system (see Figure 7-2), which categorizes roadways based on their location in an urban 
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or rural environment,59 as well as on the type of vehicle movement they are intended to 
accommodate. Under this framework, a designer conceives of a roadway as principally 
serving either vehicle access or mobility functions, with little attention paid to the 
physical or environmental context in which a roadway is placed, or on the types of users 
or behaviors that may be expected within individual design environments. Each 
functional class is then associated with a range of design speeds (see Figure 7-3),60 with 
passive safety practices resulting in the assumption that higher is better.  
How a user perceives and interprets a roadway is not covered under this 
framework; nor is the relationship between a roadway’s design and the types of uses or 
users that can be expected to be found along it. Instead, the principal objective of this 
framework is to characterize a roadway in terms of the types of vehicle operations that 
each roadway class is intended to serve. To date, their has been little consideration of 
when, and under what conditions, specific design ranges are appropriate, and almost no 
consideration of how such classifications relate to driver expectations or behavior. There 
is little information on how such categorizations, and the designs they produce, affect a 
roadway’s actual safety performance. 
 
                                                 
59 The AASHTO classification system uses the urban and rural classifications specified in the United States 
Code, Section 101, Title 23, where “urban” is defined as a Census-designated place with more than 5,000 
residents, and a rural area is any non-urban area.  
60 A roadway’s design speed is the controlling element in its design. Lane widths, roadway curvature, and 























Figure 7-2: The US Functional Classification System 
 
Context, Road Use, and Safety Performance 
 An emerging critique of US practice is that the functional classification system, 
which determines the organization and design (i.e., “composition”) of a roadway, is 
incompatible with the needs and uses of many urban areas. As a result, many cities61 and 
design professionals have abandoned this framework in favor of others that is more 
meaningfully related to the operating characteristics of urban environments (de Cerreno 
and Pierson, 2004; Duany Plater-Zyberk and Co., 2002; Forbes, 2000; Kubilins, 2000). 
Indeed, even the Highway Capacity Manual (TRB, 2000), which is used by design 
engineers to evaluate the operational performance of “functionally-designed” roadways, 
finds it necessary to categorize roads based not only on the functional classification 
system, but also on the density of roadside development, the expected presence of 
                                                 
61 Charlotte, NC and Portland, OR are two cities that have adopted alternative roadway classifications.  
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pedestrians and bicyclists, and the level of land use access provided by the roadway 
(measured in the HCM through driveway density). In all of these cases, the design 




Classification Example Description Design Speed 
Arterial 
 
Provides the highest 
level of service at the 
greatest speed for the 
longest uninterrupted 
distance, with some 





Provides a less highly 
developed level of 
service at a lower speed 
for shorter distances by 
collecting traffic from 
local roads and 
connecting them with 
arterials. 
30 mph or higher  
Local 
 
Consists of all roads not 
defined as arterials or 
collectors; primarily 
provides access to land 




Figure 7-3: Urban Roadway Defintiions Under the Functional Classification System 





An Illustration: Two Contexts, One Roadway Classification 
 The disconnect between a roadway’s functional classification and its actual 
context and use can be readily shown through an illustration. Figure 7-4 shows two 
roadways currently classified as minor arterials, with the roadway on the left being 
located in an historic, pre-automobile community, while the latter was constructed on an 
undeveloped suburban site during the last five years. The roadway illustrated on the right 
meets all the design criteria currently specified in the design guidance – high design 
speeds, paved shoulders and deceleration lanes to allow turning vehicles to reduce their 
speed before turning into an adjacent development. This roadway has a posted speed of 
45 mph, but can safely accommodate much higher operating speeds. Development along 
this roadway is set back from the travelway, and accessible only through driveways 
spaced at intervals of 0.5 miles or more. Turning movements are further controlled 
through the use of a paved median. In short, this roadway is a textbook example of the 
type of roadway specified under conventional design guidance – a quasi-freeway design 
that uses high design speeds, limits land use access, and emphasizes vehicle through-
movement.  
Yet the same design classification and specifications that direct the design of the 
contemporary roadway is also used to direct the design of the pre-automobile roadway, a 
roadway that is patently different in terms of its function, characteristics, and use. Here, 
intersections are closely-spaced, roadside development is located adjacent to the 
travelway, and much of the travel it supports occurs through non-motorized modes. 
Under these design conditions, low operating speeds are warranted, and land use access is 
(or should be) a major design consideration. Yet the designation of this roadway as an 
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“arterial” results in a design preference for design speeds that are a minimum of 30 mph, 
and preferably greater. Classifying this roadway as an arterial62 further suggests that the 
roadway should be designed to limit land use access – an impossibility based on the 
character of the development located adjacent to the roadway. Attempts to superimpose 
higher-speed, more “forgiving” designs on such a roadway are unlikely to enhance its 
safety performance; indeed, such designs will, if anything, have little or no effect on its 




Figure 7-4: Historic (Left) and Contemporary (Right) Roadways Classified as “Arterials”   
 
                                                 
62 Prior to the advent of the personal motor vehicle, commercial districts naturally located along major 
thoroughfares, which were originally intended for horse and pedestrian traffic. In pre-automobile 
conditions, concentrating commercial activities in high traffic volume locations allowed local merchants to 
capture pass-by traffic, which necessarily occurred at low speeds (Calthorpe, 1993; Jackson, 1985; Jacobs, 
J., 1961; Muller, 1995; Mumford, 1961; Oldenburg, 1989; Warner, 1962). Since these roadways were 
located along major thoroughfares, they were later classified as urban arterials, thereby producing the 




Functional Classification and Systematic Error: A Case Analysis of Orange Blossom 
Trail 
The designs presented in Figure 7-4 were each relatively well-suited to their 
respective design contexts, and thus represent “pure” illustrations of a livable urban street 
and a conventional urban arterial. While the differences between these roadways are 
obvious, contemporary safety practice attempts to superimpose the limited-access design 
solution represented by the contemporary roadway on all other roadways designated as 
arterials, an approach that can result in unnecessary crashes and injuries.  
The safety problem created by the use of the functional classification system can 
be readily observed by examining the safety performance of a 4-mile long “context-
sensitive” design treatment along Orange Blossom Trail, an arterial roadway located in 
Orlando, Florida. This section of Orange Blossom Trail connects many of the tourist 
attractions to the south of Orlando with its downtown business district, and is lined with 
relatively dense concentrations of hotels, restaurants, retail establishments, and other non-
residential activities. In short, it is representative of many arterial roadways in suburban 
environments. From a passive safety perspective, it should not be particularly unsafe – 
the cross section consists of  11.5-ft travel lanes, a 12-ft painted median, and 7-ft offsets 
to roadside objects (see Figure 7-5).   
Note that this roadway, like the livable streets examined earlier, must 
accommodate a high degree of land use access due to the character of roadside 
development. Unlike the livable street treatments considered in this study, however, it 
attempts to do so by using conventional design principles, including high design speeds 
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and forgiving roadside applications. Thus, it presents a reasonably representative 
illustration of a “functionally-defined” arterial common to suburban environments.  
 
 
Figure 7-5: Orange Blossom Trail in Orlando 
 
As shown in Table 7-1, this roadway is markedly less safe than the livable streets 
examined in this study. In terms of crashes per million vehicle miles traveled, Orange 
Blossom Trail is 4 times more likely to experience a roadside or midblock crash than the 
livable streets considered in this study. On a per mile basis, the ratio increases to being 6 
times more likely to experience a roadside crash, and 15 times more likely to experience 




Table 7-1: Safety Performance - Livable Streets vs. Orange Blossom Trail 










Total Roadside 3.3 12.1 3.7 2 12 6 
Injurious 
Roadside 0 5.3 NA 0 5.3 NA 
Total Midblock 23.1 102.2 4.4 7 101.1 14.5 
Injurious 
Midblock 18.1 64.6 3.6 5.5 64 11.6 
 
The problem with Orange Blossom Trail, from a safety perspective, is the 
inherent problem with the functional classification system and passive safety practices – 
the roadway’s design has no meaningful relationship with its developmental context, 
which in turn determines the types of users that can be found along the roadway, as well 
as how they can be expected to use it. In other words, the design is contextually 
inappropriate. What is particularly egregious about this design is that its designers 
clearly understood that this roadway was a major commercial thoroughfare intended to 
provide access to adjacent land uses, as well as to accommodate multi-modal travel. The 
decision to use “aesthetic” light posts, intersection treatments, and sidewalk coloring 
represents an attempt to accommodate a diverse set of road users on a “functionally-
defined” roadway. 
While passive safety advocates might assert that access management principles 
(i.e., adding a raised median) will resolve the safety problem along this roadway, the 
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types of crashes that occur on Orange Blossom Trail are not likely to be affected by the 
presence of a raised median. Collectively, head-on and turn-related crashes, the types of 
crashes that are directly affected by a raised median – account for less than 3% of the 
total (see Table 7-2).  Instead, the key safety problem of this roadway is the result of a 
design that produces substantial speed differentials between vehicles. Roughly half of the 
crashes on this roadway are rear-end crashes, which are associated with the presence of 
driveways on higher-speed roads. Likewise, sideswipe crashes occur when a driver 
attempts to swerve around a slow lead vehicle and crashes into a vehicle located in the 
adjacent lane. Collectively, these two crash types account for 60% of the total. Add 
roadside and pedestrian crashes63 to the list and the total number of crashes that may have 
been prevented through a lower-speed, more contextually-appropriate design climbs to 
75%.   
The safety problem on Orange Blossom Trail stems directly from the fact that the 
roadway’s design is inappropriate for its use, which is a function of its environmental 
context. There is nothing in the existing design guidance that would suggest that there is a 
problem with such designs. If anything, current design guidance encourages such designs, 
thus exacerbating existing safety problems.  
 
 
                                                 
63 20 of the 24 pedestrian and bicyclist crashes occurred in the travel lanes, rather than in the center turn 
lane. Thus, the ability of a raised median to act as a pedestrian refuge island would have had little effect on 
the pedestrian and bicyclist crash totals.  
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Table 7-2: Midblock Crash Types on Orange Blossom Trail 
Crash Type Count Percent 
Rear-End 188 46.4% 
Head-On 6 1.5% 
Angle 52 12.8% 
Left-Turn 5 1.2% 
Right-Turn 1 0.2% 
Sideswipe 63 15.6% 
Pedestrian/Bicyclist 24 5.9% 
Roadside 23 5.7% 
Other/System Missing 43 10.6% 
Total 405 100.0% 
 
 
Designing Contextually-Appropriate Roadways 
 A factor that is unrecognized in the current functional classification system is the 
role that a roadway’s developmental context will have on the types of users that can be 
found on a given roadway, and well as how these road users will behave. Pedestrians and 
bicyclists, for example, can be expected in areas where there are reasonably high 
concentrations of roadside development; the close proximity of compatible land uses 
encourages pedestrian activity. Further, roadways in areas of dense roadside development 
can likewise be expected to accommodate substantial vehicle access functions. Where 
dense roadside development is located adjacent to the roadway, drivers will attempt to 
negotiate turns to arrive at their intended travel destinations. One cannot assume away 
these maneuvers simply by classifying a roadway as an arterial; whether classified as a 
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local road or a principal arterial, a trip attraction located adjacent to a roadway will attract 
turning maneuvers. Where these driveways are located on higher-speed roadways, such 
maneuvers may result in the systematic errors that produce roadside crashes. 
In order to better advance both safety and livability, what is needed is a design 
approach that meaningfully links specific design applications to the environmental 
contexts in which they may be most appropriately used.  A context-appropriate roadway, 
as defined here, is a roadway that is explicitly designed to ensure that it is safe within its 
given design physical and operating context. Unlike context-sensitive solutions, this 
approach attempts to enhance safety by first understanding a roadway’s physical and 
operational context, and then designing a roadway to encourage drivers to operate 
appropriately. While a context-appropriate roadway will often produce designs that are 
sought by many project stakeholders, and thus result in a context-sensitive outcome, the 
distinction between these two terms is important. Context-sensitive solutions are 
concerned with designing a roadway to meet the concerns raised by project stakeholders 
in the design process, while context-appropriate design is concerned, first and foremost, 
with transportation safety.  
The process through which a context-appropriate road should be designed is 
relatively straightforward. First, the designer should determine a roadway’s 
developmental context. Next, he or she can then determine the uses and users that are 
associated with the roadway’s enviornment. Finally, the roadway should then be designed 
to ensure that the design of the roadway clearly communicates information on appropriate 
behavior to the roadway user. Where higher-speed designs are warranted, conventional 
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passive safety practices can be meaningfully used. Yet there are many conditions, such as 
in highly-urbanized areas, where such design applications are undesirable. In these cases, 
the designer should strive to prevent the types of behaviors that result in crashes and 
injuries through the use of behaviorally-restrictive, rather than forgiving, designs.  
 A context-appropriate design approach represents a significant departure from 
contemporary US design practice, and will in some cases encourage designs that are 
antithetical to what is currently recommended. Yet this approach to addressing safety is 
better supported by the empirical evidence on road safety, and indeed, is better supported 
by the knowledge of driver behavior and psychology. 
 Before discussing the application of this approach, it is important to first begin by 
stating what this approach implies, and what it does not. First this approach does not 
assert that roadways cannot or should not be designed for higher-speed mobility 
functions. For contemporary freeways and Interstates, passive safety strategies are often 
contextually-appropriate because these roadways are intended for higher-speed operation 
in environments where roadside access is restricted. The key point of departure for a 
contextually-appropriate approach to roadway design is that this approach recognizes that 
there are design conditions where higher-speed, “forgiving” designs will result in a 
decline in a roadway’s safety performance. Thus, a contextually-appropriate approach to 
roadway design represents a conscious attempt to link the design vocabulary used by the 
designer with that read and interpreted by the roadway user, with the design objective 
being to reduce crashes and injuries, rather than emphasize vehicle operations. While this 
approach is largely unprecedented in the United States, it is very similar to the design 
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approach employed by European designers, who design markedly safer roadways than 
their US counterparts.  
 
The European Approach to Roadway Design 
 Before specifically discussing the European design approach, it is worth 
presenting some basic safety statistics. In 1966, the year that passive safety principles 
first became entrenched in US design practice, the United States had fewer 
transportation-related fatalities per capita (26 per 100,000 population) than all other 
countries except Great Britain (15 per 100,000). By 2000, the fatality rate in the United 
States had dropped to 15 fatalities per 100,000, but fell even further behind Great Britain 
(6 per 100,000), and had additionally fallen behind the entirety of the European Union 
(11 per 100,000), Australia (10 per 100,000), Japan and Germany (8 per 100,000), and 
indeed, the rest of the developed world (FARS; Statistisches Bundesamt; World Health 
Organization, 2004). In short, US safety performance in terms of fatalities per capita64 
has fallen dramatically behind its international counterparts, a finding that has led many 
in the transportation community to begin fundamentally rethinking the current approach 
to addressing transportation system safety (FHWA, 2001; 2003a; 2003b). 
                                                 
64 Contemporary designers might argue that US drivers nevertheless drive more miles per year than their 
European counterparts. While this may be true, it overlooks the gruesome fact that more people per year are 
getting killed as a consequence of their travel activity. Asserting that US drivers travel more miles assumes 
that there is some benefit associated with their doing so. Yet few drivers drive for pleasure; instead, longer-
distance travel is necessitated by the physical design of cities and regions in the United States. This travel 
cannot be regarded as an optional luxury that a driver could elect to forego, but as an activity that is 
mandated through design. Stating that US drivers travel more miles is little more than a reflection of the 
fact that U.S. cities and regions have less accessibility and fewer modal options than their international 
counterparts, thereby forcing US citizens to travel more using a transportation mode that increases their 
likelihood of being killed or injured. 
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 Unlike designers in the United States, European designers have not embraced the 
passive safety philosophy (Gladwell, 2001). Instead, European designers use an 
“environmental reference speed” when designing a roadway, beginning the design 
process by tightly specifying the appropriate operating speed of a roadway, and then 
using this intended operating speed as the roadway’s design speed, providing posted 
speed limits that match (Lamm, Psarianos and Mailender, 1999; FHWA, 2001). 
Roadways are thus designed to be self-explaining and self-enforcing, conveying a single 
and consistent message to the driver on safe operating behavior.  
Further, European designers view high-speed driving as being incompatible with 
the safe operation of many urban roadways.  For all streets with any concentration of 
roadside development or anticipated pedestrian activity, design speeds are severely 
restricted, rarely exceeding 50 km/h (30 mph).65 As a 2001 FHWA scan of European 
design practice concluded: 
 [European] countries have very high safety goals (ranging from zero fatalities to 
reduction of more than 40 percent for all crashes) that guide the design approach and 
philosophy. To achieve these goals, planners are willing to provide roadways that self-
enforce speed reductions, potentially increase levels of congestion and promote 
alternative forms of transportation. This approach contrasts with the U.S. design 
philosophy, in which wider roads are deemed safer, there is a heavier reliance on signs to 
                                                 
65 Note that the highest design speed regarded as appropriate for the equivalent of an arterial roadway in a 
European city (30 mph) is also the minimum design speed recommended for an arterial roadway under the 
US functional classification system.  
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communicate the intended message, and there is a lower tolerance for congestion and 
speed reduction (p. viii). 
  
The European approach is achievable because designers explicitly recognize that 
a roadway’s environmental context plays a key role in determining its safe design and 
operation. German designers, for example, use a 30-celled functional classification 
system that accounts for not only mobility and access, but also variations in a roadway’s 
design environment and the needs of a diverse set of user groups (See Figure 7-6). Thus, 
practicing designers are provided with clear guidance on the safe and appropriate design 
of roadways in a range of physical and environmental contexts.  
Under the German classification system, the design solution used for Orange 
Blossom Trail would have either have been prevented through the use of a lower design 
speed (Class C IV – 20-25 mph), or else explicitly flagged as being problematic (Class C 
II). Further, German designers have placed no prohibitions against the use of livable 
street treatments on “arterials” in central business districts because they recognize that 
these designs encourage safe operating behavior. Indeed, the characteristics of the built 
environment in locations where urban advocates encourage the use of livable street 
treatments would lead German designers to naturally classify these roadways as 
belonging to category C III, which has a design speed of 20-30 mph – or roughly the 
design speed currently used for US livable street treatments. Stated another way, the 
German system openly recognizes that livable street treatments are highly desirable on 
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roadways located in central business districts and community main streets, an assertion 
that is supported by the existing evidence on their safety performance.   
 
Figure 7-6: German Functional Classification System (Source: Lamm et. al., 1999) 
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Unlike the coarse, two-context framework provided under the US functional 
classification system, the German framework provides designers with meaningful design 
specifications that relate specific design values to specific design contexts. By so doing, 
German designers are able to design roadways that are not only more appropriate for their 
respective design contexts, but also markedly safer. Indeed, a citizen on the United States 
is almost twice as likely to be killed in a transportation-related crash than a resident of 
Germany, with the United States having roughly 15 fatalities per 100,000 population in 
2002, compared to 8 per 100,000 in Germany (Source: FARS; Statistisches Bundesamt). 
In short, the German system encourages designs that are both safe and livable because it 
recognizes that safety and livability are often compatible design objectives. 
 
A Positive Approach to Roadway Design 
  The idea that safety can be addressed by focusing on a driver’s perception of risk, 
rather than relying on passive engineering principles, is not without precedent in the US 
engineering community. Two important by-products of the passive safety approach are 
the related concepts of positive guidance and driver expectancy, which first emerged in 
the Appendix to the second edition of AASHTO’s Highway Design and Operational 
Practices Related to Highway Safety (1974) as a means to address crashes associated 
with narrow bridges. While emphasizing that the consistent66 application of freeway 
                                                 
66 Design consistency, a term often used by designers to discuss how they address safety through design, 
also emerged in the 1974 guide, which states: “consistency in design standards is desirable on any section 
of road, because problem locations are generally at the point where minimum design treatment is used (p. 
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standards is the preferred solution for addressing safety at narrow bridges, the guide 
remarks that “it would take years and billions of dollars to effect such a program” (p. 83).   
In an attempt to satisfice a lower-cost, more implementable solution, the guidance 
proposes that “[h]ighway safety can be considerably improved by restructuring the 
driver’s expectancies so that he is prepared for the narrow bridge situation [and] the 
narrowing of the shoulder and/or roadside…” (p. 83). The guidance then proceeds to 
detail how to adequately sign and mark the approach to the “restricted” roadside 
condition of a narrow bridge.  
What distinguishes this approach from contemporary passive safety practices is 
that, rather than attempting to address safety through “fail-safe” design, it is instead 
focused on a driver’s risk perception. Under the design scenarios where positive guidance 
is warranted (e.g., locations with a restricted roadside environment), the objective is to 
increase the driver’s awareness of the forthcoming hazard to encourage them to adopt 
behaviors that will reduce their likelihood of being involved in a crash. To date, positive 
guidance has focused largely on the use of pavement markings and signs to convey safety 
information, and there has been relatively little advancement in this area since 1990, 
when the most recent edition of FHWA’s A Users Guide to Positive Guidance was 
published.67 Nevertheless, it may be time to resurrect this concept, particularly as it may 
relate to the physical design of highways and streets.  
                                                                                                                                                 
15). Restated another way, design consistency, as it was originally conceived, encourages the consistent 
adoption of high design values.   
67 In the 1994 and 2001 editions of the AASHTO’s Green Book, the sections dealing with these subjects 
contain no data, nor has a word been changed. 
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The empirical evidence on urban roadway design suggests that the principles of 
positive guidance may be highly-applicable to the geometric design of roadways – not 
just signs and pavement markings. Thus, a positive approach to design, like positive 
guidance, focuses on the needs and abilities of roadway users to enhance a roadway’s 
safety. In the case of positive design, this indicates that the safe and appropriate design of 
a roadway should be linked to a roadway’s environmental context, which in turn 
determines the types of uses and users that a roadway must serve. A design is successful 
to the extent that the roadway’s design communicates information on appropriate 
behavior to the roadway user, thereby providing them with the information they need to 
avoid being involved in a crash.  
Towards a Comprehensive Model of Road Safety 
Moving beyond design engineering specifically, and considering the subject of 
transportation safety more broadly, a positive approach to road safety provides a means 
for comprehensively evaluating a full-suite of transportation safety solutions. Currently 
there is a professional divide between those strategies that seek to enhance safety by 
addressing driver behavior, and those that attempt to enhance safety through roadway 
design (Dumbaugh, Meyer, and Washington, 2004). What is needed is a comprehensive 
approach to transportation safety that can fully account for the broad array of behavioral 
and design strategies that can enhance a roadway’s safety performance. Figure 7-7, 









 The positive model of road safety depicted in Figure 7-1 is centered on a driver’s 
target risk, or the level of risk that a driver uses as a threshold value during the course of 
their driving activity. As discussed in Wilde (1994), all activities involve some non-zero 
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 179 
activity.68 Once an individual elects to undertake an activity, such as driving, their target 
risk level thus directs their subsequent behavior, with the objective of the being not 
simply to minimize risk, but to maximize the benefits derived from an activity without 
exceeding their target risk threshold.  
 
Driver-Related Factors 
Four major driver-related factors function as inputs into a driver’s level of target 
risk. First, education on driving hazards can shape drivers’ target risk levels by increasing 
their awareness of their potential exposure to a crash or injury. Driver education 
programs often take the form of specific courses intended to provide instruction on safe 
driving behavior, such as those often offered in high schools or state-funded “traffic 
schools.” In these cases, the educational objective is to increase a driver’s knowledge and 
awareness of the potential hazards of driving, as well as to provide instruction on the 
types of driving behavior that will help minimize his or her exposure to harm. A second 
common educational approach is embodied by national advertising campaigns, such as 
those on the risk associated with driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In this 
case, the educational objective is targeted towards increasing a driver’s perception of the 
risk associated with this activity in the hopes of encouraging them to forego the activity.   
                                                 
68 Where an activity is perceived as exceeding an individual’s target risk level, the individual will forego 
the activity altogether if it is possible to do so. This is readily evidenced by the way elderly drivers change 
their driving activities as their vision and motor abilities decline. For example, many elderly drivers avoid 
higher-speed routes such as Interstates due to the perception that they can no longer safely drive under 
these conditions.  
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Previous driving experience likewise shapes target risk. With greater driving 
experience, individuals develop subjective assessments of the risks associated with 
driving, which in turn directs their behavior. Generally speaking, one expects that risk 
tolerance declines as individuals age, which is evidenced in the fact that the number of 
people involved in crashes declines logarithmically with age (see Figure 2-1). 
Nevertheless, there may be exceptions to this rule, such when individuals repeatedly 
drive while under the influence of alcohol without consequence. Based on such 
experience, one may begin to believe that the risk associated with this behavior is 
overstated, and modify his or her behavior accordingly (Van Elslande and Faucher-
Alberton, 1997). 
Target risk levels may also vary as a result of individual characteristics. 
Individual characteristics can include demographic factors, such as the higher-risk 
behavior exhibited by young males,69 but may also be influenced by psychological 
characteristics and personality types as well. For example, “Type A” personalities may be 
more aggressive about accomplishing their travel objectives than other personality types. 
Likewise, many individuals may be psychologically-predisposed towards higher risk 
behavior due to decreased concern about harm or injury, or an overestimation of their 
driving abilities.   
                                                 
69 The reasons for higher-risk behavior among young males appears to be biological. Research in the area 
of developmental psychology, for example, suggests that the portions of the brain the relate to executive-
level control (the frontal lobe), and thus risk-assessment and behavior, do not fully develop until an 
individual has passed through their teenage years (National Institute of Mental Health [NIMH], 2003).  
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Finally, motivation is also an important factor that shapes an individual’s level of 
acceptable risk. When an individual has an important travel objective to accomplish, such 
as being on-time for work, he or she may be willing to accept higher levels of short-term 
risk than under normal, less time-constrained occasions. Alternatively, the presence of a 
child or loved one in the vehicle may possibly reduce a driver’s target risk level out of 
concern for the safety of the passenger.  
 
Driving Behavior 
Collectively, these driver-related factors shape a driver’s level of target risk, 
which in turn directs his or her driving behavior. Under the framework presented in 
Figure 7-1, driving behavior is treated as a dynamic process that involves vehicle 
operation, driving experience, and subjective sense of security. With an individual’s 
target risk functioning as a static threshold against which driving behavior is based, an 
individual determines an acceptable operating speed, lane placement, and position in 
relation to other vehicles or roadway features. The adequacy of vehicle operation is 
determined through the individual’s driving experience, which is a combination of a 
driver’s comfort with his or her current vehicle operation, the degree of control he or she 
has over the vehicle, as well as the presence of any possible conflicts with other vehicles 
and/or roadway hazards. This driving experience thus provides the driver with a sense of 
security, or a perceived likelihood of being involved in a hazard or injury. Security thus 
serves as a feedback loop which is used to adjust vehicle operation. Under a positive 
framework, driving behavior is a dynamic process that may change based on variations in 
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the roadway environment, traffic conditions, or a driver’s perception of their exposure to 
harm.  
 
Safety and the “3 E’s” 
Finally, a positive model of road safety treats safety as an outcome of driver-
related factors, target risk, and driving behavior, and can be affected by changes in any of 
the intervening variables. This is a complete model of safety that fully accounts for the “3 
E’s” of traffic safety – education, enforcement and engineering. As discussed previously, 
driver education programs can influence drivers’ levels of target risk, and thus serves as 
an important input that directs their driving behavior. Many of the activities currently 
carried out under the section 402 program strive to address safety through education and 
indeed, prior to the 1960s, driver education was viewed as the central strategy for 
enhancing road safety (Gladwell, 2001) 
Traffic law enforcement, on the other hand, may relate to both driver-related 
factors, as well as security. From a driver-related perspective, traffic law enforcement 
may impact a driver’s motivation. Traffic enforcement programs that levy points against 
a driver’s license can reduce a driver’s acceptable risk level; increased points against a 
license can result in the negative effects of increased insurance penalties, as well as the 
possible loss of one’s license. Thus, as points accrue, the driver is provided with 
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increased motivation to minimize their likelihood of receiving an additional motor-
vehicle citation.70  
Traffic enforcement may likewise impact a driver’s level of security. The 
possibility of receiving a traffic citation is treated as a hazard associated with a roadway; 
where traffic enforcement is known or suspected, drivers will adjust their behavior to 
minimize their likelihood of being ticketed. A common example of this is the rapid 
braking movements one observes when vehicles spot a police vehicle parked on the side 
of a freeway.71  
Finally, such a model allows strategies that attempt to address safety through 
design engineering to be meaningfully considered as part of a broad suite of 
transportation safety solutions. As discussed in this study, the design of a roadway has a 
profound influence on a driver’s perception of risk (i.e., security), and their subsequent 
driving behavior. By designing a roadway to provide drivers with clear instruction on the 
appropriate operating behavior within a specific design context, it is possible to 
substantially reduce and even eliminate systematic error, which is a product of a driver’s 
operating behavior.   
                                                 
70 The issue of traffic enforcement and motivation also shapes a number of practices common in the 
trucking and freight industry. For example, overlimit freight vehicles regularly bypass known highway 
checkpoints to avoid weight violation citations. Further, with mandatory laws restricting the number of 
hours that a trucker may drive during a single shift and week, many truckers keep two logs of their driving 
activity – one reporting their actual mileage (truckers are often paid by the mile), and a second, “doctored” 
travel log that under-reports their actual driving activity, which is used solely in the event that a trucker is 
stopped by a police officer and forced to account for this or her travel (O’Neill, 2004).  
71 Note that the rapid braking movements associated with a driver’s awareness of a police vehicle results in 
dramatic speed differentials between vehicles. Thus, the presence of a police vehicle may actually increase 
the possibility of a rear-end collision as the lead vehicles in a speeding platoon will rapidly decelerate to a 
roadway’s posted speed. Vehicles that are following must then likewise rapidly decelerate to account for 
the reduction in the offset to the lead vehicle. 
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Implications for US Design Practice  
While a positive approach to design represents a fundamental shift in the core 
assumptions of modern design practice, it is not a wholesale repudiation of passive safety 
principles. There are clearly conditions where high speed, forgiving design practices are 
warranted: the safety performance of the Interstate system72 provides an immediate 
example of this. But because a certain set of design solutions are appropriate to the design 
of freeways and Interstates does not mean that they are also appropriate for all other 
roadways as well. Yet this is the assumption that is currently made by contemporary 
design practice. 
And thus the problem with passive safety. Passive safety is a design paradigm 
derived from limited observations of Interstates and high-speed rural arterials, and has 
been subjected to very little empirical testing for its appropriateness in other design 
contexts. Yet, as currently embodied in design guidance, it is presumed to be a complete 
theory of roadway design, in spite of a growing body of contradicting empirical evidence. 
Common sense suggests that it is unreasonable to assume that design practices 
appropriate for high-speed roadways that exclude non-motorists and do not to provide 
land access are also appropriate for all other roadway types. Nevertheless, contemporary 
roadside design practice is based on exactly this assumption. 
                                                 
72 It is worth observing that the basis for the US Interstate system is the German Autobahn (Ambrose, 
1990), which does not use posted speed limits. Since the Autobahn is designed for high-speed travel, it 
allows high-speed travel. The only criterion applied to travel on the Autobahn is behavioral – vehicles may 
only pass on the left. As such, it creates an environment where travel is predictable and safe. 
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What this study adds to the subject of roadway design and safety is a framework 
for understanding the already-existing empirical evidence. Currently, the wide array of 
safety “anomalies” have been ignored by US design practice, as has any meaningful 
consideration of driver behavior (Kannelaidis, 1996). Yet when one examines the subject 
of road safety as a function of driver behavior, the empirical evidence ceases to be 
anomalous, and instead reorganizes itself into a meaningful whole.  
 So what are the negative implications of incorporating a positive approach to 
design in the US design context? From a practical perspective, the answer is “none.” 
Such a framework absorbs the coarse functional classification system used by US 
designers, and provides it with greater detail that better relates the design of specific 
roadways to their appropriate contexts and uses. It is important to reiterate that this 
framework does not prohibit the design of high-speed roadways. Orienting design around 
human behavior, rather than motor vehicle operations, simply provides clear criteria for 
determining when, and under what contexts, such design applications may be most 
appropriate.   
The only significant implication of this approach is that it will require designers to 
disinvest themselves of the blanket use of passive safety principles, as well as the 
erroneous assertion that “safety” and “efficiency” are necessarily compatible design 
objectives. In exchange, a behavior-based approach provides a means for not only 
enhancing safety, but a means for enhancing the livability as well. In short, it provides a 
basis for designing roadways that are safer, more livable, and more readily acceptable to 




SAFE STREETS, LIVABLE STREETS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
  This dissertation began as an attempt to understand the safety effects of livable 
streetscape treatments in urban environments. Specifically, it was interested in the degree 
to which the placement of aesthetic roadside features adjacent to the vehicle travelway 
would decrease a roadway’s safety performance. Yet an interesting finding that emerged 
in the existing literature on urban roadside safety, and confirmed through an independent 
analysis conducted as part of this research effort, was that recommended practices 
regarding the design of “safe” roadsides were not meaningfully related to a roadway’s 
actual safety performance, particularly in urban areas. Further, livable street treatments, 
which are conventionally regarded as being detrimental to safety because they are 
“unforgiving” to errors, were found to substantially enhance safety. Indeed, during the 5-
year period for which they were examined, not a single injurious roadside crash 
occurred on any of the livable streets considered in this study.  
 
The Passive Safety Paradigm 
Because of the radical inconsistency between what is asserted in contemporary 
design guidance (and perpetuated through transportation design courses), and that which 
one can reasonably conclude from observations of crash performance, this dissertation 
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further sought to understand why design guidance proved to be so incongruent with the 
existing empirical evidence on roadside safety. Thus, this study also included an 
historical analysis that sought to better understand the basis for the current assumptions 
on the relationship between design and safety.  
The current approach to addressing safety through design, termed passive safety 
by this study, emerged out of the broader transportation safety movement that occurred in 
the mid-1960s. This approach assumes that drivers are prone to error, and that driver 
errors cannot be prevented through a roadway’s design. Nevertheless, through the use of 
high, “forgiving” design values, this approach assumes that it is possible to ensure that 
drivers are not injured when they commit an error. Thus, by designing a roadway to be 
safe for a worst-case-scenario driving event, such as a vehicle leaving the travelway at a 
high speed, this approach assumes that an adequate level of safety can be designed into 
the roadway.  
The low rates of crashes observed on the Interstate system compared to other 
roadway classes seemed to confirm this theory. Since Interstates used high design values, 
and also reported low rates of crashes, it seemed logical to infer that use of high design 
values were responsible for the low rates of crashes. Thus, it was assumed that the 
application of “forgiving,” high-speed design practices would likewise enhance the safety 
of other roadway types as well. Such a finding further led to an appealing conclusion, one 
currently embodied in the goal statements of many transportation agencies, which is that 
a high-speed, “efficient” roadway is also a “safe” one. Thus, the provision of a “safe and 
efficient transportation system” is often listed as a single, all-inclusive design goal.  
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Driving Behavior and Systematic Error  
The inference that higher, more “forgiving” design values are responsible for the 
Interstate system’s safety performance overlooks some of the other characteristics of the 
Interstate system, characteristics that better explain its safety performance than does its 
use of high design values. First, the Interstate system legally prohibits use by non-
motorized travelers, thus limiting its use to a single user class – motorists. Further, and 
perhaps more importantly, access to the system is severely restricted. Interstate highways 
do not provide direct land use access, and severely restrict system access through the use 
of on- and off-ramps designed to account for vehicle acceleration and deceleration. Thus, 
the operating characteristics of the Interstate system are radically unlike the operating 
characteristics of most non-Interstate urban roadways.  
 Passive safety practices do not account for a roadway’s design and environmental 
contexts, contexts that have a profound influence on roadway’s operating characteristics. 
Instead, the assumption is that since the use of high design values is appropriate for 
Interstate highways, they must therefore also be appropriate for all other roadways as 
well. Such an assertion is possible only by assuming that a crash is the product of 
random, purely unpreventable error on the part of the driver. In other words, passive 
safety assumes that the driver is singularly responsible for the behavior that resulted in a 
crash, and that the design of the roadway has little influence on the operating behavior 
that led to the crash. 
Yet one examining roadside crashes in urban environments cannot conclude that 
these crashes are simply the result of purely random and unpreventable errors on the part 
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of the driver. Instead, there was a clearly discernible pattern to these crashes, a pattern 
that appears to be strongly influenced by a roadway’s design. Between 65-83% of all 
fixed-objects involved in a roadside crash are located behind a driveway or intersection, 
rather than at random locations located along the roadway. The behavioral pattern that 
seems to produce these crashes is that drivers are attempting to negotiate turns into 
driveways and intersections at the high-speeds designed into the main arterial, a 
maneuver that causes them to leave the travelway at the back-end of the driveway or 
intersection. When an object is present at this location, a fixed-object crash occurs.  
Were such events purely random, one would expect them to occur randomly 
along the length of a roadway, with the majority occurring at midblock locations since 
the majority of a roadway’s length does not include driveways or intersections. The fact 
that the majority of these crashes are located at a very specific location along a roadway  
suggests that there is a systematic pattern to roadside crashes. Systematic error, as 
defined in this study, occurs when there is a mismatch between what a roadway user 
perceives as safe operating behavior, and the behavior actually required to safely use the 
roadway. In the case of urban roadside crashes, systematic error appears to be the direct 
result of the use of “forgiving” design values along arterial roadways, which encourages 
drivers to negotiate turns at higher-than-appropriate speeds.  
Passive safety does not account for systematic error. Instead, this approach simply 
assumes that the further back a roadside object is set from the travelway, the lower the 
probability of a fixed-object crash. Yet the roadside object most likely to be involved in a 
roadside crash is often not that which is closest to the travelway, but that which is located 
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behind a driveway or intersection. In many cases, designs aimed at enhancing safety by 
increasing the offset between an arterial thoroughfare and the nearest roadside fixed 
object can result in the placement of a roadside hazard in the location where it is most 
likely to be struck. As discussed in Chapter 7, roadside safety audits based on passive 
safety assumptions will often do little to address the actual hazards of urban roadways.  
 The use of “forgiving” designs along arterial roadways where there are a large 
number of intersecting streets, or where land access is a major use of the roadway, can 
further result in drivers traveling at speeds that limit their ability to respond to the vehicle 
and pedestrian hazards that naturally occur in these environments. As illustrated by the 
Orange Blossom Trail example, the use of conventional arterial design applications in 
urbanized environments are not only undesirable from a livability perspective, but also 
from a safety perspective. Such designs increase the speed differentials between vehicles, 
resulting in unnecessarily high numbers of rear-end and sideswipe collisions.  
Alternatively, the livable street designs, which provide comparable or even better 
land use access than Orange Blossom Trail using a much-less forgiving design, report 
dramatically fewer roadside and midblock crashes – 4 times fewer injurious midblock 
crashes per vehicle mile traveled, on average, and exactly no injurious roadside crashes. 
To the extent to which safety is measured not by hypothetical passive safety principles, 
but by crash frequency and severity, there can be little doubt that livable street designs 
are markedly safer in this design context.  
The ability of livable streets to perform similar functions while reporting 
markedly fewer crashes and injuries is a result of the fact that these designs eliminate the 
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systematic error that produces crashes and injuries – namely, the high operating speeds, 
that produce speed differentials between vehicles and dangerous turning maneuvers. In 
short, under design conditions where land access is a major function of a roadway, or 
where there are frequent driveways and intersections, lower-speed, less-“forgiving” 
designs can substantially enhance a roadway’s safety.  
  
A Positive Approach to Roadway Design 
  To better address the current approach to addressing transportation system safety, 
this dissertation proposes a new approach to roadway design that better accounts for the 
existing empirical evidence. The positive model of road safety presented in Chapter 7 is 
derived from both the available empirical evidence on crash performance, as well as more 
recent developments in the areas of driver psychology and behavior. Unlike passive 
safety, however, this model is centered on the way drivers read and interpret a roadway, 
and adapt their behavior as a result.  
 Rather than beginning from the erroneous assertion that there is a single “fail-
safe” design that can be applied in all design contexts, a positive model of roadway safety 
is instead centered on a system user’s “target risk.” Target risk is a psychological concept 
that asserts that all individuals have a certain level of risk that they are willing to accept 
in exchange for the ability to engage in a particular activity. An individual’s target risk 
level is thus a static threshold, psychologically-determined, that influences how an 
individual will behave. The concept of target risk, derived from risk homeostasis theory, 
asserts that an individual will seek to maximize the benefit derived from a particular 
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behavior or activity up to the point where doing so exceeds the level of risk that they are 
willing to accept in exchange for the ability to engage in the activity. With respect to 
driving, risk homeostasis theory asserts that drivers will increase their operating speeds 
(thereby reducing travel times) until the relative hazard of traveling at higher speeds 
exceeds the risk they are willing to accept for doing so. A driver’s target risk level thus 
informs their subsequent driving behavior, which under the positive model of roadway 
safety is a combination of vehicle operation, driving experience, and security, or a 
driver’s perception of harm or hazard. Thus, driving behavior is a dynamic process that 
can be influenced by a driver’s relative target risk level, his or her level of comfort with 
operating a vehicle under various design conditions, and his or her awareness or 
perception of a potential roadway hazard.  
 Because it is derived from an understanding of the relationship between driver 
behavior and crash performance, it is better able to explain the existing empirical 
evidence on safety than is the passive approach. The safety performance of Interstate 
highways, for example, can be understood in that these roadways both present the 
appearance that higher-speed driving is safe, and because the overall context and 
operating conditions of these roadways are appropriate for higher-speed travel. In other 
words, the driver’s perception of the relative hazard associated with higher-speed travel is 
meaningfully linked to the actual risk associated with such travel under the design and 
environmental conditions of the Interstate system. Likewise, livable streets address safety 
in highly-urbanized environments since they inform drivers that higher-speed travel is 
hazardous, resulting in drivers adopting lower, more contextually-appropriate operating 
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speeds. Again, the perception of hazard is well-matched to the actual hazards present in 
the roadway’s environment.  
 Conversely, the design of a roadway like Orange Blossom Trail, which is 
representative of many suburban roadways in the United States, is not well-matched to its 
environmental context. The design of Orange Blossom Trail gives drivers a false illusion 
of being able to safely travel at high speeds, resulting in increased rates of crashes and 
injuries. In this case, the roadway is designed to be “forgiving” to high-speed travel, 
resulting in increased operating speeds. Yet the problem that emerges is that under the 
roadway’s design condition, high-speed travel will increase a driver’s probability of 
being involved in a crash, or, in other words, that it increases the likelihood of systematic 
error.  
 The positive model of road safety addresses systematic error by relating a 
roadway’s design to its appropriate use, with the design objective being to provide drivers 
and other roadway users with clear and consistent information on safe operating 
behavior. As discussed in Chapter 7, a roadway’s safety performance can be understood 
as a communicative event between a roadway designer and a roadway user. Where 
designs are successful at providing roadway users with correct information on safe 
operating behavior, a roadway’s safety will be enhanced. When inaccurate or false 
expectations are communicated by a roadway, systematic errors occur.  
 There are multiple advantages of the positive model over the contemporary 
passive safety approach. First, and most importantly, it meaningfully accounts for the 
actual crash performance one observes on real-world roadways.  The positive model is an 
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empirically-driven approach to addressing safety that adequately explains the variations 
in crash performance that one observes for a wide variety of individual roadways. 
Further, because it understands safety as a function of driver behavior, it is a complete 
approach to safety that fully accounts for the 3 “Es” of traffic safety – education, 
enforcement and engineering. As such, it provides a comprehensive framework for 
addressing safety that allows practitioners from a host of safety-related disciplines to 
consider the comparative benefits of a wide array of safety strategies. By defining safety 
as a function of behavior, it is thus possible to more meaningfully understand the nature 
of specific safety problems, as well as to link these problems with the types of solutions 
that are best able to address them.  
 
Future Research  
This study has examined the history and literature on roadside safety as it relates 
to the design of urban roadways, identified current deficiencies regarding the design of 
roadways in urban environments, and has outlined a viable alternative that may be better 
able to balance the twin goals of safety and livability. Yet much remains to be done. 
There is a critical need to enhance professional knowledge on the safe design of non-
freeway streets. Researchers must move beyond simply transferring the findings from one 
environment (rural) or one roadway class (principal arterial) to all others, and to begin 
systematically developing a comprehensive language of design that can be used to 
relate specific design applications to their appropriate design contexts. The development 
of such an approach will require researchers to move beyond the use of hypothetical 
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design scenarios, and begin to meaningfully examine how a roadway’s design relates to 
its environmental and developmental context, as well as how the combination of design 
and environment encourage or prevent the behaviors that result in crashes. 
While Chapter 7 has synthesized the current knowledge in the areas of road 
safety, psychology, and behavior to provide a theoretical framework for such an 
approach, and has presented the German functional classification system as a basis for 
better linking a roadway’s design to its developmental context and safety performance, 
this should be viewed as a point-of-departure, rather than an end point. To date, there 
have been relatively few studies that have explicitly examined how the combination of a 
roadway’s geometric design and environmental context influences a driver’s expectations 
on safe operating behavior, or the role that such relationships may have on a roadway’s 
safety performance.  
Further, this dissertation has focused principally on one crash type – roadside 
fixed-object crashes – and has provided only a limited examination into multiple-vehicle 
and vehicle-pedestrian crashes. Additional research is needed into each crash type to 
better understand their unique behavioral characteristics, which are currently assumed, 
rather than known. As this study has demonstrated, broad quantitative analyses must be 
combined with detailed site investigations of actual crash locations; the over-reliance on 
aggregate data sets is undoubtedly a major reason why there has been little meaningful 
advancement in the professional approach to addressing safety during the last 40 years.  
More thoroughly examining crashes in a variety of design environments will 
provide much-needed information on safety in the short-term. Yet over the longer-term, 
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there is a clear need to more fully understand the unique behavioral patterns that result in 
crashes and injuries. To develop such an understanding, new research approaches are 
needed. The sections below detail several research strategies that will be able to supply 
such information.  
Examining Behavioral Schemata and Scripts 
As discussed previously, systematic error occurs when there is a disconnect 
between a driver’s expectations on safe operating behavior, and the actual behavior 
necessary to minimize their exposure to injury or harm. Yet little is currently known 
about how a roadway’s design can induce specific expectations, whether correct or 
incorrect, or indeed, even what these expectations may be. To better advance design 
practice, research into the schemata and scripts used by drivers to determine their 
operating behavior is needed.  
 
Examining Schemata 
A straightforward study that would advance professional understanding of the 
schemata drivers associate with particular design environments would be to present 
individuals with images depicting specific geometric designs in a range of design 
environments, and then have them report the types of hazards they expect to be 
associated with each. To corroborate the respondent’s expectations with actual hazards, 
as well as to evaluate their relationship to a roadway’s actual crash performance, the 
images should depict real-world roadways where crash performance and environmental 
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factors are known. For each image, the survey respondent can be provided with a fixed 
amount of time (as a hypothetical starting point, 3 seconds, which would permit three 300 
ms revolutions of the four fixation points used in navigation), after which the respondent 
is asked about his or her expectancies regarding certain hazards. Table 8-1, below, lists 
several features that may be included in such a study. 
 
Table 8-1: Elements Included in Schemata-Recognition Study 
Do You Expect… Yes No 
Trees adjacent to the travelway   
Light posts adjacent to the travelway   
Utility poles adjacent to the travelway   
Bicyclists along the roadway   
Pedestrians along the roadway   
Vehicles turning into a driveway   
Vehicles existing a driveway   
Vehicles present in an adjacent lane   
Vehicles present in the opposing direction   
The presence of a traffic signal   
The presence of a stop sign   
  
As shown in Table 8-2, each response will fall into one of four categories, which 
can then be used to determine the ability of a roadway to effectively communicate 
information on potential hazards, as well as the efficiency with which it does so. Where 
respondents are able to accurately anticipate features that are present along a road, then 
the roadway can be regarded as being effective at communicating necessary information. 
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Yet it is important to recognize that there are limits to the amount of external information 
that an individual can cognitively process. As discussed in Dewar, Olsen, and Alexander 
(2002), roadway safety can often be enhanced by limiting a driver’s need to process 
unnecessary external information. Thus, a roadway can be said to be efficient at 
communicating information if drivers are not expecting hazards that are not present. 
Stated another way, a roadway that is communicatively efficient is one that allows drivers 
to focus exclusively on the actual hazards of a roadway. 
 
Table 8-2: Road Hazards, Road Schemata and Driver Expectancy 
 Present  Not Present  
Expected Effective Type B Error 
Unexpected Type A Error Efficient 
 
Errors occur when a driver’s expectancies do not match the actual hazards of a 
roadway. Here, error is categorized into two types. Type A error is communicative error, 
where a roadway fails to induce expectations on the part of the driver for hazards that are, 
in fact, present. Type A error would seem to be the type of error that most directly relates 
to a driver’s probability of being involved in a crash. Because a driver does not anticipate 
a particular type of hazard in the observed environment, he or she is not prepared to 
engage in preventative behaviors to avoid the hazard. 
 Type B error is processing error, where a roadway encourages the driver to 
actively search for hazards that are not present. Processing error can result in crashes 
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since it distracts a driver’s attention away from other features of the roadway, thereby 
limiting the amount of attention that can be directed towards the identification of more 
relevant roadway features.  
Responses can then be aggregated to determine the percentage of respondents 
correctly identifying the hazards associated with each roadway, which can then be used 
as independent variables to explain the degree to which correct expectations are 
associated with a roadway’s actual crash performance. Where there is a great degree of 
consistency in the expectations across the sampled population, and where such 
expectancies are meaningfully related to an roadway’s safety performance, the individual 
roadway can be regarded as a “type” that may be useful as a specific roadway class for 
future design efforts.  
Where a representative cross-section of the population is used in such an analysis, 
it further permits researchers to determine if expectancies vary for specific 
subpopulations. For example, while most roadway users may be able to derive correct 
expectations from a particular roadway, it is possible that certain subpopulations, such as 
young males, may have incorrect expectations, thus being more likely to be involved in a 
crash. The expectations of the specific subpopulation can then be examined against its 
proportional representation in crashes to determine the degree to which such expectations 
place them at increased risk of hazard or harm. If incorrect expectancies do, in fact, 




It is important to note that “safety strategies” do not necessarily equate to “design 
changes.” Where a roadway is relatively safe for most drivers, strategies aimed at better 
educating members of the at-risk subpopulation about the hazards associated with 
specific environments may be more effective, particularly in the short-term, than a 
substantive redesign. Information on the driver and safety performance of specific 
populations can provide safety professionals with the information needed to target 
specific safety countermeasures to specific safety needs.  
 
 Identifying Scripts 
Scripts relate to the behavioral patterns adopted by drivers based on their 
expectations regarding safe and appropriate operating behavior. This dissertation has 
found that many urban run-off-roadway events appear to be precipitated by behavioral 
scripts that encourage high-speed turning maneuvers, while such events are prevented 
when a roadway’s design encourages scripts that promote lower-speed operating 
behavior. While such behavioral descriptions explain observations of crash performance, 
they do not provide meaningful information on the specific characteristics of driver 
behavior. What, specifically, are the objects or features that encourage appropriate 
behavioral scripts? Do certain features, more than others, result in the adoption of 
appropriate scripts, and do the presence or absence of others result in inappropriate 
behavioral scripts? The answers to these questions are currently unknown. 
Traditionally, it has been difficult to examine the behavior of drivers under 
varying real-world design environments, both because there are ethical concerns about 
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placing real drivers in potentially hazardous environments, as well as because of the 
absence of a meaningful framework on which to measure driving performance. 
Nevertheless, recent technological advancements increasingly provide the means to do 
so. Advanced driving simulators, such as the National Advanced Driving Simulator 
(NADS) at the University of Iowa, enable researchers to examine driving behavior under 
increasingly realistic operating conditions. The NADS system, for example, places 
drivers in a highly realistic virtual environment, providing not only realistic simulations 
of a roadway environment, but also providing users with the physical sensation of 
acceleration, braking, and turning as well. The emergence of advanced driving 
simulators, combined with human performance monitoring technologies that track and 
record eye movements and heart rates, make it possible to examine a driver’s behavioral 
and physiological responses to changes in their operating environment. Such technologies 
thus promise to dramatically increase the professional understanding of the human 
aspects that affect a roadway’s safety performance. 
To date, driving simulators have been largely used for driver training and 
education, or else for conducting studies on the influence of alcohol and age on operating 
performance. Yet such applications, more broadly used, can also provide important new 
insights into the relationship between a roadway’s design and driver behavior as well. 
Specifically, it allows researchers to place a broad cross section of drivers into a host of 
design environments to evaluate how they adapt their operating behavior in response to 
varying design conditions. Important behavioral questions that can be answered through 
the use of driving simulators are the following: 
 
 202 
•  What are the elements of the road and roadway environment that most 
influence a driver’s choice of operating speed or other behaviors? Variables 
that can be examined through the use of simulators include: 
 Cross sectional elements 
 Presence of other roadway users (motorized and non-motorized) 
 Presence/absence of specific roadside features (both expected and 
unexpected) 
 Salience 
•  What are the objects or features on which a driver is focusing most heavily 
when navigational errors occur? 
•  How do drivers adapt their behavior to the presence of expected objects or 
features, and what are their response times? 
•  How do drivers adapt their behavior (if at all) to the presence of unexpected 
objects or features, and how do response times differ from a driver’s response 
to expected hazards? 
 
Collectively, the objective of such analyses should be to identify those areas 
where there is a high degree of behavioral consistency across broad segments of the 
population. Where there is a high degree of behavioral homogeneity, such patterns of 
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behavior can be regarded as behavioral scripts. Yet simply identifying behavioral scripts 
is not enough; scripts, by themselves may enhance safety, may have no effect on safety, 
or may even lead to a declines in safety when the script produces behaviors that increase 
errors, and thus crashes. Thus, such research should be undertaken with an eye towards 
their relationship to real-world safety performance. 
 
Linking Scripts, Schemata and Safety 
  A straightforward means for developing a linkage between scripts, schemata, and 
safety is to simulate, as accurately as possible, actual roadways for which crash 
performance is known. For example, the state routes considered in this study could be 
reasonably simulated to examine how a driver adapts his or her behavior to changes in 
the design conditions along a roadway’s length. These behavioral adaptations can then be 
compared against the specific crash performance of individual road segments to 
determine how, if at all, specific behavioral scripts may influence a roadway’s crash 
performance.  
Further, another important application would be to develop simulations of both 
high-crash and low-crash locations in various design environments, and examine the 
differences in operating behavior for each. Such a study would permit researchers to 
begin to understand the specific types of behavioral scripts that result in crashes and 
injuries, and will undoubtedly suggest important countermeasures that can be used to 
enhance safety.   
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 While such research is exciting, there is an important caveat, and one that has not 
been examined, to my knowledge. Specifically, that while driving simulators can provide 
increasingly realistic representations of the real world, are not the real world. The lack of 
meaningful consequences may have a strong influence on a driver’s operating behavior. 
Further, simulations are conducted in conditions where a driver knows he or she is being 
monitored; a respondent’s awareness of being monitored may also influence his or her 
operating behavior. Nevertheless, the development of a simulated roadway based upon 
the design of a real roadway will permit researchers to examine the degree to which 
simulated driver behavior corresponds to actual driving behavior. The observable, 
external characteristics of the actual roadway, such as its operating speed and headways 
between vehicles, can be compared with that of the simulated environment to determine 
the extent to which the two correspond. Where there is a high degree of consistency 
between the real roadway and its simulation, the simulated roadway can be viewed as a 
reasonable proxy for the actual roadway. Such an analysis is useful for not only better 
understanding driver behavior, but may also be used to enhance the quality and realism of 
driving simulators as well.  
 
Conclusion 
 At the most basic level, the major tension in the design of urban roadways does 
not appear to be a matter of balancing safety and livability. As this research has shown, 
there are many circumstances where safety and livability are mutually-supportive design 
objectives. There is currently little evidence to support the claim that livable street 
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treatments are less safe than their more conventional counterparts, and a growing body of 
evidence to suggest that, appropriately used, such designs will actually enhance a 
roadway’s safety performance.  Instead, the more basic problem is that safety and 
livability objectives are often both in direct conflict with the overall objective of mobility 
and its proxy – speed. 
  The passive approach to transportation safety began with the observation that the 
Interstate Highway System produced fewer crashes and injuries than other roadway 
classes, and attributed this safety performance to the use of higher speed, more 
“forgiving” design values. Yet it must be recognized that the safety performance of the 
Interstate system is probably better explained by the fact that these roadways physically 
restrict access, channelize vehicle movements, and limit their use to a single user type – 
motorists – than because they permit higher operating speeds.  
Conventional safety practice attempts to superimpose these high-speed, limited-
access design characteristics on other roadway types, but it is not at all clear that these 
designs are either safe or appropriate in an urban context. At the most basic level, the 
primary function of cities, and thus the streets that serve them, is to concentrate 
compatible developments and activities together and to encourage a high-degree of 
access between them, traditionally through non-motorized modes. High speed, limited-
access roadways are inherently antithetical to these purposes.  
Finally, it is important that future researchers do not lose sight of the fact that 
crashes and injuries are the dependent variables of interest in any study that attempts to 
address the subject of road safety. Regardless of the internal logic of a given theory of 
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safety – be it the passive theory currently embraced by many practicing designers, or the 
positive theory detailed in this study – such theories are valid only insofar as they are 
meaningfully related to observations of a roadway’s safety performance. Where empirical 
observations of crash performance contradict a given design theory, the empirical 
findings should prevail.  
  This study has argued that many of the safety concerns that emerge on urban 
streets result from design practices that that fail to link a roadway’s design to its 
environmental context, thereby providing motorists in urban environments with a false 
sense of security and increasing their potential exposure to crashes and injuries. It has 
further provided a theoretical framework that better accounts for existing empirical 
evidence on roadway safety, and suggested the means through which such a theory can 
be used to enhance roadway design practice. This study thus concludes with the hope that 
by better accounting for the relationship between design, driver behavior and safety, we 
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